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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Accountability 
 
A constitutional principle requiring that a person (for example, 
a Minister) exercising power over others routinely explain and 
justify conduct and decisions (“explanatory accountability”) 
and be held responsible for errors and failings. 
 
Administrative decisions Determinations about individuals taken by Ministers, 
Connétables, civil servants and other holders of public office 
exercising legal powers conferred on them by law. 
 
Administrative redress Any process that a person may be able to use to challenge an 
administrative decision, for example, making a complaint, 
appealing to a tribunal, making an application for judicial 
review to the Royal Court, or using ADR. 
 
Administrative justice An umbrella term describing the whole system from making 
administrative decisions to administrative redress, and the 
values unpinning the system (for example, fairness). 
 
Administrative Justice 
(Jersey) Law 
 
The name we give to the piece of legislation we envisage 
being used to turn many of our recommendations into law. 
Alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) 
Techniques that may be used to help parties resolve a dispute 
without a formal hearing by a tribunal, Royal Court, or the 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel. 
 
(Right of) appeal A person has a right of appeal, when a law permits a person to 
start legal proceedings within a specified time to challenge the 
correctness of an administrative decision by going to a tribunal 
or to the Royal Court. Where a tribunal hears an appeal, there 
is normally a further right of appeal (a “second appeal”) to the 
Royal Court.   
 
Appointments process 
 
The criteria and procedures used to select office-holders to 
serve as members of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel, 
tribunals, courts and other positions of authority. 
 
Bailiff 
 
The head of the judiciary in Jersey and the principal judge of 
the Royal Court. The Bailiff also has a “dual role” as the 
presiding officer of the States Assembly, though since 2000 
there have been recommendations that this should cease. 
 
Chief Minister  The head of the Government of Jersey appointed under Article 
19 of the States of Jersey Law 2005. The Chief Minister has 
specific ministerial responsibility for justice policy and 
providing resources to the justice system, including 
responsibility for safeguarding human rights and for 
strengthening democracy (P92/2013). 
 
(Jersey) Citizens’ Advice 
Bureau 
 
A charity providing independent, confidential and impartial 
advice service in Jersey. Core funding is provided by the 
Government of Jersey. In 2016, over 11,000 clients made 
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contact with CAB. The largest single issue about which clients 
sought advice in 2016 was Income Support. 
 
Clothier report 
 
The report, published in 2000, by the Review Panel on the 
Machinery of Government in Jersey, chaired by Sir Cecil 
Clothier QC. This made far-reaching recommendations, 
including the introduction of ministerial government. Some 
recommendations have not been implemented, including 
ending the dual rôle of the Bailiff and the creation of a public 
services Ombudsman. 
 
Complaint An “expression of dissatisfaction” by a person, which requires 
a response from a public body. 
 
(States of Jersey) 
Complaints Panel 
Originally established by the States Assembly in 1979, the 
Panel appointed by the States Assembly enquires into 
complaints made by people about Ministers’ decisions. It 
conducts hearings and makes non-binding recommendations 
to Ministers. 
 
Connétable (or 
Constable) 
 
Each of the Island’s 12 Parishes is headed by a Connétable, 
an elected public office with responsibility for some types of 
administrative decision-making. The 12 Connétables are by 
virtue of their office members of the States Assembly. 
 
Constitutional principles 
 
Guiding values in Jersey’s unwritten constitution, including 
accountability, the Rule of Law, and judicial independence. 
 
Customary law 
 
A source of obligations and rights in Jersey law flowing from 
the Island’s legal heritage as part of the Duchy of Normandy 
until 1204. 
 
European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) 
 
An international law protecting human rights, in force since 
1958, that applies across 48 countries in Europe. The ECHR 
was made part of Island law by the Human Rights (Jersey) 
Law 2000. 
 
Government of Jersey The term “Government of Jersey” was first used in legislation 
approved by the States Assembly in 2012 and was adopted by 
the Council of Ministers in July 2014 to refer to all-Island 
executive government. 
 
Grievances 
 
A non-technical umbrella term for complaints and legal 
disagreements. 
 
Human rights 
 
Fundamental liberties or entitlements benefiting everybody, 
which are protected by Island and international law, including 
for example the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression. 
Many human rights have legal protection under the European 
Convention of Human Rights and the Human Rights (Jersey) 
Law 2000. 
  
Human Rights (Jersey) 
Law 2000 
 
A Law passed by the States Assembly to incorporate rights 
contained in the European Convention of Human Rights into 
 Improving Administrative Redress – Topic Report 2017 | page 12 
Island law. It is closely modelled on the UK’s Human Rights 
Act 1998. 
 
Income Support 
 
Launched in 2008, Income Support is a non-contributory, 
means tested welfare benefit for low income households in 
Jersey funded from general tax revenues. From 1 October 
2017, the weekly rate is £94.85 to cover adult personal costs; 
a person may be eligible for additional components related to 
accommodation, medical and disability needs, and child care. 
In 2016, support of £72m was provided to 5,951 households. 
Income Support replaced benefits previously paid by various 
Departments and the Parish Welfare system. 
 
Internal complaints 
process 
 
The procedure that a public body has for dealing with 
complaints. 
Judicial and Legal 
Services Commission 
 
In July 2017, the Department for Community and 
Constitutional Affairs published a consultation report proposing 
the creation of a body called the Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission; its functions include appointing judges. 
 
Judicial independence 
 
The constitutional principle that judges (sitting in tribunals and 
courts) should operate – and be seen to operate – at arms’ 
length from the Government and parliament (States 
Assembly). 
 
Judicial Greffe 
 
Headed by the Judicial Greffier, this public body provides 
administrative support for the running of courts and tribunals in 
the Island. 
 
Jurats 
 
The 12 members of the Royal Court who are judges of fact in 
trials; the Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff or other legally-qualified 
presiding judge of the Royal Court is the judge on questions of 
law. Jurats are appointed by an electoral college and hold 
office until retirement at 72. Jurats hear applications for judicial 
review and administrative appeals to the Royal Court. 
 
Judicial review The procedure in the Royal Court of Jersey by which a person 
can question the legality of an administrative decision (Royal 
Court Rules, Part 16). The grounds on which review can be 
sought include “illegality”, “irrationality”, and “procedural 
impropriety”. Judicial review cannot normally be used if there 
is a right of appeal against an administrative decision. 
 
Judgment The written reasons given by a tribunal or court at the 
conclusion of a hearing explaining the outcome and reasons 
for it. 
 
Jurisdiction A legal term used to describe the remit of a tribunal or court to 
hear different kinds of cases. 
 
Mediation A form of ADR in which the mediator (a neutral third party) 
helps parties in a dispute to reach an acceptable outcome. 
Mediation normally takes place in private. 
 
 Improving Administrative Redress – Topic Report 2017 | page 13 
Ministers/ ministerial 
government 
 
Since 2006, Jersey has had a system of Ministerial 
government. Ministers are elected members of the States 
Assembly on whom legal powers are conferred to develop 
policy and carry out public administration (supported by civil 
servants). 
 
Ombudsman A public office-holder independent of government who has 
power to investigate people’s complaints and make 
recommendations to government about rectifying injustices 
causes by maladministration. 
 
Parish 
 
Jersey is divided into 12 Parishes, which have ancient 
boundaries. A Parish is headed by a Connétable and 
decisions are also made by the Assemblée Paroissiale (Parish 
Assembly).   
 
Projet de loi 
 
A proposal for a new Law, typically made by a Minister, which 
is debated by the States Assembly before receiving Royal 
Assent and being registered in the Royal Court.   
 
Public bodies (or public 
authorities) 
 
The different office-holders and organisations authorised by 
Laws to make administrative decisions. 
 
Public administration 
 
A general description for the whole system of making 
administrative decisions. 
  
Rule of Law 
 
A constitutional principle requiring people exercising power to 
do so in accordance with legal rules (for example, those set 
out in a Law passed by the States Assembly) and broader 
legal principles recognised in Jersey’s unwritten constitution. 
 
Rights of audience The legal rules about who is permitted to represent a person 
appearing in a tribunal or court. 
 
Royal Court of Jersey The Island’s principal court, operating under the Royal Court 
(Jersey) Law 1948 and the Royal Court Rules 2004. 
 
Scrutiny panel 
 
A committee of the States Assembly responsible for inquiring 
into an area of Government administration, policy, or 
legislation established under the Standing Orders of the 
States, Order 135. 
 
Social Security and 
Health Insurance 
 
A compulsory insurance scheme funded by employer and 
employee contributions and general tax revenues. The 
scheme provides old age pensions, maternity allowances, 
death grants, subsidies for GP consultation fees, and medical 
prescriptions. The introduction of “insular insurance” in 1950 
was politically controversial. 
 
States Employment 
Board 
The SEB is the employer of all public employees in Jersey. It 
is chaired by the Chief Minister, two other Ministers or 
Assistant Members and two further members of the States 
Assembly who are not Ministers. 
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States Greffe 
 
The Greffier of the States, Deputy Greffier and Assistant 
Greffiers provide advice and support to members of the States 
Assembly.  
 
States of Jersey (or 
States Assembly) 
 
The official name for the States Assembly, the Island’s 
parliament. Its elected members consist of 8 Senators, 12 
Connétables and 29 Deputies. Ministers are held to account 
through questions, debates and the work of scrutiny panels. 
 
Tribunal (administrative 
appeals tribunal). 
A judicial body established by a Law to hear appeals against 
administrative decisions.  
 
Tribunal members 
 
The people appointed to serve on a tribunal. Typically, cases 
are heard by three members. Members may be legally 
qualified, expert (e.g. medical practitioners), or lay people. 
 
Tribunal Service 
 
A section of the Judicial Greffe currently responsible for 
supporting the work of some administrative appeals tribunals 
(and the Jersey Employment and Discrimination Tribunal). 
 
User perspective The guiding principle that in designing and operating public 
services and administrative redress systems, public bodies 
should prioritise the interests and needs of citizens (rather 
than administrative convenience or tradition). The system 
should be as user friendly as possible. 
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SUMMARY OF REPORT 
In this report, the Jersey Law Commission makes a series of recommendations (see Annex A: List of 
Recommendations) designed to modernise how individuals and businesses aggrieved by administrative 
decisions can question whether a public body’s decision is correctly made and lawful. The 
recommendations will now be considered by the Government of Jersey and the States Assembly.    
Chapter 1 provides an outline of the project. We say that Jersey’s administrative justice system should 
become less complicated and more focused on the needs of people using the procedures. It is important 
that institutions and processes operate a satisfactory legal and constitutional footings. There should be 
better coordination of the different parts of the system and data should be collected to measure how well 
it is working. 
Chapter 2 focuses on overarching issues in Jersey’s administrative justice system. We recommend 
that the Chief Minister should issue guidance to public bodies about internal procedures for handling 
complaints fairly and effectively. The Chief Minister should also make an annual report to the States 
Assembly providing an overview how the system is performing, which should be scrutinised. The largest 
category of internal complaints is those relating to health and social services, which calls for further study. 
We recommend that there should be a general right to “good administration” in Jersey law, including a 
right to request reasons for decisions. 
Chapter 3 considers administrative appeals tribunals. We recommend that eight existing tribunals 
should be merged into a single new tribunal, to be called the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(JAAT). Five rights of appeal that currently go to Ministers should instead go to JAAT. More than 50 rights 
of appeal to the Royal Court, most of which are rarely if ever used, should instead go to JAAT. As in the 
current administrative appeal tribunals, the members should include legally-qualified, expert and lay 
members. They should be appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission (recently proposed 
by the Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs) and should no longer be appointed on fixed-
terms. An annual report on the work of JAAT should be published. JAAT should be run by the Judicial 
Greffe. A set of user-friendly procedures should be made, bearing in mind that most appellants will be 
individuals with no legal training. There is, however, a category of case where there is a risk – because of 
the vulnerability of the appellant or the complexity of the case – that a fair trial will not take place if the 
appellant does not have access to an affordable lawyer; we say that these appellants should be provided 
with legal advice and representation from public funds. 
Chapter 4 looks at rights of appeal to Ministers. In most situations, it is not appropriate for a politician 
to be carrying out appellate functions. We recommend that five out of six of these rights of appeal should 
be amended so that they are heard by JAAT rather than a Minister. 
Chapter 5 examines the operation of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. We conclude that the 
Complaints Panel should be replaced by an Ombudsman. If, contrary to our principal recommendation, 
the Complaints Panel is retained we outline a range of reforms that would be needed to help it function 
more effectively. 
Chapter 6 calls on the Government of Jersey to make an “in principle” decision to support next 
steps in the creation of a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman (JPSO). It would have a remit to 
investigate alleged maladministration by public bodies and to work with public bodies to ensure the 
continuous improvement in the quality of public administration. Further detailed work would be needed to 
develop options for the detailed institutional design of JPSO. 
Chapter 7 surveys the work of the Royal Court of Jersey as part of the Island’s administrative justice 
system. We recommend that many current rights of administrative appeal to the Royal Court should 
instead go to JAAT, but the Royal Court should retain power to hear administrative appeals that are likely 
to involve important general questions of law.   
Chapter 8 considers the scope for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in relation to administrative 
grievances. We identify a need for further research to develop proposals for the use of mediation and other 
forms of ADR. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE REDRESS PROJECT 
About this report 
1.1 This chapter outlines the scope of the Jersey Law Commission’s project on administrative 
redress. It explains the terms “administrative decisions” and “administrative redress” and 
provides an overview of the problems and proposed solutions addressed in this report.    
1.2 The report sets out recommendations for improving the law about what happens in Jersey when 
an individual, business or organisation is aggrieved about an administrative decision made by 
a public body. Annex A: Recommendations lists the recommendations, which are explained 
in more detail in each chapter. Recommendations within each chapter are shown as highlighted 
boxes, starting with the chapter number followed by the number of the recommendation, for 
example: 
 
Annex B: Alternative recommendations relating to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
contains different proposals should our main proposal to replace the Complaints Panel with an 
Ombudsman not be accepted. Annex C lists provisional proposals we put forward in our April 
2016 consultation paper that are not being taken forward.1 
1.3 In line with the Jersey Law Commission’s general terms of reference, the recommendations 
seek in particular to achieve “the elimination of anomalies; the repeal of obsolete and 
unnecessary enactments; the reductions of the number of separate enactments; and generally, 
the simplification and modernisation of the law”. We have also had regard to principles relevant 
to reform of administrative justice systems, which are discussed further in Annex D: Research 
statement. Of particular importance is the need for grievance redress processes to be designed 
around the needs of potential users of the system (rather than being based on tradition or 
administrative convenience). Another essential consideration is that procedures and institutions 
must operate on satisfactory legal and constitutional footings.  
1.4 The recommendations are made to the Chief Minister and will now be considered by the 
Government of Jersey and the States Assembly. 
Administrative decisions  
1.5 An “administrative decision” is a determination by a public body that has legal effects on a 
particular individual, business or organisation. In the typical scenario, there is (1) a law either 
passed by the States Assembly or in a few situations found in Jersey customary law, which (2) 
empowers a public authority, such as a Minister or Connétable, to (3) make a decision about a 
person’s rights.  
1.6 This process affects many aspects of personal and business life. 
• Administrative decisions may be about money such as assessment of income tax, liability 
for Parish rates, payment of old-age pensions, deciding whether a person is eligible for 
Income Support and other welfare benefits, decisions about grants and bursaries for 
students in higher education. 
                                                
1 Jersey Law Commission, Consultation Paper: Improving Administrative Redress in Jersey, No.1/2016/CP (St 
Helier, Jersey, 2016). 
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• The provision of public services involves administrative decision-making, such as 
decisions made by professional staff in the General Hospital, about access to mental 
health services, support from social workers, access to schools, allocation of social 
housing. 
• Administrative decisions may be about the regulation of work, business and professional 
activity (including financial services), controls on imports and exports, regulation of the 
right to work, health and safety, the running of ports and the airport, and controls over 
ownership, use and trade in legal but potentially dangerous items (fireworks, explosives, 
firearms). 
• The Island’s infrastructure and environment is controlled by administrative decision-
making across a wide variety of areas, including maintenance and closure of highways, 
licensing of taxi-cabs, and planning permission.  
1.7 The public bodies in Jersey that have powers and duties conferred on can be placed into five 
main categories. 
• Many Laws confer decision-making powers on a Minister (all of whom are elected 
members of the States Assembly). The Government of Jersey is organised as 
departments led by Ministers: the Chief Minister’s Department; Education; Health and 
Social Services; Housing; Social Security; Treasury and Resources; Economic 
Development, Sport and Tourism; External Relations; Community and Constitutional 
Affairs (formerly Home Affairs); Environment; and Infrastructure (formerly Transport and 
Technical Services). Ministers will in many situations be advised by civil servants, though 
the power or duty is conferred directly on the Minister. 
• Laws may directly empower non-elected office-holders to make administrative 
decisions. These include, for example: the Comptroller of Taxes; the Chief Officer, Deputy 
Chief Officer and police officers of the States of Jersey Police; the Chief Officer of 
Education; the Superintendent Registrar of births deaths and marriages; the Registrar of 
Companies; and “determining officers” who make decisions relating to social security. 
• Each of the 12 Parish administrations has a variety of powers in their area exercised by 
the Connétable, the Parish Assembly, the Rates Assessment Committee or the Roads 
Committee. These powers include, for example: in relation to roads – closures and naming 
of streets; compulsory purchase; issuing permits for Sunday trading, regulation of 
pawnbrokers and sale of fireworks; granting firearms certificates; registration of premises 
for marriages and civil partnerships; dog licences; driving licences; and making orders in 
respect of various kinds of nuisances on private property affecting public health. 
• “Arm’s length” public bodies operate independently from Ministers. These include 
bodies carrying out regulatory functions, such as the Jersey Financial Services 
Commission and the Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority. Some functions previously 
exercised by Government of Jersey departments have been transferred to corporate 
entities wholly owned by the States of Jersey, operating at arm’s length from Ministers: JT 
Ltd (Jersey Telecom Group Ltd, a telecommunications business); Jersey Post Ltd (the mail 
service); Ports of Jersey Ltd (running harbours and the airport since 2015); and Andium 
Homes Ltd (in July 2014 the housing stock and responsibilities of the Housing Department 
were transferred to Andium). Some functions of the corporate entities are commercial 
rather than administrative.  
• Several “non-ministerial bodies” are recognised by the Public Finances (Jersey) Law 
2005: the Bailiff’s Chambers; Office of the Lieutenant Governor; Office of the Dean of 
Jersey; Viscount’s Department; Judicial Greffe; Law Officers Department; Comptroller and 
Auditor General; Data Protection Registrar; Probation Department; Official Analyst; States 
Assembly. Other “minor entities” include the Government of Jersey London Office and the 
Jersey Legal Information Board. 
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The changing face of administrative decision-making in Jersey 
1.8 Within living memory, there has been a transformation in administrative decision-making in 
Jersey. Several trends can be identified, which provide a practical context for thinking about 
future development. In outline: 
5.1 The quantity of administrative decision-making has increased significantly. There are 
more people living in the Island than ever before (the population has risen from around 
57,000 in 1951 to over 104,200 in 2017), more public services are provided than in 
the past, and the day-to-day activities of individuals and business are more highly 
regulated. 
5.2 There has been some transfer of responsibility for public functions (and therefore 
administrative decision-making) from Parish level to whole-Island government. This is 
especially evident in relation to provision of welfare support, with the introduction of 
“insular insurance” in the 1950s and Income Support in 2008. 
5.3 There has been a transfer of responsibility for some public functions from the 
Government of Jersey to arms’ length bodies (see para 1.7 above). 
5.4 Broad discretionary powers of public authorities (in the country Parishes, often based 
on the Connétables’ personal knowledge of individuals and their families) have been 
replaced by detailed rules governing entitlement to welfare and other public services, 
by civil servants with no prior knowledge of individuals and their families. 
5.5 At whole-Island level, there was a change from committee-based government to 
ministerial government under the States of Jersey Law 2005, following 
recommendations in the Clothier report. 
Administrative redress 
1.9 In the large majority of cases, administrative decisions are taken on the basis of correct facts, 
in accordance with the law, and using fair procedures. In a minority of cases, however, 
experience suggests that the individual, business or organisation affected by the decision will 
be dissatisfied. A grievance or sense of grievance may arise for a variety of different reasons, 
for example the public authority may have (or be thought by the aggrieved person to have): 
• made a legal error in interpreting or applying relevant legal rules and standards applicable 
to the decision 
• misunderstood the facts 
• made a judgement based on professional expertise or a policy preference that is disputed 
by the individual 
• failed to make the decision in a procedurally fair manner. 
1.10 This report is about how disputes about administrative decision-making are dealt with. The term 
“administrative redress” describes the various ways in which this happens or should happen – 
a fourth step in the chain of public administration: 
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1.11 There is a variety of ways in which a person can challenge an administrative decision that is 
thought to be wrong.  
1.12 In Chapter 2, we look at internal complaints procedures within public bodies in Jersey. We 
conclude that there should be more sharing of good practice and that coordination is needed to 
make sure this happens. 
1.13 Chapter 3 is concerned with administrative appeals tribunals. In Jersey, these have 
developed piecemeal over many years. Work by the Judicial Greffe is helping to create a more 
coordinated and streamlined approach across some of the tribunals but this has not been 
underpinned by changes in the Laws governing tribunals. Our recommendations include 
amalgamating existing tribunals into a single new tribunal (the Jersey Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal) and creating user-friendly procedural rules. We also find that there some cases where 
a fair trial may not occur because appellants seeking to challenge an administrative decision do 
not have access to affordable legal advice and representation. Tribunals fall outside the current 
legal aid scheme in Jersey. We recommend that where necessary, a judicial order should be 
made to provide legal assistance paid for by public funds. 
1.14 We found six rights of appeals against administrative decisions in Jersey law that must be made 
to Ministers. It is generally not appropriate for Ministers, as elected politicians, to hear 
administrative appeals and we accordingly recommend in Chapter 4 that five of these appeals 
move to the new Jersey Administrative Appeal Tribunal. 
1.15 In Chapter 5, we examine the role of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (a body unique 
to the Island). During the consultation phase of this project, the Complaints Panel and the 
Privileges and Procedure Committee (PPC) of the States Assembly argued strongly against our 
provisional recommendations that the Complaints Panel should be replaced by an ombudsman. 
We have considered the views of all consultees (the majority of whom supported our provisional 
proposal) and concluded that the Complaints Panel should be replaced. If, however, our 
1. Law passed 
by States 
Assembly
2. Law confers 
powers and 
duties on public 
body
3.	Public	body	
makes	individual	
administrative	
decision
4.	How	the	
administrative	
decision	can	be	
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recommendation is not accepted, we provide a series of recommendations for improving the 
effectiveness of the Complaints Panel.2 
1.16 In Chapter 6, we outline our recommendations for a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman, 
who would become responsible for investigating complaints about maladministration and who 
would have a role coordinating continuous improvements in administrative redress and the 
quality of administrative decision-making.  
1.17 In Chapter 7, we consider the Royal Court’s contribution as part of the administrative redress 
system. In relation to appeals, in our view the Royal Court’s function should be to hear cases 
that involve complex issues of fact or law, leaving more straightforward appeals to be 
determined by the new Jersey Administrative Appeal Tribunal (JAAT). We therefore recommend 
that more than 50 laws that currently create rights of appeal to the Royal Court should be 
amended to give JAAT the responsibility for determining these appeals. This will help make the 
appeals process more user-friendly and accessible, especially to people who do not have legal 
advice or representation. 
1.18 In Chapter 8 we look at the role of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes. We 
recommend an expansion of the Community Mediation scheme to provide mediation in 
administrative disputes – but only where this is suitable for the type of case and the parties 
agree. 
Other reform initiatives linked to administrative redress 
1.19 Our project to analyse and develop proposals for improving administrative redress is one of a 
number of relatively uncoordinated reform initiatives from different bodies in Jersey which have 
considered questions of access to justice. 
1.20 In December 2000, a Review Panel on the Machinery of Government, chaired by Sir Cecil 
Clothier QC, made a range of recommendations for modernising Jersey’s system of 
government. This included replacing the States of Jersey Complaints Panel with an 
Ombudsman. On this issue, our report makes similar conclusions and recommendations as the 
Clothier panel did 17 years ago (see Chapter 5 below). 
1.21 In December 2013, the States Assembly approved a proposition by the Chief Minister to 
establish a Review of Access to Justice in Jersey.3 The main panel consists of a Minister, a 
Connétable, and two other elected States Members. The focus of the Review is to examine 
Jersey’s legal aid system and “make proposals for developing further an efficient and effective 
legal system, which would improve access to justice and the resolution of complaints, whilst 
delivering value for money in the use of public funds”. Three interim reports have been made.4 
The Law Society of Jersey (the professional body for Jersey-qualified advocates and solicitors) 
has undertaken a review of its rules of legal aid, under which members of the profession provide 
legal advice and representation at no fee or fees at less than normal commercial rates; we 
understand a new scheme will come into force in 2018. Our Recommendation 3.5 calls for public 
funding for legal advice and representation in the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, where it is necessary to ensure a fair trial. In Chapter 8, we review provision for 
alternative dispute resolution in administrative redress and make the case for further research.  
1.22 During 2014-15, the Royal Court Rules Review Group developed proposals for amendments to 
the Royal Court Rules, including the introduction of an “overriding objective” based on the 
                                                
2 See Annex B: List of alternative recommendations on the future of the States of Jersey Complaints 
Panel. 
3 States of Jersey, Access to Justice in Jersey: Review, P.158/2013.  
4 See www.gov.je/CrimeJustice/AccessToJusticeReview/Pages/index.aspx 
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overriding objective contained in the Civil Procedure Rules in force in England and Wales.5 Our 
recommendation 3.18 proposes that the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
should have a modern set of user-friendly procedural rules, including an overriding objective. 
1.23 Under the States of Jersey Strategic Plan 2015-18, the Government of Jersey is undertaking a 
programme of public sector reform, involving a variety of projects.6 The driving principles are 
“start with the customer, provide the right services, have digital provision in mind, be 
collaborative across the States, and design to anticipate of the needs of tomorrow, not just 
today”.7  Our Recommendation 2.1 (that the Chief Minister issues guidance on internal 
complaint handling) should back this work. 
1.24 In July 2017, the Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs published a consultation 
paper proposing the creation of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (JLSC).8 In 
developing our proposals for the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal, we have assumed 
that the JLSC will be established. 
1.25 In July 2017, the Report of the Independent Jersey Care Inquiry 2017, chaired by Frances 
Oldham QC was presented to the States Assembly.9 The inquiry’s remit was to “establish what 
went wrong in Jersey’s child care system over many decades”. Among its findings were “a 
worrying history of both inappropriate and ineffectual state intervention and state indifference”, 
that “child care legislation in Jersey had failed to keep pace with developments in social care 
and children’s rights in the developed world” and that there was “failure to tackle a silo mentality 
among public-sector agencies”. The inquiry’s recommendations included: the appointment of a 
Commissioner for Children, consideration of how fear and lack of trust associated with “The 
Jersey Way” can be countered in a lasting way,10 and that the complaints system be reviewed 
with a view to ensuring that it is easily accessed and that clear responses are always made to 
complainants within set timescales. The Government of Jersey’s responsibilities for children’s 
services (the focus of the Oldham inquiry) is a subset of the broader field of administrative 
redress. Our recommendations aim to contribute to the wider project of building trust and 
confidence in processes for complaining about public administration. 
Pervasive issues across the system 
1.26 As well as leading to recommendations for the development of the different types of 
administrative redress mechanisms in Jersey, our research has revealed some pervasive 
issues, which are considered at various points in the report. 
1.27 Looking across the current administrative justice system in Jersey, our assessment is that it is 
often not user friendly. Institutions and procedures have not been designed primarily with the 
needs of ordinary people in mind and we found numerous ways in which the day-to-day 
                                                
5 Royal Court Rules Review Group, Access to Justice: Final Consultation Paper issued by the Royal Court 
Rules Review Group, 5 October 2015. 
6 States of Jersey, Strategic Plan 2015-18 (available online at 
https://www.gov.je/SiteCollectionDocuments/Government%20and%20administration/R%20States%20of%20J
ersey%20Strategic%20Plan%202015-18%2020150430%20VP.pdf).  
7 Government of Jersey website, “About public sector reform” (available online at 
https://www.gov.je/Government/PublicSectorReform/Pages/AboutPublicSectorReform.aspx).  
8 Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Judicial Independence and the 
Establishment of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (July 2017). 
9 States of Jersey, R.59/2017. 
10 The report stated, “At its best, the ‘Jersey Way’ is said to refer to the maintenance of proud and ancient 
traditions and the preservation of the island’s way of life. At its worst, the ‘Jersey Way’ is said to involve the 
protection of powerful interests and resistance to change, even when change is patently needed”. 
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operation of systems does not help aggrieved people. A contributing factor to this state of affairs 
is that the current administrative justice system is unnecessarily complicated. We identify 
numerous ways in which the Law could be simplified. We also note that Jersey’s administrative 
redress system has developed piecemeal over many years.  
1.28 A consequence of complexity and piecemeal development is that the administrative redress 
system is uncoordinated. An antidote is to create opportunities for strategic leadership to 
help coordinate the system better to ensure that it is fit for purpose. Several of our 
recommendations seek to do this. We envisage the Chief Minister (supported by civil servants) 
providing leadership over how internal complaints are handled across all public bodies 
(Recommendation 2.1) and in carrying out an annual review of administrative justice 
(Recommendation 2.2). If and when a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman is created, these 
functions could move to him or her.11 Within the new Jersey Administrative Appeal Tribunal, we 
recommend the creation of a part-time salaried judicial post of Chairman, who would have 
responsibilities for running the tribunal in addition to hearing appeals (Recommendation 3.7); 
an early call on the Chairman’s time (supported from staff in the Judicial Greffe) would be to 
take the lead in developing a set of user-friendly appeal procedures, drawing on best practice 
from other jurisdictions adapted to Jersey’s circumstances.  
1.29 There is currently a lack of publicly available data about administrative redress in Jersey, 
which hinders evidence-led policy making, transparency and accountability. We therefore make 
proposals for better data collection, evaluation, reporting, and scrutiny. These include an annual 
report by the Chief Minister on administrative justice (Recommendation 2.2) and an annual 
report by the Chairman of the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Recommendation 3.11). 
1.30 Our proposals aim to assist the States Assembly to have an overview of the administrative 
justice system, better able to decide if, when and how further scrutiny work is needed where 
problems arise (Recommendations 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.11). Historically, the States 
Assembly has concerned itself mainly with seeking to right wrongs suffered by particular 
individuals; a more strategic approach to scrutiny would ensure that States Members do not 
lose sight of the wood for the trees. 
1.31 For an island with a population in excess of 100,000, fewer people than might be expected 
choose to use the current administrative redress system. In Chapter 5, we note that the 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel receives a very small number of complaints a year whereas 
comparable grievance-handling bodies in Gibraltar, Cayman Islands, and Bermuda receive 
hundreds a year. In Chapter 7, we see that many rights of appeal to the Royal Court against 
administrative decisions have never or only rarely been used. There are three hypothesise that 
could explain this situation.  
• The quality of public administration in Jersey is exceptionally high, so that very few 
administrative decisions give rise to a sense of grievance. 
• People are unaware of their rights to complain or question administrative decisions.  
• People are aware that they can complain and question but choose not to because there 
are barriers to using the system (for example, cost, they see it as too intimidating, or a 
feeling that “nothing will change”). 
We have not been able within the scope of this project to test these hypothesise, but we can 
speculate that factors b and c are at least sometimes present. We suggest ways in which 
these factors should be addressed. Recent experience in Jersey indicates that changes to 
administrative redress procedures may lead to significant increases in the number of 
aggrieved people using the system: in 2015, the right of appeal to the Royal Court in appeals 
                                                
11 See Chapter 6. 
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relating to planning permission was replaced by a system of inspectors, leading to the number 
of appeals more than doubling in its first year of operation. 
What was excluded from this project 
1.32 Some aspects of the administrative decision-making and redress were excluded from our 
project. 
1.33 A new planning appeals system was established by the Planning and Building (Amendment No. 
6) (Jersey) Law 2014, creating a new right of appeal to the Minister advised by planning 
inspectors in place of a right of appeal to the Royal Court. As previously noted, there was a 
significant increase in the number of appeal under the new system. The new arrangements 
should be allowed to bed down before a review is carried out. 
1.34 The operation of the Jersey Employment and Discrimination Tribunal (JEDT) is also beyond the 
scope of this review (though we make some references to its practices in relation to our 
proposals for a single new administrative appeals tribunal that would sit alongside the JEDT). 
Employment disputes do not usually arise as a result of purely administrative decision-making 
but from a contractual relationship. 
1.35 The Jersey Police Complaints Authority’s remit is to oversee, monitor and supervise the 
investigation, by the Professional Standards Department of the States of Jersey Police, of 
certain complaints made by members of the Public against States of Jersey Police and Honorary 
Police officers. It does not itself carry out investigations or make determinations and for this 
reason falls outside this scope of the project. 
1.36 The largest category of formal complaints against the Government of Jersey is those made to 
the Department of Health and Social Services. We have been unable to look in detail at this 
category of grievances within this project but return to this in Chapter 2 (see Recommendation 
2.4 calling for a more detailed study).  
How much will the reforms cost? 
1.37 As a law reform agency, we must be mindful of the cost of the reforms we recommend. Although 
we lack the resources needed to quantify the costs (and savings), we have sought to identify 
the main costs (and savings) headings for each recommendation in Annex A: List of 
Recommendations. Ultimately, questions of affordability and priorities in public spending will 
be questions for politicians in the Government of Jersey and States Assembly. 
How much did this report cost? 
1.38 We estimate that the cost of undertaking the research for this project, carrying out the 
consultation process, and preparing this final report to be approximately £15,000. Breaking this 
down: around £10,000 was paid by the Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs 
under a research contract with the University of Essex, to enable Andrew Le Sueur (the Topic 
Commissioner) to be released from teaching and administrative duties at the University to carry 
out research interviews in Jersey during 2015-16. The balance of the cost is attributed to 
research assistance, travel and the consultation exercise. 
Criticism of institutions and processes not individuals 
1.39 Throughout this report, we set out findings that are often critical of existing institutions, 
procedures and practices and make recommendations for reforms. Our report is not intended 
to be direct criticism of the people who currently run the system – Ministers and other holders 
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of public office, civil servants, members of administrative tribunals and the States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel. Our focus is on getting the structures and procedures right in order to create 
a better quality administrative justice system for the people of Jersey. 
Thanks and acknowledgements 
1.40 More than 30 individuals agreed to be interviewed during the research phase of this project (see 
Annex D: Research statement); we are grateful for their input and thank them for being 
generous with their time. We also record our disappointment that three elected States Members 
declined to be interviewed – two without explanation and one citing lack of time.  
1.41 Various organisations were helpful in providing information (but we again record regret that two 
public bodies ignored or failed to act on our requests for help). We are particularly grateful to 
staff and board members of the Channel Islands Financial Ombudsman, who provided 
invaluable insight into their organisation’s work.12 We also thank colleagues involved in the UK 
Administrative Justice Institute (UKAJI), which provides invaluable resources and sharing of 
ideas between academics, lawyers, judges, complaints-handlers and advisers and others 
involved in administrative justice systems. 
1.42 Lori-Ann Foley provided efficient research assistance during an early phase of the project. 
1.43 Twelve people attended a consultation event on 21 June 2016, including members of the public, 
two States Members (one a Minister), civil servants, and representatives of the Jersey Law 
Society.  
  
                                                
12 CIFO is the joint operation of two statutory ombudsman roles, established in law by the Financial Services 
Ombudsman (Jersey) Law 2014 and the Financial Services Ombudsman (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2014. 
The primary role of CIFO is to resolve complaints about financial services provided in/or from the Channel 
Islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark (source: www.ci-fo.org).  
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CHAPTER 2 
OVERARCHING ISSUES IN ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE   
 
2.1 This chapter examines several overarching issues and make recommendations relating to the 
whole administrative justice system in Jersey. 
Proposed duty to issue guidance to public bodies about fair and 
effective handling of internal complaints 
Recommendation 2.1: Create a legal duty on the Chief Minister to issue guidance to public 
bodies about fair and effective handling of complaints  
The value of internal complaint handling 
2.2 The starting point for a person aggrieved by an administrative decision will often be to ask the 
decision-making public body to check or reconsider its decision. Indeed, in some situations a 
Law requires this to happen (for example, in the Social Security Department there is a 
mandatory procedure for asking a second determining officer to review the decision of a 
colleague).13 
2.3 Good internal complaints procedures help aggrieved people and the organisation complained 
about. As a UK parliamentary committee has noted, “There are clear economic arguments for 
resolving complaints as quickly as possible. The earlier complaints are resolved, the cheaper it 
is for everyone”.14 Well-run organisations also now recognise the value of complaints as a 
positive influence in continuous quality improvement, seeking to learn lessons from each 
complaint for the future (whether or not the complaint is upheld).15 
The quantity of internal complaints in Jersey 
2.4 Data disclosed in the States Assembly Hansard in November 2015, in response to a question 
to a Minister from a backbench States Member, show the number of “formal complaints” 
received by the Government of Jersey and resolved internally within departments (see Table 
below).16 The largest category of formal complaints is recorded in relation to health and social 
services. The Department comments “HSSD has hundreds of thousands of interactions with 
islanders each year and the number of complaints represents a very small fraction of those 
interactions. The department is always seeking to improve its services and to learn from the 
occasions when it could have done better”. The next largest categories of formal complaints 
                                                
13 Social Security (Determination of Claims and Questions) (Jersey) Order 1974. 
14 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, When Citizens Complain, 5th Report of 2007-
08, HC 409 (March 2008) para 10. 
15 See for example: House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, Department for Work and Pensions: 
Handling Customer Complaints, 13th Report of 2008-09, HC 312 (March 2009); Centre for Public Scrutiny and 
Local Government Ombudsman, Aiming for the best: using lessons from complaints to improve public 
services (July 2011); National Audit Office, Feeding back? Learning from complaints handling in health and 
social care (a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Session 2007-08, HC 853, October 2008); 
Richard Simmons and Carol Brennan, Grumbles, Gripes and Grievances: the role of complaints in 
transforming public services (Nesta, April 2013). 
16 Extrapolated from an answer to a written question from Deputy M.R. Higgins to the Chief Minister, States of 
Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 17 November 2015, 2.1. 
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relate to police and social security. In relation to other departments, the data appears to reveal 
a picture of very low numbers of formal complaints that need to be resolved internally. In a 
number of respects, these data do not paint a complete picture, an issue we discuss below.  
Department Formal complaints 
during period 2010-15 
Average number of 
complaints per year 
Health and Social Services 
Department 
1,260 252 
Home Affairs: Police 215 43 
Social Security Department 171 approximately 34 
Environment Department 71 approximately 14 
Home Affairs: Customs & 
Immigration  
64 approximately 13 
Education Department 36 approximately 7 
Treasury and Resources Department 9 approximately 2 
Transport and Technical Services 5 1 
Home Affairs: Fire 6 approximately 1 
Human Resources 2 fewer than 1 
Economic Development Department 1 fewer than 1 
Home Affairs: Prison 2 fewer than 1 
Chief Minister’s Department Not recorded  
The quality of internal complaint handling in Jersey 
2.5 In 2016, we carried out a small-scale desk-based study of the websites of a sample of Jersey 
public bodies to understand what, if any, information they contained about how to make a 
complaint.17 Based on this evidence, we concluded that the quality of information about internal 
complaints procedures in Jersey is variable. For example: the most detailed published 
complaints procedure we identified was for Health and Social Services, which scores highly in 
relation to clarity. At the other end of the spectrum, some public bodies have no complaints 
procedures published online.  
2.6 Other bodies fall between these points. For example, the Social Security Department has 
information online (and in leaflet format) called “If you think the decision is wrong”, which 
explains appeals to a tribunal and to the Royal Court. It does not mention that some matters 
may appropriately be taken to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. It is also rather vague in 
the information it provides about sources of advice, referring to “Advice centres such as Citizens 
Advice can give you help and support” (why not provide a telephone number and address?). 
2.7 In response to our consultation report, the Tribunal Service (part of the Judicial Greffe) told us: 
“Currently procedures and processes regarding administrative decisions made by the 
administrative arm of our government are not accessible (sometimes even to staff members in 
other areas), or procedures are passed down from one member of staff to another, without 
being written down, which gives little room for improvement and consultation with users of the 
service – all this will create challenges if and when a tribunal is to review a decision. This of 
course varies between departments, but must be something which is borne in mind”. 
                                                
17 We acknowledge that in relation to some types of administrative decision-making, for example in relation to 
older people who are less likely to have easy access to the internet, information on a website may not be the 
most appropriate method of publishing. 
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2.8 The quality of internal complaints systems can be assessed against the following criteria:18 
a. Accessibility. Does the public body have an accessible internal complaints procedure (for 
example, published online or available in leaflet format)? 
b. Clarity. Is the procedure designed and written in a way that can be understood by users? 
c. Independence. Does the procedure allow for the matter to be looked at by an officer who 
has not previously been involved in the matter? Does the officer taking a “second look” at 
the matter do so through a fresh consideration of the merits (or is the officer confined to 
checking for technical mistakes in the original decision)? 
d. Outcomes. What proportion of complaints are upheld? How satisfied are complainants 
with the process of complaining? If the aggrieved person is unsuccessful, does the public 
body clearly signpost what the person can do next (for example appeal to a tribunal or 
make a complaint to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel)? 
2.9 In July 2017, the Report of the Independent Jersey Care Inquiry chaired by Frances Oldham 
recommended that:  
“An effective complaints system is one key element in the structures that are necessary to 
ensure that looked after children are safe, and, to that end, we recommend that the current 
complaints system is replaced with one that is easily accessed and in which children and 
young people have confidence. The outcomes of complaints should be reported regularly to 
the relevant Minister, who, in turn, should present an annual report to the States”.19 
2.10 This approach should not be limited to children’s services but should apply across all public 
bodies. Everyone in Jersey should have confidence that a fair and effective complaints system 
exists whenever a decision is made by a public body. 
Our proposal on complaint handling guidance 
2.11 During the consultation phase of this project, everybody who expressed a view agreed with our 
initial proposal that “All public bodies should set out their internal procedures for dealing with 
grievances in an accessible, clear and comprehensive manner”. In subsequent work, we have 
developed our proposal to ensure that it can be effectively implemented.  
2.12 We considered who should develop, publish and keep under review the proposed guidance to 
all public bodies. There are three main candidates.  
a. The States of Jersey Complaints Panel could have this function, alongside its role of 
responding to individual complaints that are not resolved internally. In Chapter 5, we 
recommend that the Complaints Panel is replaced by an ombudsman. If our 
recommendation is not accepted, we make alternative proposals for reforming the 
Complaints Panel. It would be possible, as part of these changes, for the duty to issue 
guidance to be placed on the Complaints Panel. We are not, however, confident that the 
Complaints Panel would have the capacity to carry out this function within its current 
resources. 
b. The Jersey Public Services Ombudsman, which in Chapter 6 we propose is created, could 
have this function. The advantage is that an ombudsman would be perceived as having 
greater independence than the Chief Minister and will bring expertise to the Island about 
managing complaints systems and promoting good standards of complaints handling. The 
                                                
18 A similar template was developed and used in M Anderson, A McIlroy and M McAleer, Mapping the 
Administrative Justice Landscape in Northern Ireland (2014). 
19 Recommendation 2 (p 57). 
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disadvantage is that it is likely to be many months before the JPSO is operational and able 
to start this work.  
c. We therefore conclude that the responsibility should be placed on a Minister. We propose 
that this should be the Chief Minister to ensure that there is a sufficient overview of all 
other departments and other public bodies. If, in due course, the JPSO is established the 
function could be transferred from the Chief Minister. 
2.13 In our revised recommendation, there would be three steps: 
a. The Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law20 should place a legal duty on a body (the Chief 
Minister) to develop guidance on good complaint handling.   
b. The Chief Minister should develop the guidance. We envisage this process should be 
open, with opportunities for sharing of good practice between public bodies in Jersey as 
well as lesson-learning from other systems.21 Although the guidance will be non-statutory 
(it will not be “law”) to ensure that it can be kept under reviewed and easily updated, we 
expect that the States Assembly would want to scrutinise the guidance before a final 
version is published. 
c. The Chief Minister should ensure that the guidance is followed, including through 
appropriate training. Issues about non-compliance with the guidance should be included 
in the proposed Chief Minister’s annual report on administrative justice (see 
Recommendation 2.2) and if individuals were adversely affected by non-compliance, they 
could complain to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (if retained) or the Jersey Public 
Services Ombudsman (if created). 
Proposed duty to make an annual report on administrative justice 
Recommendation 2.2: Create a legal duty on the Chief Minister to present an annual report to 
the States Assembly on administrative justice across the Government of Jersey and other 
public bodies. 
Consultation responses 
2.14 During the consultation phase of this project, there was moderate agreement with our initial 
proposal for an annual administrative justice report by the Chief Minister to the States Assembly.  
2.15 One response acknowledged the general value of annual reports as a good basis for 
accountability, but was unconvinced that the cost of producing the proposed annual report could 
be justified. We are alive to cost implications of implementing the proposals made in this report 
and in Annex A: List of recommendations we seek to identify the heads of cost and the 
benefits flowing from each recommendation. In relation to this particular proposal, the Chief 
Minister could consider a “sunset clause” in the Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law, under 
which the duty to make an annual report would lapse unless renewed by the States Assembly. 
This would encourage a debate about the real costs and benefits of fulfilling the duty. If a sunset 
clause is included, we recommend that it should be 5 years. 
                                                
20 This is the Law we envisage should be made to implement the recommendations in this report. 
21 For example: the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman has set up a unit known as the Complaints 
Standards Authority (CSA), which is “leading the development and implementation of simplified, standardised 
complaints handling procedures (CHPs) across the Scottish public sector” (www.spso.org.uk/complaints-
standards-authority-csa); Northern Ireland Ombudsman, Rights, Responsibilities and Redress: a Framework 
for Effective Complaints Handling; (UK) Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, Principles of Good 
Complaint Handling (2009); Local Government Ombudsman, Guidance on Running a Complaints System. 
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2.16 During consultation, we were told that “the reality is that in a small island the shortfall in service 
and the shortcomings of the complaint system are likely to become well known soon”. We do 
not share the confidence that this will always be the case. The findings and recommendations 
of the Report of the Independent Jersey Care Inquiry 2017 chaired by Frances Oldham highlight 
the risks that flow from an approach such as this. 
2.17 A member of the public liked the idea of an annual report but thought it was inappropriate for 
the report to be made by the Chief Minister and should be produced by an external body. We 
do not agree. In relation to this recommendation it is important that the maker of the report is 
accountable to the States Assembly. The Chief Minister is well placed to be questioned by 
States members on the content of his report, and to be answerable to a scrutiny panel or other 
committee (see Recommendation 2.3). 
What would go into the annual report on administrative justice? 
2.18 Our recommendation does not seek to prescribe in detail what should be contained in the annual 
report but we envisage that it might contain the following elements. 
2.19 Information about how the Chief Minister has implemented his duty to provide guidance on 
complaints handling (Recommendation 2.1). This might describe training and other continuing 
professional development opportunities for staff within public bodies with responsibility for 
decision-making and complaints handling. 
2.20 The report should contain analysis and evaluation of data on complaints received and their 
outcomes.22 Publication of the statistics on “formal complaints” used to compile the Table in 
paragraph 2.4 above is a welcome step in developing a more systematic understanding of 
administrative redress in Jersey, but in some respects the picture revealed is unclear or 
incomplete.  
a. First, the term “complaint” is not defined and the distinction between “informal” and “formal” 
complaints is imprecise. In the United Kingdom, the lack of a commonly held definition of 
complaint has also been a problem. In 2008, the House of Commons Public Administration 
Select Committee recommended “that all government organisations use the widest 
possible definition of ‘complaint’ – that of ‘any expression of dissatisfaction that needs a 
response, however communicated’ – and treat all such expressions of dissatisfaction as 
complaints”.23 We recommend that in future this definition should be used. 
b. Clearer statistics are needed to show the relationship between “complaints” and “appeals”. 
There will be cases where an aggrieved person has exercised a right of appeal to a tribunal 
or the Royal Court: these may or may not have started as a “complaint”. For example, the 
71 complaints against the Environment Department is expressly stated to exclude appeals 
made under the Planning and Building (Jersey) Law 2002 (to the Royal Court or under the 
new system introduced in February 2015). The data show nine complaints against 
Treasury and Resources in the period 2010-15 (an average of 2 a year) but it is unclear 
how this figure relates to appeals taken to the Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes. 
c. The statistics in the Table above present an incomplete picture of public administration in 
Jersey because it is limited to decisions by Government of Jersey departments. 
Administrative decision-making takes place in a variety of other bodies, including Parishes, 
non-ministerial bodies carrying out public functions, and States-owned corporate entities 
                                                
22 We are aware of the Government of Jersey’s open date initiative (see https://opendata.gov.je/about). Data 
sets should be published there. 
23 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, When Citizens Complain, 5th Report of 2007-
08, HC 409 (March 2008) para 17. 
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to which functions previously carried out by Ministers have been transferred (notably 
Andium Homes Ltd, which manages States of Jersey social housing). 
d. Statistics on administrative redress are not published as a coherent package. Those on 
formal complaints used in the Table above were published only as a result of a written 
question in the States Assembly. The States of Jersey Complaints Panel includes some 
basic statistics in its annual reports to the States Assembly. The Jersey Court Service 
Annual Reports published by the Judicial Greffe and Viscount’s Department contain some 
very basic data on the tribunals administered by the Judicial Greffe (but not on other 
tribunals) but contain no data on statutory appeals or applications for judicial review in the 
Royal Court. 
2.21 The absence of reliable and systematic data is our view hampering the development of a 
strategic and evidence-based approach to the design and operation of Jersey’s administrative 
redress system. For example, in relation to system design, when in 2004 the States Assembly 
Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC) examined the case for the creation of a public 
service ombudsman, one of their main reasons for rejecting the idea was that there would be 
an insufficient number of complaints. PPC appears not to have had regard to the level of 
complaints about health and social services matters or to have considered what role an 
ombudsman could have in relation to them. In relation to the operation of the redress system, 
better data could act as a driver for the continual improvement of public administration. For 
example, the detailed data used in the Table above shows a notable spike in formal complaints 
about education in 2015 (20 compared to five or fewer in previous years), a trend that should 
prompt further inquiry. 
2.22 The Chief Minister’s annual report on administrative justice would also provide a vehicle for 
explaining the Government of Jersey’s responses to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel’s 
reports on individual cases and to the Complaint Panel’s own annual report (or, in future, those 
of the Jersey Public Services Ombudsman). 
2.23 The general purpose of the annual reporting duty is that it will provide incentives for both the 
Government of Jersey and the States Assembly to maintain an overview of where problems are 
arising across the whole administrative redress system, make strategic decisions about how 
best to scrutinise those problems, and to recognise and value where improvements are made 
and maintained. Ultimately, individuals, business and organisations using public services in 
Jersey will benefit from more effective coordination and improvements in the operation of the 
administrative justice system. 
Proposal that the States Assembly should scrutinise the annual report 
on administrative justice 
Recommendation 2.3: The States Assembly should scrutinise the Chief Minister’s annual 
report on administrative justice. 
2.24 Few people responded specifically to our initial proposal. One person with experience of the 
States Assembly agreed, saying “Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC) is a better body 
to do this. Scrutiny Panels are not organised to follow a regular timetable of work and therefore 
I feel an annual review might not happen”. 
2.25 It would not be constitutionally appropriate for the Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law to impose 
a legal duty on the States Assembly to carry out scrutiny of the Chief Minister’s annual report 
on administrative justice. Nor do we seek to prescribe by whom, or how, the scrutiny should be 
organised. This should be a matter for the States Assembly to determine.  
2.26 We recommend that the Scrutiny Chairmen’s Committee considers how best to provide the 
necessary level of scrutiny. It should be open to individual members of the States Assembly to 
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ask oral or written questions to the Chief Minister, though more detailed scrutiny and effective 
accountability is likely to be secured through the investigatory work of a scrutiny panel or 
committee. 
2.27 Consideration should also be given to achieving a joined-up approach to scrutiny of all annual 
reports relating to administrative justice system. These include: 
a. the Chief Minister’s annual report on the administrative justice system (this 
recommendation) 
b. the proposed annual report by the Chairman of the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(Recommendation 3.11) 
c. aspects of the Jersey Court Service annual report prepared by the Judicial Greffe & 
Viscount’s Department, to focus on data about the use of applications for judicial review 
and administrative appeals to the Royal Court    
d. the annual report of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (or the Jersey Public Services 
Ombudsman if it is established). 
2.28 The opportunity for the States Assembly to engage on an annual basis with the Chief Minister’s 
report on administrative justice is designed to provide a basis for members of the States 
Assembly to adopt a more systematic and strategic approach to accountability over the 
administrative justice system. The States Assembly has in the past tended to focus attention on 
individual cases24 rather than using data and scrutiny of reports to see an overview of the 
administrative system as a whole. 
Future sector-specific reviews, starting with health and social services 
Recommendation 2.4: The Chief Minister and Minister for Health & Social Services should 
commission a study of complaints handling relating to health and social services decision-
making and services, with a remit to make recommendations 
2.29 As we noted in Chapter 1, we were unable within our resources and the time available to carry 
out a review of the sector that appears to generate the largest number of complaints – health 
and social services.  
2.30 The Department of Health and Social Services’ grievance procedures are published online.25 It 
involves, first, ‘local resolution’ during with the grievance is investigated and considered by the 
Health and Social Services Patient and Client Liaison Officer and if necessary the Chief Nurse, 
the Medical Officer of Health and an Assistant Minister of Health and Social Services. If needs 
be, second, the grievance may be escalated to ‘external review’, which is conducted by the 
Guernsey Health and Social Services Department. If the aggrieved person remains dissatisfied, 
the outcome of the external review may be challenged by an application for judicial review in 
the Royal Court (though this can consider only the legality of the decision, not the merits of the 
outcome).  
2.31 We recommend that that a review is carried out to check that current arrangements for handling 
complaints in this area are satisfactory. The experiences of people should be central to the 
review alongside expert analysis of how the system measures against comparable complaints 
systems elsewhere. Examples of good practice should be shared across the whole public 
                                                
24 See for example: States of Jersey P.130/2013 and BBC News, “Jersey man given compensation after 
fireworks failure”, 23 November 2013; and Jersey Evening Post, “No compensation for skip hire couple”, 3 
April 2009. 
25 See www.gov.je/Government/Comments/Pages/HSSFeedback.aspx.  
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administration system as part of the Chief Minister’s work in developing guidance on complaint 
handling (see Recommendation 2.1).    
Proposal for a legal right to good administration 
Recommendation 2.5: Create a “right to good administration”, based on models developed in 
some other jurisdictions 
2.32 The final overarching recommendation we make in the chapter is that the States Assembly 
should enact a right to good administration. This could be achieved by including an appropriately 
worded Article in the Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law, which we envisage would be passed 
to implement our other proposals. We propose that the right be drafted as follows: 
Right to good administration 
(1) All decisions and acts of Listed Public Bodies must be lawful, rational, 
proportionate, procedurally fair, and taken within a reasonable time. 
(2) Every person whose interests have been affected by such a decision or act has the 
right to request and be given written reasons for that decision or act. 
“Listed Public Bodies” means the list of public authorities, which will appear in a Schedule to 
the Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law, showing which public authorities fall within the ambit of 
the new Law. 
2.33 In recent years, several territories and countries have adopted or considered adopting a right to 
“good” or “lawful” administration, including the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos 
Islands (both British Overseas Territories), Northern Ireland, South Africa (a Commonwealth 
member) apparently inspired by the 1990 Constitution of Namibia. When the European Union 
adopted a Charter of Rights in 2009, it also included a right to good administration in relation to 
citizen’s dealings with EU institutions. During debates in the United Kingdom about a British Bill 
of Rights in 2008, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, recommended that a right to 
administrative justice is “a strong candidate for inclusion in a UK Bill of Rights”.26  
2.34 Our proposed right would not have “constitutional status”: Jersey does not have a codified 
written constitution (unlike the Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands). The right would 
therefore be part of a normal Law.   
2.35 The rights to good or lawful administration have been drafted in various ways: see table below. 
Our proposal adopts elements from several. 
a. The main text is taken from that used for new constitutions recently adopted in the Cayman 
Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands. In the second part of the Article, we have removed 
the word “adversely” in front of “affected”. 
b. We have added “taken within a reasonable time”, adopted from the Northern Ireland 
proposal, to make the right more complete. 
c. We prefer the right be called “good” rather than “lawful” administration. There is a risk that 
the label “lawful” will be perceived as creating a narrow right of concern only in court 
proceedings (such as an application for judicial review to the Royal Court). We envisage 
that the right would be used as a point of reference in training decision-makers, designing 
changes to administrative decision-making systems, and by bodies whose function is to 
                                                
26 House of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the United 
Kingdom? 29th Report of 2007-08, HL Paper 165-I, HC 150-I, para 128. The UK Government later abandoned 
the British Bill of Rights project. 
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consider grievances (the States of Jersey Complaints Panel if retained or the Jersey Public 
Service Ombudsman if created). 
 
Table showing different formulations of rights to good or lawful administration: 
Territory How the right to good or lawful administration is 
formulated 
Cayman Islands 
Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009, SI 
2009/1379, Schedule 2, Part 1, “Bill of rights, 
freedoms and responsibilities”, Article 19 
Lawful administrative action 
(1) All decisions and acts of public officials must be lawful, 
rational, proportionate and procedurally fair. 
(2) Every person whose interests have been adversely 
affected by such a decision or act has the right to request 
and be given written reasons for that decision or act. 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
The Turks and Caicos Islands Constitution 
Order 2011, SI 2011 No. 1681, Schedule 2, Part 
1, “Fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual”, Article 19 
Lawful administrative action 
(1) All decisions and acts of the Government and of 
persons acting on its behalf must be lawful, rational, 
proportionate and procedurally fair.  
(2) Every person whose interests have been adversely 
affected by such a decision or act has the right to request 
and be given written reasons for that decision or act.  
In Northern Ireland, proposals have been made 
by the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission for “the right to civil and 
administrative justice” as a right supplementing 
those contained in the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  
 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, A 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (10 
December 2008) p 44 
1. Everyone has the right of access to any information 
held by public authorities, in accordance with laws 
governing the exercise of this right. 
2. Everyone has the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, procedurally fair, rational, proportionate and taken 
within a reasonable time. 
3. Public authorities must give reasons for their decisions 
and, where feasible, provide appropriate mechanisms for 
internal review or appeal of their decisions. 
South Africa 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996), Article 33 
 
Just administrative action 
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by 
administrative action has the right to be given written 
reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to 
these rights, and must – 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action 
by a court or, where appropriate, an independent 
and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the 
rights in subsections (1) and (2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration. 
 
Namibia 
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia 1990 (as 
amended), Article 18 
Administrative Justice 
Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act 
fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements 
imposed upon such bodies and officials by common law 
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and any relevant legislation, and persons aggrieved by 
the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the 
right to seek redress before a competent Court or 
Tribunal. 
European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (2012/C 326/02), Title V, Citizens’ Rights, 
Article 41 
Right to good administration 
1.   Every person has the right to have his or her affairs 
handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by 
the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. 
2.   This right includes: 
(a) the right of every person to be heard, before any 
individual measure which would affect him or her adversely 
is taken; 
(b) the right of every person to have access to his or her 
file, while respecting the legitimate interests of 
confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy; 
(c) the obligation of the administration to give reasons for 
its decisions. 
3.   Every person has the right to have the Union make good 
any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in 
the performance of their duties, in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member 
States. 
4.   Every person may write to the institutions of the Union 
in one of the languages of the Treaties and must have an 
answer in the same language. 
2.36 The idea of a right to good or lawful administration has not been met with universal approval 
among academic experts. Two Cambridge professors argued, in relation to including such a 
right in the proposed British Bill of Rights, that this “should be approached with considerable 
caution”.27 They argue that a right to lawful administration would in effect merely repeat rights 
that are already to be found in the common law (judge-made law) in England and Wales. Their 
assessment is that a “blandly expressed right to good administration in a bill of rights would be 
unlikely to do much damage, and its omission from a catalogue of rights might create a 
misleading impression as to its fundamental importance. But any attempt to lay down the 
principles of good administration in detail, or to define with precision the reach of the right, might 
well add needless layers of complexity and uncertainty while making little by way of a positive 
contribution”. 
2.37 The body of judge-made law in Jersey called “the grounds of judicial review” is very closely 
modelled on the case law that has been developed by the courts in England and Wales. It is 
therefore true to say that Jersey law already includes requirements that public bodies’ decisions 
are “lawful”, “rational” and “procedurally fair”. In several respects, however, the proposed right 
would help clarify the law. 
a. Our proposed formulation would provide clarification that administrative decisions must 
also be “proportionate”, meaning that a person could argue in the Royal Court or the 
proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal, or States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
(if retained) or Jersey Public Services Ombudsman (if created), that a decision-maker 
manifestly failed to strike a “fair balance” between competing considerations or between 
means and ends. In the law of England and Wales there has been a long running debate 
in the courts as to whether “proportionality” exists in judge-made law. In Jersey, the 
                                                
27 Mark Elliott and Christopher Forsyth, A right to administrative justice? (October 11, 2012). University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2160221.  
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proposed right to good administration would confirm that public bodies are subject to this 
constraint. 
b. The inclusion as part of the proposed right of a requirement of decisions taken “within a 
reasonable time” would also clarify that there is a corresponding legal duty on public bodies 
to exercise their powers and carry out their duties in a timely manner. 
c. The proposed right includes a right to be given reasons for an administrative decision. The 
English common law, on which Jersey judge-made law is based, lacks clarity on when 
public bodies are required to give reasons for their decisions.28 The proposed right will put 
this beyond doubt in Jersey. A right to have reasons is important for several reasons. It is 
respectful of the individual affected by the decision to be provided with an explanation and 
justification. Having to give reasons can also be a positive discipline on decision-makers 
to ensure they have satisfied themselves that the decision is correct. A statement of 
reasons may also bring out in the open flaws in the decision, facilitating an appeal by the 
person affected to a tribunal or court or a complaint to the States of Jersey Complaints 
Panel (or the proposed Jersey Public Services Ombudsman). 
2.38 The proposed right would, in our view, be symbolic of a commitment by the Government of 
Jersey (which would propose the right in the projet de loi) and the States Assembly (which would 
pass the Law) to upholding administrative justice in the Island. The proposed right should 
become a point of reference for Ministers and civil servants and other public authorities.   
 
 
   
  
                                                
28 See Andrew Le Sueur, “Legal Duties to Give Reasons” (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 150; H Woolf, J 
Jowell, A Le Sueur et al, De Smith’s Judicial Review (7th edn, 2013). 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODERNISING JERSEY’S TRIBUNAL SYSTEM 
The aims of the modernisation proposals 
3.1 Many of the recommendations in this Chapter are concerned with technical aspects of 
institutional design and procedures. The ultimate aim, however, is to improve the experience 
of using tribunals for the members of the public who need to question the correctness of 
decisions made by public bodies. The package of reforms is designed to 
• simplify Jersey’s tribunal system by amalgamating eight separate administrative appeal 
tribunals into a single new tribunal called the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(JAAT) 
• make the procedures for bringing appeals more straightforward, with a codified set of user-
friendly rules that will be easier to find, be more comprehensive, and to keep updated than 
current arrangements 
• improve compliance with constitutional principles and human rights laws by enhancing 
judicial independence and making the work of tribunals more transparent and accessible.  
3.2 The great majority of responses to our interim proposals for JAAT agreed with them. Where 
consultees raised significant objections, these are considered in relation to the 
recommendations below. 
What is a tribunal? 
3.3 Tribunals are judicial bodies, usually consisting of a panel of three members. Some working 
methods of tribunals are broadly similar to courts: they adjudicate on questions of fact and law 
using an oral procedure. Tribunal judgments are legally binding on the parties, not mere 
recommendations. There is, however, often a right of appeal on a point of law to a more senior 
court (in Jersey, the Royal Court) if either party is dissatisfied by the tribunal’s decision. 
3.4 In other ways, tribunals may have features that differentiate them from courts. Tribunals 
normally focus on a particular and sometimes quite narrow area of law and public 
administration (such as social security or mental health); this enables members of the tribunal 
to develop expertise in the law and the subject matter that a generalist court may not have.  
3.5 Tribunal members come from a variety of backgrounds. The chair of the panel may be legally 
qualified (contributing an understanding of procedures, interpretation of laws and the general 
legal framework); the other members may “expert members” with professional expertise (for 
example, medical qualifications) or be “lay” members.  
3.6 Tribunal proceedings are intended to be less formal than some courts: hearings may take place 
in less intimidating surroundings, the tribunal members wear normal business attire rather than 
robes, and the rules of procedure and evidence are more flexible.  
3.7 In tribunals, the parties are normally not represented by lawyers. The aggrieved person will do 
his or her best to present the case, perhaps with the assistance of a friend or colleague. The 
public body’s case may be presented by an officer from the public body whose decision is 
being appealed against. Partly because of this, tribunals members may therefore use an 
inquisitorial approach, asking the parties questions directly in order to understand the case 
rather than relying on submissions of the parties’ legal representatives.  
3.8 Tribunal members may serve on a part-time basis, sitting on panels as and when the case 
load requires. 
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Mapping the existing administrative appeals tribunals in Jersey 
3.9 Over several decades in Jersey, a number of tribunals have been created under various Laws 
to hear appeals against administrative decisions.29 There is no official list of tribunals in Jersey 
law but according to our analysis there are eight bodies that carry out judicial functions in 
adjudicating in appeals against decisions of public bodies. (As we note below, there are also 
some bodies called “tribunals” that have different functions). 
Name of tribunal Case load 
Commissioners of Appeal for 
Taxes 
Average hearings a year: approximately 23 
(92 appeals heard 2012-15)30 
Social Security Tribunal Average hearings a year: approximately 4 
(2013: 4, 2014: 4; 2015 to July: 3)31 
Social Security Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
Average hearings a year: approximately 11 
(2013: 9, 2014: 4, 2015 to July: 2)32 
Income Support Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
Average hearings a year: approximately 3 
(2013: 6, 2014: 3, 2015 to July: 1)33 
Mental Health Review Tribunal During 2014 there were 32 applications, 9 of which went to 
full hearings34 
Health and Safety Appeal 
Tribunal 
Average hearings a year: fewer than 1 
‘In the last 3 years [to May 2015], the Appeal Tribunal has 
met on one occasion to hear an appeal from an asbestos 
licence-holder whose approval to carry out work in Jersey, 
pursuant to Regulation 5 of the Health and Safety at Work 
(Asbestos – Licensing) (Jersey) Regulations 2008, was 
withdrawn’35 
Data Protection Tribunal No information available 
Rate Appeal Board The RAB sits infrequently; the States were told in 2009 
that it had convened only twice in recent years 
 
 
                                                
29 As noted in Chapter 1, the work of the Jersey Employment and Discrimination Tribunal (JEDT) falls outside 
the scope of this report as its main work relates to contractual disputes between employers (mostly in the 
private sector) and employees rather than disputes about administrative decisions taken by public bodies. We 
envisage that JEDT would continue and work alongside JAAT, administered jointly by staff of the Judicial 
Greffe. 
30 Source: correspondence from Advocate Adam Clarke, Clerk to the Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes. 
31 Source: Freedom of Information request 
www.gov.je/Government/Pages/StatesReports.aspx?ReportID=1596   
32 Source: Freedom of Information request 
www.gov.je/Government/Pages/StatesReports.aspx?ReportID=1596  
33 Source: Freedom of Information request 
www.gov.je/Government/Pages/StatesReports.aspx?ReportID=1596  
34 Judicial Greffe & Viscount’s Department, Jersey Court Service Annual Report 2014 (April 2015) p 12. 
35 States of Jersey, P.54/2015.   
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Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes 
3.10 The Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes (CAT) is a body established by the Income Tax 
(Jersey) Law 1961, which provides that up to 12 Commissioners are appointed by the States 
Assembly on the recommendation of the Minister for Treasury and Resources. Members must 
“be chosen from residents in the Island experienced in financial matters, who are not actively 
interested in any trade, business or profession carried out in the Island which is of such a 
nature as would cause their appointment to be objected to by competitors in similar trades, 
businesses or professions carried on in Jersey”. 
3.11 CAT has jurisdiction over assessments of income tax and Goods and Services Tax (GST). 
CAT deals with two main types of case. “Delay hearings” are concerned with situations where 
the appellant taxpayer has failed to provide sufficient information for the Income Tax 
Department to establish the correct tax liability; the role of the CAT is to order information to 
be provided. “Contentious hearings” are cases where the appellant tax payer does not accept 
the assessment for tax. Either party may appeal to the Royal Court against a determination of 
CAT.  Hearings are listed in batches and heard on average three times a year.  
3.12 There is no requirement for CAT to have a legally-qualified member. Instead, under the 1961 
Law, “The Minister may appoint a clerk to the Commissioners of Appeal, and shall fix his or 
her salary and determine the conditions of his or her appointment”. Since 2008, the clerk has 
been Advocate Adam Clarke.  
3.13 In an unusual arrangement for an official body, CAT hearings take place on the premises of 
the clerk’s law firm (currently, Le Gallais and Luce). Hearings are in private and judgments are 
not published. Little information about CAT is available online and we were unsuccessful in 
our attempts to obtain information from the Taxes Office helpdesk at Cyril Le Marquand House 
(the Government of Jersey HQ).  
Social security tribunals 
3.14 Three different tribunals hear appeals relating to social security and income support.  
3.15 The Social Security Tribunal (SST) was set up in 1974. Under current law, SST determines 
appeals against decisions of the Department for Social Security relating to most aspects of 
Income Support, the Christmas bonus, TV licence benefit, cold weather bonus, food costs 
45%
35%
18%
2%
Subject matter of tribunal appeals: approximate 
proportions
Tax
Social	Security
Mental	Health
Other
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bonus and under the Health Insurance (Jersey) Law 1967. The appointments process is for 
the Minister for Social Security to nominate prospective members to the States Assembly. SST 
sits as three members to hear appeals: a legally qualified chair and two lay members. The lay 
members are drawn from a panel of 12. The rationale given for the composition of SST is that 
it “consists of a legal Chair, to ensure correct interpretation of legislation, and two lay members 
to provide a representative public view”.36 
3.16 The Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal (SSMAT), also established in 1974, hears 
appeals regarding the award of Long-Term Incapacity Allowance following assessments 
regarding loss of faculty made by a Medical Board. Until March 2015, appeals were heard by 
three medically qualified members. Since then, SSMAT hearings consist of three members: a 
legally qualified chair and two medically qualified members (selected from a panel of eight). 
The appointments process is for the Minister for Social Security to nominate prospective 
members to the States Assembly. 
3.17 The Income Support Medical Appeal Tribunal (ISMAT) hears appeals on the award of the 
Impairment Component under the Income Support system and any other decisions made on 
medical grounds and appeals regarding care requirements for Home Carer’s Allowance and 
the care assessments for Long-Term Care. ISMAT panels are formed of three members: a 
legally qualified chair and two medically qualified members.  
3.18 Under the relevant Laws until 2010, the Minister was responsible for providing administrative 
support for the three tribunals (“The Minister shall appoint a Registrar of Appeals and one or 
more deputy Registrars of Appeals from among the officers in any administration of the States 
for which the Minister is assigned responsibility who shall perform such duties in connection 
with appeals under the law as the Minister may direct subject to the provisions of this order”). 
In recent years until 2010, an individual – a retired police officer – provided administrative 
support for the work of the three tribunals. When that individual retired, a ministerial decision 
was made to transfer responsibility for supporting the tribunals to the Judicial Greffe and the 
legislation was amended accordingly.37 The motivating consideration for this change was a 
recognition within the Government of Jersey that it was necessary to “maintain the required 
independence of the appeals process from the Social Security Department”. 
3.19 Staff of the Judicial Greffe supporting the tribunals are branded as “Tribunal Service: A 
Department of the Jersey Court Service”, though these terms are not formally recognised in 
law. 
3.20 The Tribunal Service and hearings were until mid-2017 based in premises known as Trinity 
House, Bath Street, St Helier (above a branch of Ann Summers). The Tribunal Service is now 
based and hearings take place at 1st Floor, International House, 41 The Parade (above Burger 
King). 
3.21 In December 2015, the States Assembly appointed the same person (Advocate Sarah Fitz) to 
be chairman of each of the three tribunals; she is also chairman of the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal. The Minister for Social Security explained in a Proposition to the States Assembly, 
“In consultation with the Judicial Greffe, who are responsible for the convening and 
administration of the Tribunals, the role of Chairman was developed across all 3 Tribunals to 
ensure consistency of process and decision-making, and to support the further development 
of the Tribunals Service. The same principle is being applied, as appropriate, to Deputy 
                                                
36 For example States of Jersey P.145/2014. 
37 Ministerial Decision, “Social Security (Determination of claims and questions) (Jersey) Order 1974: 
Amendment”, 11 June 2010. 
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Chairmen and Panel members, ensuring a stronger pool available for each Tribunal”.38 All 
members of the tribunals are paid per sitting. 
Mental Health Review Tribunal 
3.22 When we published our consultation report in April 2016, the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
(MHRT) operated under the Mental Health (Jersey) Law 1969; this continues to be the case 
but the States Assembly has passed the Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016, which is not yet in 
force. Reform of the Island’s mental health legislation was necessary to make law and practice 
compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
3.23 MHRT’s role is to adjudicate on appeals against decisions that a patient is compulsorily 
detained or treated. MHRT must direct that the patient be discharged unless it is satisfied that 
there is good reason to continue to detain the patient. Mind Jersey (the mental health charity) 
employs an “Independent Mental Health Advocate”, who offers assistance free of charge to 
appellants. Legal representation is available under a recently implemented special legal aid 
scheme under which Jersey advocates on a specialist panel offer services on a fixed fee basis 
(paid for by public funds). Appeals are heard at St Saviour’s Hospital.  
3.24 Members of MHRT are appointed by the Bailiff, which means there is no public record of who 
is appointed in Propositions to the States Assembly (as there are for most other tribunals, 
where appointees are nominated by Ministers). Advocate Sarah Fitz is the current chairman. 
All members of MHRT are paid per sitting.  
3.25 MHRT sits as a panel of three: a legally-qualified chairman, a medical member, and a lay 
member (“qualified by virtue of his or her experience in administration or application of mental 
health legislation, or his or her knowledge of social services, or of such other qualification as 
the Bailiff considers suitable”). The Judicial Greffe provides administrative support for the work 
of MHRT. 
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal 
3.26 The Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal (HSAT), which rarely sits, hears appeals made against 
administrative sanctions (‘notices’) served under the Health and Safety at Work (Jersey) Law 
1989 and against decisions taken by the Minister in respect of licence provisions.  
3.27 The tribunal members are: a chairman and deputy chairman (who must be advocates or 
solicitors of not less than 7 years’ standing) and two lay members appointed by States 
Assembly. All members of the tribunal are unremunerated.  
3.28 The legislation provides that “The Tribunal may appoint a secretary and such other officers as 
it thinks fit”. In practice, the Judicial Greffe provides administrative support for the work of 
HSAT. 
Data Protection Tribunal 
3.29 The remit of the Data Protection Tribunal (DPT) is to adjudicate on appeals by people 
aggrieved by decisions of the Data Protection/Information Commissioner for Jersey under the 
Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005. DPT consists of a legally qualified president and four other 
members, appointed by the States Assembly for terms of six years on the recommendation “of 
the Minister and on the basis that they evenly represent the interests of data subjects and of 
                                                
38 States of Jersey P.11/2016 (re-issue).  
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data controllers”. The DPT is required to publish its determinations.39 Members of the tribunal 
are remunerated. We have been unable to locate information on the DPT’s caseload.  
Rate Appeal Board 
3.30 The Rate Appeal Board (RAB), operating under the Rates (Jersey) Law 2005, hears appeals 
from decisions of Assessment Committees (each of the 12 Parishes has one). It is a successor 
body to the Parish Rate Appeal Board established under Article 41 of the Parish Rate 
(Administration) (Jersey) Law 2003. 
3.31 It consists of between five and nine members appointed by the States Assembly on the 
recommendation of the Minister for Treasury and Resources; a panel of at least three members 
sits to hear appeals.  
3.32 In 2011, the States were told that RAB meets “infrequently”40 and in 2009 that “they have only 
met twice in recent years”.41 We have been unable to establish who is responsible for providing 
administrative support for the work of RAB. 
Other appellate bodies 
3.33 During our mapping exercise, we identified further bodies with appellate functions related to 
administrative decision-making but which fall outside the definition of an administrative appeal 
tribunal. 
Discretionary education grants panel 
3.34 The Appeals panel on discretionary education grants operates under the Education 
(Discretionary Grants–General)(Jersey) Order 2008. Its role is to hear appeals against 
decisions relating to higher education grants to students. Because of its composition, it is best 
understood as part of the internal complaints system of the Department of Education rather 
than an independent tribunal exercising judicial powers. It consists of: (i) the Director of 
Education or a nominated officer; (ii) the Minister or a nominated person; and (iii) a person, 
nominated by the Minister, ‘who is independent of the administrations of the States for which 
the Minister has been assigned responsibility’. Overall, the membership clearly lacks judicial 
independence and contains no requirement for legal expertise (despite the fact that appeals 
may involve the interpretation and application of legislation).  
Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
3.35 The role of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) is to adjudicate on issues arising under the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Jersey) Law 2005, which provides a legal framework 
under which public authorities in Jersey may use investigatory powers, including interception 
of communications and covert surveillance.  The IPT comprises an ordinary member of the 
Jersey Court of Appeal and two Jurats, appointed by the Superior Number of the Royal Court. 
The seniority of its judges, the sensitivity of the cases that it may be called on to hear, and the 
special procedures it needs to adopt in order to preserve secrecy, mark it out as different from 
other tribunals. It is, in reality, a senior level court.  
 
                                                
39 Data Protection (Appeals) (Jersey) Regulations 2006, Article 18(5). 
40 States of Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 12 July 2011. 
41 States of Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 10 December 2010. 
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Appeals against Prison discipline decisions 
3.36 Until recently, the Prison Board of Visitors (PBV) consisting of Jurats (the judges of fact in the 
Royal Court) exercised supervisory functions over conditions in HMP La Moye and made an 
annual report to the States Assembly. A panel appointed by the chairman of the Prison Board 
of Visitors heard appeals against findings of guilt relating to a breach of prison discipline. The 
composition of the Prison Board of Visitors was controversial for several years,42 as it was 
doubtful that PBV met international human rights standards of independence because the 
Jurats had been involved (as members of the Royal Court) in decisions to sentence people to 
imprisonment.43   
3.37 New arrangements came into force in September 2017 following amendments to the Prison 
(Jersey) Rules 2007 by the Prison (Amendment No. 2) (Jersey) Rules 2017. Under the new 
rule 94, a prisoner has 14 days to appeal against a finding of guilt for breach of prison 
discipline.  
• If finding of guilt was made by the Governor, the appeal is to Minister for Home Affairs. 
• If the finding of guilt was made by a prison officer appointed by the Governor, the appeal 
is to a “disciplinary appeals panel” constituted under directions by the Minister. The panel 
must consist of three members of staff of the prison selected by the Governor from a list 
of role holders (for example, “the prison chaplain”, “the head of learning and skills”, and 
“the education manager”). The disciplinary appeals panel makes recommendations to the 
Governor after hearing the appeal, which the Governor must follow. If the prisoner is 
aggrieved by the outcome of the appeal to the disciplinary appeals panel, he or she may 
make a second appeal to the Governor. If the Governor concludes that the disciplinary 
appeals panel was correct, must refer to appeal to the Minister if requested by the prisoner 
to do so. 
3.38 The disciplinary appeals panel is clearly not independent from the original decision-maker, so 
is not a judicial tribunal. It is best understood as a form of internal complaints handling. We 
return to consider the new arrangements, which we regard as unsatisfactory, in Chapter 4. 
Bodies called ‘tribunals’ that are not appellate bodies 
3.39 Three bodies called ‘tribunals’ do not hear administrative appeals. 
3.40 A Minister may in cases where it is alleged that conduct by an approved medical practitioner 
has been prejudicial to the Health Insurance Fund refer the matter to the Health Services 
Disciplinary Tribunal (HSDT) established under Articles 1, 27 and Schedule 2 to the Health 
Insurance (Jersey) Law 1967. The Tribunal makes recommendations to the Minister. The 
practitioner may appeal to the Royal Court against the Minister’s decision. In 2011, the States 
Assembly were told that tribunal has sat only twice in 40 years.  The HSDT is part of the initial 
decision-making process rather an appeal. 
3.41 Under the Misuse of Drugs (Jersey) Law 1978, the Minister may ask the Bailiff to constitute a 
panel of the Misuse of Drugs Tribunal (MDT) to inquire into and advise the Minister on 
situations where it thought that a medical practitioner is prescribing, administering or supplying 
or authorizing the administration and supply of, any controlled drug in an irresponsible manner. 
The MDT is part of the initial decision-making process rather an appeal. 
                                                
42 States of Jersey Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel, Prison Board of Visitors, S.R.9/2015. 
43 www.gov.je/News/2015/pages/PrisonBoardVisitors.aspx.   
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3.42 A Marine Accident Tribunal appointed under Article 167 of the Shipping (Jersey) Law 2002 Art 
167, which investigates accidents. It is part of the initial decision-making process rather than 
an appeal. 
3.43 For clarity and to aid public understanding of the law, we recommend to the Law Draftsmen 
that the term “tribunal” in Jersey legislation should in future be reserved for judicial bodies 
adjudicating on appeals and should not be used for bodies exercising executive or advisory 
functions.     
Unmet need: missing rights of appeal to a tribunal? 
3.44 The mapping exercise has identified for the first time the tribunals “landscape” in Jersey. 
During the consultation period, we asked consultees whether there were any gaps in the 
landscape: situations where it would be useful to have a right of appeal to a tribunal but where 
none currently exists. We did not receive any suggestions. 
3.45 Our own suggestion is decision-making relating to children’s special educational needs (SEN). 
Under Article 31 of the Education (Jersey) Law 1999, parents have a right to request and 
assessment of their children’s SEN. If a child is assessed to have SEN, the Minister must 
ensure that provision is made to meet the needs. There is a right “to appeal against any part 
of the results of the assessment” to the Minister within 15 days after the parent is notified of 
the results of the assessment. Article 31(4) provides: 
“The Minister may by written direction delegate the power to receive and determine any 
appeal … to the Chief Officer or to a panel of persons appointed by the Minister for the 
purpose, subject to the conditions, exceptions or qualifications that the Minister may specify 
in the direction.” 
3.46 During 2015, the States Assembly Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel conducted an 
inquiry into SEN.44 Key finding 5.19 was that ‘The legislation and policies relating to SEN in 
Jersey provide a suitable framework for the provision of a high quality service’ but 
recommended that ‘The Minister … must improve lines of communication with parents of SEN 
children’. The Panel’s report did not, however, deal specifically with any issues relating to 
appeals. Our assessment is that the current system of appeals to a Minister fails to provide a 
sufficiently independent form of redress. We return to this issue in Chapter 4. 
Lesson learning from other jurisdictions 
3.47 In England and Wales, more than 70 separate tribunals were established during the 20th 
century as alternatives to legal proceedings in courts. Initially, tribunals had close ties with the 
government departments against whose decisions they heard appeals: for example, tribunal 
members were appointed by Ministers. By the 1950s, however, there was a realisation that 
tribunals should operate, and be seen to operate, independently of government departments.  
3.48 Further major reforms were introduced for tribunals in England and Wales, and some that 
operate at a pan-UK level, by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. For the first 
time, it was made clear that all members of tribunals (whether legally qualified or not) are 
members of the judiciary. The 2007 reforms made significant structural changes. Over 70 
separate tribunals set up under different Acts of Parliament were amalgamated into a single 
tribunal called the First-tier Tribunal, from which there is a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal. 
The post of Senior President of Tribunals was created (occupied by a senior judge), to provide 
strategic leadership to the new tribunal system. The administrative support arrangements for 
                                                
44 States of Jersey Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel, Special Education Needs, Presented to the 
States on 14 July 2015, S.R.3/2015. 
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tribunals were also modernised, with responsibilities transferred from individual tribunals or 
government departments to Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service.45  
3.49 The Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014, enacted by the Scottish Parliament, introduced broadly 
comparable reforms to the tribunal system in Scotland. This included creating a judicial 
leadership role of Senior President of Scottish Tribunals.46  
3.50 Structural reforms to tribunals in Northern Ireland have also been implemented and continue 
to be discussed.  Five previously separate tribunals on social security and child support have 
been amalgamated into a single tribunal. In 2009, the Northern Ireland Executive agreed that 
the Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service should assume administrative 
responsibilities for all tribunals on a phased basis. Proposals have been made to create the 
Northern Ireland Amalgamated Tribunal (NIAT), which would take the process of 
amalgamation further.47 
3.51 More recently, reforms to tribunals in Wales will be implemented during 2018 under the Wales 
Act 2017.48 
3.52 A preference for replacing a proliferation of specialist tribunals with a ‘super tribunal’ can also 
be seen in Australia, at both Commonwealth and State levels. Our view is that useful lessons 
can be learnt for Jersey from other jurisdictions, with necessary adaptations to the special 
circumstances of a small jurisdiction – including Jersey’s constitutional framework and the 
smaller scale on which its justice systems operate. 
How much will the tribunal reforms cost? 
3.53 The majority of consultation responses expressed support for the package of reforms to 
tribunals that we proposed in April 2016. One response disagreed and was critical of the interim 
proposals, saying “what is proposed amounts to a Rolls Royce service, and if it were to be 
adopted, pressure would be brought to bear on the delivery of other services which have at 
least equal and probably more importance for the community”. 
3.54 It is not our intention to propose a grandiose and unjustifiably expensive package of reforms. 
The final assessment of the costs and benefits of making changes is a political decision for the 
Government of Jersey and the States of Jersey. As a law reform agency, our role can include 
                                                
45 For background, see Sir Andrew Leggatt, Report of the Review of Tribunals: Tribunals for Users – One 
System, One Service (2001); Michael Adler, “Tribunal Reform: Proportionate Dispute Resolution and the 
Pursuit of Administrative Justice” (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 958; Genevra Richardson and Hazel Genn, 
“Tribunals in Transition: Resolution or Adjudication” [2007] Public Law 116; Andrew Le Sueur, “Administrative 
Justice and the Resolution of Disputes”, ch 11 in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (7th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2011).   
46 For background, see Scottish Government, “Scottish Tribunals Landscape”  
www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/policies/civil-courts/tribunal-system/Tribunals; Tom Mullen and Chris Gill, 
“Scottish Tribunals: Smith Commission Proposes Major Transfer of Jurisdiction to Scotland”  
www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/ArticleView/ar
ticleId/5228/Tom-Mullen-and-Chris-Gill-Scottish-Tribunals-Smith-Commission-Proposes-Major-Transfer-of-
Jurisdiction-to-Scotland.aspx (2015). 
47 For background, see Gráinne McKeever and Brian Thompson, Redressing Users’ Disadvantage: Proposals 
for Tribunal Reform in Northern Ireland (Law Centre NI, 2010) and Brian Thompson, Structural Tribunal 
Reform in Northern Ireland (Law Centre NI, 2011); Marie Anderson et al, Mapping the Administrative Justice 
Landscape in Northern Ireland: report on research undertaken on the Administrative Justice System in 
Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Ombudsman’s Office, 2014). 
48 For background, see Huw Pritchard, “Tribunal reform in Wales under the Wales Act 2017”, UKAJI Blog, July 
2017, https://ukaji.org/2017/07/20/tribunal-reform-in-wales-under-the-wales-act-2017/ . 
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identifying the different “heads” of costs and savings (but we lack the resources to be able to 
quantify these). 
3.55 One head is one-off set-up costs (such as drafting and scrutinising the Administrative Justice 
(Jersey) Law. It will normally be necessary to spend money in order to save money in the 
longer run or provide a better service.   
3.56 Another head of costs/savings is the ongoing operational costs of running the proposed new 
system, it is helpful to identify three categories of changes – (i) those likely to create 
opportunities for saving operational costs, (ii) changes that are likely to be cost neutral, either 
because there is no significant cost or new costs are cancelled out by anticipated savings, and 
(ii) change that is likely to lead to increased cost.  
3.57 A further head is any non-financial benefits that may flow from the proposed reforms. In 
relation to tribunals, these may include: improving public confidence and trust in the system; 
meeting international human rights standards on fair trials; and enhancing the judicial 
independence of tribunal members. 
3.58 In discussing costs and benefits, it is useful to identify the impact on different bodies and 
individuals of the costs and benefits. In relation to tribunal reform, these are (i) to the Judicial 
Greffe, the public body responsible for running courts and tribunals, paid for by public funds 
allocated by the Chief Minister, (ii) users of the tribunal system, who comprise the individuals 
challenging administrative decisions and the public bodies (e.g. Department for Health and 
Social Services) that must respond appeals, and (iii) others, including for example advice 
services such as the Jersey Citizen’s Advice Bureau which allocate resources in supporting 
people to use the tribunal system. 
3.59 Applying these considerations to the proposal for JAAT: 
One-off set-up 
costs 
• Drafting the Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law to implement changes –
cost to Government of Jersey 
• Scrutiny of projet de loi on Administrative (Jersey) Law – cost to States 
Assembly 
• Work on producing the first draft of the JAAT Rules; some efficiency 
savings should be gained from having tribunal rules in one place 
• Set-up costs of Judicial Greffe in starting to support the work of JAAT  
Ongoing 
operational 
costs 
• Ongoing costs of Judicial Greffe in supporting work of JAAT 
• Part-time salary of Chairman of JAAT (but some of this cost would 
replace daily fees paid to a senior lawyer member of the current tribunal 
system) 
• Cost of preparing Chairman of JAAT’s annual report (cost to Judicial 
Greffe) 
• Occasional payments from the public purse for legal advice and 
representations for appellants who would not otherwise have a fair 
hearing  
• Arrangement for publishing JAAT judgments or summaries of significant 
cases  
Ongoing 
savings 
• Day-to-day efficiency savings to the public funds (the Judicial Greffe and 
departments) from running one tribunal rather than 9 separate ones  
• Streamlined process for appointing members (savings to the States 
Assembly or Judicial and Legal Services Commission 
Other benefits • Improved judicial independence   
• Improved adherence to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in relation to open hearings   
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Creating a single administrative tribunal 
Recommendation 3.1: Create a new tribunal (the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal) with 
a broad jurisdiction to hear appeals against administrative decisions. 
3.60 The approach adopted in Jersey has been to create separate tribunals under different Laws 
relating to different types of administrative decision-making. For example, during the research 
interviews,49 we were told that told that three separate social security tribunals were needed 
because there are three separate types of benefit operating under different Laws. Another 
reason for having separate tribunals, some interviewees suggested, was to enable members 
to develop expertise in the subject matter and law relating to particular types of appeals. 
3.61 There are, however, considerable disadvantages to having several separate tribunals. 
• The administrative redress system becomes unnecessarily complicated. 
• Providing administrative support to eight separate tribunals is less efficient and effective 
than supporting the work of one tribunal. 
• There are unnecessary differences between tribunals in relation to appointment of 
members, terms of service, and procedures. 
• The absence of a tribunal with general jurisdiction across different Laws acts as a 
disincentive to creating tribunal appeals (because setting up a new tribunal is a 
cumbersome process). Laws therefore create appeals to the Royal Court – but this is 
disproportionate for straightforward appeals about facts or straightforward questions of 
law. 
• It can be difficult to recruit members to serve on a tribunal that is expected to sit 
infrequently. 
• There was limited evidence of sharing of good practice across the different tribunals 
(though this may be changing following the appointment of the same Chairman across 
several tribunals). 
• Provision of training for members across the fragmented tribunals is more difficult to deliver 
than if there was a single tribunal. 
3.62 The experience in England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Australia is that there is 
no need to have a separate tribunal for each type of administrative decision taken under 
different laws. Appeals can be directed to a single tribunal with broad jurisdiction.  
3.63 The creation of JAAT would build on administrative changes that have taken place in recent 
years across Jersey’s tribunals. As outlined above, the administration of several tribunals has 
been transferred from States departments to the Judicial Greffe. Moreover, since November 
2015, the same person has held the posts as legal chairman of the three social security 
tribunals and the Mental Health Review Tribunal (Advocate Sarah Fitz).  
3.64 JAAT should have administrative support services provided by the Judicial Greffe. For 
presentational or administrative reasons, the staff of the Judicial Greffe who currently provide 
administrative support to some of the existing tribunals are designated as the “Tribunal 
Service”. We do not see any legal necessity for the Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law to 
create a free-standing Tribunal Service separate from the other functions of the Judicial Greffe; 
indeed, to do so would run counter to the models for integrated courts and tribunals services 
that have been established in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland over the past 
decade. 
                                                
49 See Annex D: Research statement for further information on our research methods. 
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3.65 A consequence of our recommendation is that the work of the Commissioners of Appeal for 
Taxes would no longer be supported by an advocate in private practice (appointed as “clerk” 
to CAT), with CAT conducting hearings from the clerk’s law firm’s premises.50 In response to 
our consultation report, a member of CAT told us that it would be unsatisfactory for CAT to be 
supported by Judicial Greffe staff (“perhaps from a pool and therefore probably not dedicated 
to us”) and he expressed fear that new arrangements would be a “dumbing down” if panels of 
CAT no longer had the presence of an advocate as clerk (whose advice in contentious cases 
is described as invaluable). The Tribunal Service of the Judicial Greffe took a different view, 
describing the private sector support for CAT as “not best practice, nor does it meet the needs 
of a modern tribunal service”. We agree.    
3.66  JAAT will be a “judicial tribunal” for the purposes of Article 11 of the Departments of the 
Judiciary and the Legislature (Jersey) Law 1965. This provides: 
“(1) The Judicial Greffier, the Deputy Judicial Greffier or a Greffier Substitute shall attend at 
all sittings of the courts and judicial tribunals to record the acts and decisions of those courts 
and tribunals, to take down where necessary the depositions of witnesses and generally to 
carry out all the duties of clerk. 
(2) All acts and decisions so recorded shall be authenticated by the signature or initials of 
the Judicial Greffier, the Deputy Judicial Greffier or the Greffier Substitute, as the case may 
be, and shall be entered in the appropriate register.” 
3.67 The work of JAAT must be adequately resourced. The Department for Community and 
Constitutional Affairs’ July 2017 policy paper Judicial Independence and the Establishment of 
a Legal Services Commission, proposed a new Law to provide that “In accordance with his 
responsibility for justice policy and resources, the Chief Minister must have regard to … The 
need for the judiciary to have the support necessary to enable them to exercise their functions” 
(para 22). This should apply to JAAT as it does to other courts and tribunals. We do not 
consider there to be a need to state this expressly in the Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law 
(the name we have given to the Law that we envisage being used to implement our 
recommendations). 
Transferring jurisdiction from eight existing tribunals to JAAT 
Recommendation 3.2: Transfer jurisdiction of eight existing tribunals to JAAT 
3.68 The jurisdiction of the following eight tribunals should be transferred to JAAT and the tribunals 
should cease to exist once the new arrangements are in place: 
• Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes 
• Social Security Tribunal 
• Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal 
• Income Support Medical Appeal Tribunal 
• Mental Health Review Tribunal 
• Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal 
• Data Protection Tribunal 
• Rate Appeal Boards 
                                                
50 Since 2008, the Clerk has been Advocate Adam Clarke of Le Gallais and Luce. 
 Improving Administrative Redress – Topic Report 2017 | page 48 
3.69 The legislation under which these tribunals operate would be amended by the proposed 
Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law to change the name of the tribunal and make 
consequential amendments.   
3.70 Legal, expert and lay members of the current tribunals would become members of JAAT on 
the day of transfer, subject to any transitional arrangements thought desirable to achieve a 
smooth transition. 
Transferring appeal hearing powers to JAAT from Ministers 
Recommendation: this is considered in more detail in Recommendations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. 4.4 and 
4.5 
3.71 In Chapter 4, we recommend that five rights of appeals that currently lie to Ministers should 
instead be made to JAAT. The main rationale for the change is that it is not constitutionally or 
legally appropriate for an elected political figure to exercise appeal functions determining an 
individual’s rights and obligations. The Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law would amend the 
relevant legislation to change the name of the appeal body. 
Appeals relating to discipline under the Prison (Jersey) Rules 2007 
Recommendation: this is considered in more detail in Recommendation 4.5 
3.72 As explained above, the arrangements for hearing appeals from prisoners about disciplinary 
findings has changed during the course of our project. This was part of a broader set of reforms 
to Prison Visitors, who in the past were Jurats of the Royal Court. 
3.73 Under the revisions to rule 94 of the Prison (Jersey) Rules 2007, which came into force in 
September 2017, a “disciplinary appeals panel” of members of staff of the Prison is convened 
by the Governor to hear appeals. This panel is best understood as a form of internal complaint 
handling (see Chapter 2) rather than a tribunal. We would expect the Governor to have regard 
to the guidance on handling internal complaints that we propose should be published by the 
Chief Minister (Recommendation 2.1). 
3.74 Appeals to the Minister of Community and Constitutional Affairs from determinations of a 
disciplinary appeals panel, or from determinations of the Governor, are not in accordance with 
the principles we set out in Chapter 4 and we therefore recommend that JAAT (rather than the 
Minister) should hear appeals: see Recommendation 4.5. 
Transferring appeal hearing powers to JAAT from the Royal Court 
Recommendation: this is considered in more detail in Recommendation 7.1 
3.75 In Chapter 7, we recommend that over 50 rights of appeal that currently lie to the Royal Court 
should instead be made to JAAT. The main rationale for this proposed change is that people 
(individuals and small businesses) considering appealing against an administrative decision 
will find JAAT more accessible than the Royal Court. 
3.76 The Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law would amend the relevant legislation that currently 
creates rights of appeal against administrative decisions directly to the Royal Court. In most 
Laws, this would involve only substituting the words “Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal” 
for “Royal Court”, though in some Laws further consequential amendments may be needed. 
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Creating the judicial post of Chairman of JAAT 
Recommendation 3.3: Create a new judicial post of Chairman of the Jersey Administrative 
Appeal Tribunal 
3.77 In our interim proposals, we recommended creation of the post of “President of the Jersey 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.  
3.78 Recommendation 3.4 is in substance the same. Although there are grounds for preferring the 
title “President”,51 the term “Chairman” indicates better that the office is the counter-part to that 
of the Chairman of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal, which will run in parallel to 
the proposed JAAT.  
3.79 During the research interviews, it became clear that there has been no strong sense of 
leadership across the existing tribunals. This is unsurprising, given the fragmented structure, 
the relatively low volume of appeals, the part-time nature of the work, and remuneration of 
legal members being based on daily fees to hear particular cases allocated to them. During 
the consultation phase, all respondents who supported the proposal to create JAAT welcomed 
the idea of a senior legal member of JAAT designated as President.  
3.80 The absence of a clearly identified leadership role has in our assessment had an adverse 
effect on the quality of tribunal justice in Jersey. It has hampered the sharing of good practice 
between tribunal jurisdictions, prevented the development of strategy, hindered the provision 
of training for tribunal members, and limited the accountability for the operation of the tribunal 
system. For example, it remains unclear who has responsibility for ensuring that all tribunals 
have clear and appropriate published procedures.  
3.81 JAAT should have a judicial figure with leadership responsibilities. We envisage that this 
judicial and leadership role would be permanent, part-time and salaried. The Chaiman of JAAT 
would, in addition to sitting on appeals, have strategic responsibilities for 
• leading work, as a member of the JAAT Rules Committee, in preparing and keeping up to 
date the set of user-friendly procedures for making appeals 
• contributing to decisions about appointment of legal, professional and lay members of 
JAAT through identifying JAAT’s needs and serving on the proposed Judicial and Legal 
Services Commission52  
• ensuring that the Bailiff is aware of the views of tribunal members on matters affecting the 
operation of JAAT, to enable the Bailiff to fulfil his “representative” role as head of the 
judiciary in Jersey53 
• from time to time responding to plans for legislative change that may have an impact on 
the operation of JAAT, for example as a consultee on proposals for new rights of 
administrative appeal contained in projets de loi 
• working closely with the Judicial Greffier to ensure that the training needs of tribunal 
members are met  
• working closely with the Judicial Greffe on questions of deployment of tribunal members 
                                                
51 The senior judge of the Data Protection Tribunal is described as “a president” in the Data Protection 
(Jersey) Law 2005. 
52 See Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Judicial Independence and 
the Establishment of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (July 2017) para 28 ff. 
53 See Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Judicial Independence and 
the Establishment of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (July 2017) para 26-27. 
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• making an annual report to the States Assembly on the operation of JAAT  
• ensuring that the operation of JAAT is kept informed by research and learning from good 
practice in tribunals in the United Kingdom and other systems. 
3.82 We recommend that the Chairman of JAAT should be appointed on a permanent, part-time 
salaried basis. A permanent appointment – rather than a fixed-term of for example 4 years – 
is important for enhancing the judicial independence of this post for the reasons discussed 
below. Appointment on a salary, rather than on a daily fee-paid basis, will ensure that the 
officeholder has sufficient time to devote to the leadership aspects of the role beyond sitting 
on panels to hear particular appeals. We envisage that the Chairman will preside in a 
substantial number of appeals. (If the Chairman was not salaried, daily fees would need to be 
paid for this work). 
Creating the judicial post of Deputy Chairman of JAAT 
Recommendation 3.4: Create a new judicial post of Deputy Chairman of the Jersey 
Administrative Appeal Tribunal 
3.83 We propose that one of the legal members of JAAT should be appointed to a post of Deputy 
Chairman of the Jersey Administrative Appeal Tribunal. This does not need to be a salaried 
post as the substantial part of the office-holders time will be focused on hearing appeals, for 
which a daily fee-paid arrangement is satisfactory. The Deputy Chairman will deputise for the 
Chairman of JAAT when required. 
 
Members of JAAT to be included in the legal definition of “the judiciary 
of Jersey” 
Recommendation 3.5: All members of JAAT – the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, legal 
members, expert members, and lay members – should fall within the definition of “the 
judiciary of Jersey” in the proposed legislation to create a Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission 
3.84 In the consultation paper published by the Department for Community and Constitutional 
Affairs in July 2017, the Government of Jersey proposes to enact a legal definition of “the 
judiciary of Jersey”.54 The practical purpose of this is to demarcate who benefits from the 
“guarantee of judicial independence” and which posts will be appointed by the proposed 
Judicial and Legal Services Commission. 
3.85 The consultation paper expressly leaves open the position of “other persons who also exercise 
judicial functions in the tribunals of Jersey”. We recommend that all members of JAAT should 
be recognised as part of the “judiciary of Jersey”. It would be undesirable to draw a distinction 
between legally qualified members of JAAT (the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and other legal 
members) and the expert members and lay members. All members of JAAT are equally 
responsible for adjudicating and should therefore have the same status for the purposes of 
appointments and protection. 
                                                
54 See Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Judicial Independence and 
the Establishment of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (July 2017) para 6. 
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Members of JAAT appointed by the proposed Judicial and Legal 
Services Commission 
Recommendation 3.6: Members of JAAT should be appointed by the proposed Judicial and 
Legal Services 
3.86 In our consultation paper published in April 2016, we made detailed proposals about the 
arrangements for appointing members of JAAT.55 These have been overtaken by the 
proposals made in July 2017 by the Department of Community and Constitutional Affairs for 
the creation of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission, chaired by the Bailiff, that will have 
the function of appointing the Island’s judiciary. 
3.87 We support the principle of a judicial appointments commission. If one is established in Jersey, 
we recommend that all appointments to JAAT should be made by this body. 
Diversity across the members of JAAT 
Recommendation 3.7: The Judicial and Legal Services Commission proposed by the 
Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs should have legal duty to “have regard 
to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for 
appointments” to JAAT. 
3.88 One of the features that distinguishes most tribunals from many courts is that their membership 
includes lay people. The rationale for having lay people as judges on matters relating to 
administrative decision-making is that they “provide a representative public view” (to use the 
words often used in Propositions to the States Assembly for appointments of members of 
Jersey’s current tribunals. The reason for valuing diversity rests on the understanding that a 
diverse judicial body is better at carrying it is functions than one that is drawn from a narrow 
spectrum of society. For example, where a panel of three members has the task of finding 
facts, or applying or developing the law, the decision will be enriched if the panel is able to 
draw on different life experiences and perspectives. 
3.89 We investigated the diversity of the lay membership of Jersey’s current tribunals. We examined 
Propositions for tribunal appointments lodged au Greffe in the 6½ year period from January 
2011 to May 2017 (when the last appointments were made). Appointments were made to the 
Income Support Medical Appeal Tribunal, the Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes, the Rate 
Appeal Board, the Social Security Tribunal, the Health and Safety Tribunal, and the Income 
Support Medical Appeal Tribunal. No appointments to the Data Protection Tribunal appear to 
have been made in this period and we are unable to ascertain who the current members are.56 
There is no record of membership of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in the official record 
of the States of Jersey, as members are appointed by the Bailiff.   
3.90 During the sample period, 38 individuals were appointed or reappointed to membership of a 
tribunal (see the Table at the end of this Chapter for details). Eight of the individuals are female 
(21%). Fifteen are former or current employees of the States of Jersey (40%). Seventeen are 
described as retired or semi-retired in the Propositions (45%). The proportion of retired people 
may be affected by the requirement, in relation to the Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes, that 
                                                
55 Jersey Law Commission, Consultation Paper: Improving Administrative Redress in Jersey Consultation 
Paper No.1/2016/CP Chapter 2. 
56 The last appointments for which a Proposition is available on the States Assembly website is dated 2006. 
Under the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005, members hold office for 6 years. 
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members must not be “actively interested in any trade, business or profession carried out in 
the Island”.57 
3.91 During the research interviews, several interviewees referred to the stereotype that lay tribunal 
members in Jersey are retired men, mostly with a background in working for the States. Our 
data confirms that this is a broadly accurate impression. We make absolutely no criticism of 
the individuals concerned. The concern about lack of diversity is that current practices are 
leading to a profile of lay membership of the tribunals that is not representative of Jersey 
society in terms of gender, age and employment background. This risks undermining the stated 
aim of having lay tribunal members (to provide “a representative public view”). 
3.92 In England and Wales, when the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) was established 
by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, one of the aims was to address the long-standing 
problem that the judiciary lacked diversity. There were too few women and the number of 
judges from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds was also disproportionately small. 
The judicial appointments bodies in Northern Ireland and in Scotland also have legal duties in 
relation to diversity. 
3.93 As the Jersey Law Commission, we express no official view about the decision of the 
Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs to entirely exclude provisions relating to 
diversity from its package of reforms.58 We do, however, recommend that in relation to 
appointments to JAAT the new Judicial and Legal Services Commission should have a 
diversity duty. 
3.94 We suggest that this diversity duty should be modelled on the one that applies to JAC in 
England and Wales: a duty “to have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of 
persons available for selection for appointments”.59 We envisage that the Jersey Judicial and 
Legal Services Commission would fulfil its diversity duty through, for example, outreach and 
awareness events. Selection of candidates should be solely on merit and good character.60 
Defining professional eligibility criteria for Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman 
Recommendation 3.8: The professional eligibility criterion for appointment as Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman of JAAT should be 7 years relevant legal experience. 
3.95 The judicial posts of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of JAAT will be new ones. As explained 
above, the Chairman’s role will involve leadership functions as well as hearing appeals. Both 
posts should be occupied by people with significant prior legal experience, to ensure that they 
have sufficient professional standing to command respect. We therefore propose that there 
should be an eligibility criterion related to a minimum number of years of relevant legal 
experience.  
                                                
57 Income Tax (Jersey) Law 1961 Article 10. 
58 As set out in Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Judicial 
Independence and the Establishment of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (July 2017). 
59 UK Constitutional Reform Act 2005 section 64 (“Encouragement of diversity”). 
60 We note that this is an aspect of a much broader issue of diversity in public appointments and membership 
of public bodies in the Island. It will be for the Chief Minister to take steps to put in place an “effective island 
diversity strategy … essential in addressing the challenges of an increasingly diverse community”, as 
recommended by the Report of the Independent Jersey Care Inquiry in July 2017. 
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3.96 In our April 2016 consultation paper, we suggested that the legal professional criterion for the 
Chairman of JAAT should be 10 years of relevant law-related work experience. The 
consultation paper published in July 2017 by the Department for Community and Constitutional 
Affairs proposes that “The Master of the Royal Court, Family Court Registrars, and the 
Chairmen and Deputy Chairman of the Jersey Employment and Discrimination Tribunal shall 
have 7 years legal practice in Jersey (including as a Law Officer) or the Commonwealth”.61  
3.97 In light of the Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs’ general proposals on 
judicial appointments, we consider our initial proposal of 10 years sets the bar too high and 
risks missing out on candidates well placed to carry out the duties of Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman.  
3.98 We therefore recommend that the eligibility criterion for the posts of Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman should be 7 years. We would prefer the criterion to be framed as “years relevant 
legal experience” rather than “years legal practice”. The term “practice” connotes private 
practice in a law firm, which is presumably why the Department for Community and 
Constitutional Affairs adds the qualification “including as a Law Officer”. It is possible to foresee 
good applicants for these posts coming from a variety of other legal professional backgrounds, 
including for example as in-house counsel, law draftsmen, or legal academics.   
3.99 This criterion could be contained either in the proposed Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law or 
in Regulations made under that proposed Law. Alternatively (and in our view preferably), the 
criterion could be included in the proposed legislation to establish a Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission. This is because Jersey law will be simpler if all criteria relating to judicial 
appointments are contained in one Law. 
Defining professional eligibility criteria for legal members of JAAT 
Recommendation 3.9: The professional eligibility criterion for appointment as a “legal 
member” of JAAT should be 5 years relevant legal experience. 
3.100 The proposed ordinary “Legal members” of JAAT will preside at panel hearings if the Chairman 
or Deputy Chairman do not do so. Further work will be needed to identify how many Legal 
members should be appointed, having regard to  
• the number of hearings in which the Chairman and Deputy Chairman can be expected to 
sit 
• the anticipated case load of JAAT 
• our recommendation (see below) that there should be a presumption in the JAAT Rules 
that every panel is presided over by a Legal member. 
3.101 The current Laws defining who may be a legal member of Jersey’s existing tribunals specify a 
variety of different arrangements. 
Name of tribunal Requirements for legal members 
Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes No legal member required 
Social Security Tribunal Chairman and deputy chairmen must be ‘persons holding a 
qualification in law’ 
Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal Chairman and deputy chairmen must be ‘persons holding a 
qualification in law’ 
                                                
61 See Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Judicial Independence and 
the Establishment of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (July 2017) para 68. 
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Income Support Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
Chairman and deputy chairmen must be ‘persons holding a 
qualification in law’ 
Mental Health Review Tribunal Chairman and Vice-chairman must be an advocate or 
solicitor of the Royal Court of not less than 5 years standing 
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal Chairman and Deputy Chairman must be an advocate or 
solicitor of the Royal Court of not less than 7 years standing 
Data Protection Tribunal “The president of the Tribunal shall be an advocate or 
solicitor of at least 7 years’ standing”. The Data Protection 
Commissioner has proposed removing “the requirement for 
the President of the Data Protection Tribunal to be of seven 
years standing as an advocate or solicitor should provide 
greater latitude in the context of any future appointment 
process”.62 
Rate Appeal Boards No legal member required 
 
3.102 We recommend that for ordinary Legal members of JAAT, the eligibility criterion should be 5 
years relevant legal experience. 
Proposal on duration of judicial appointments to JAAT 
Recommendation 3.10: Appointment as a judge to JAAT should be on a permanent basis. 
Open-ended terms of office should be able to be brought to an end by resignation, reaching a 
mandatory retirement age of 72 years, or removal from office on the same basis as other 
judges. 
3.103 The length of a judicial appointment is of great significance because the “tenure of judges is 
one of the most important areas in which legal frameworks can support the judiciary in 
upholding the rule of law”.63 
3.104 The Laws that currently establish Jersey’s tribunals define the length of service for members 
in different ways.  
                                                
62 Office of the Data Protection Commissioner, Proposed Amendments to the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 
2005, http://www.statesassembly.gov.je/scrutinyreviewresearches/2010/s-24166-31881-232010.pdf  
63 J van Zyl Smit, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth Principles: a 
Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice (Report of Research Undertaken by the Bingham Centre for the 
Rule of Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2015) para 2.1.1. 
Name of existing tribunal Term of office 
Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes “The Commissioners of Appeal shall hold office for 
such period as the States may determine on their 
appointment”: Income Tax (Jersey) Law 1961, Article 
10. Current practice is to appoint for a 5-year term, 
renewable for a further 3-year term. 
Social Security Tribunal “A member of the Tribunal shall hold office for such 
period as is specified in his or her appointment and 
after expiry of such period is eligible for re-
appointment for such period as is specified in his or 
her new appointment”: Social Security (Determination 
of Claims and Questions) (Jersey) Order 1974, Article 
8. 
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3.105 In our consultation report, we made the provisional recommendation that members of JAAT 
should have permanent appointments brought to an end by (i) mandatory retirement at 72 
years, (ii) resignation, or (iii) removal from office. There were mixed responses among the 
small number of people who responded to this particular question: two people agreed (a lay 
member of a tribunal and a member of the public, who said this would provide consistency) 
and two people disagreed, one commenting that “fixed terms appointments are useful to 
ensure ‘new blood’ and a fresh approach”. 
3.106 Guidance published by the Jersey Appointments Commission (JAC)64 provides that “States 
appointees and members of independent bodies should not normally be appointed for terms 
in excess of nine years. The period of nine years includes any term of office and periods of 
office in a shadow position. The terms of office for Officers of the Crown and other judicial 
appointments are subject to the normal judicial terms of office” (our emphasis).65 As there are 
no normal, or standard, terms of judicial office in relation to administrative appeal tribunals in 
Jersey it might be thought that this guidance is not conclusive. Ministers have, however, 
                                                
64 This is an independent advisory body that oversees the recruitment of States’ employees and appointees to 
States supported or related bodies. Note that this is distinct from the Judicial and Legal Services Commission 
proposed in a July 2017 consultation paper by the Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, 
which will have a remit relating to the appointment judges and Law Offices. 
65 Jersey Appointments Commission, Guidelines for the recruitment of Senior States Employees, appointees 
and members of independent bodies (May 2016) para 10. 
Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal “A member of the Tribunal shall hold office for such 
period as is specified in his or her appointment and 
after expiry of such period is eligible for re-
appointment for such period as is specified in his or 
her new appointment”: Social Security (Determination 
of Disablement Questions) (Jersey) Order 1974, 
Article 6. 
Income Support Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
“A member of the Tribunal shall hold office for such 
period as is specified in his or her appointment and 
after expiry of such period is eligible for re-
appointment for such period as is specified in his or 
her new appointment”: Income Support (General 
Provisions) (Jersey) Order 2008, Article 15   
Mental Health Review Tribunal Appointment by Bailiff, which ceases “at midnight on 
31st December in the fifth year following the year of 
appointment”: Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016, 
Article 48.  
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal “A member of the Tribunal shall vacate the member’s 
office at the expiry of 3 years from the date of the 
member’s appointment but shall be eligible for re-
appointment”: Health and Safety at Work (Appeal 
Tribunal) (Jersey) Regulations 1989, Regulation 4 
Data Protection Tribunal “A member of the Tribunal may hold office for such 
term not exceeding 6 years as the States determine at 
the time of the person’s appointment”: Data Protection 
(Jersey) Law 2005, Schedule 5 para 9. 
Rate Appeal Board “A member of the Rate Appeal Board holds office for 
such period, not exceeding 5 years, as the States 
determine on the member’s appointment”; “A member 
of the Rate Appeal Board is eligible for re-
appointment”: Rates (Jersey) Law 2005, Article 44. 
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consulted JAC in relation to tribunal appointments, as evidenced (for example) by States of 
Jersey P.145/2014 on the reappointment of three lay members to the Social Security Tribunal. 
The Proposition states: 
“The Social Security (Determination of Claims and Questions) (Jersey) Order 1974 provides 
that members of the Tribunal may be re-appointed for a further term of office. The 
appointment of Tribunal members is in accordance with the Jersey Appointments 
Commission’s Code for Quangos and Tribunals. Re-appointment of members is accepted, 
providing it does not exceed a total of 10 years. Following consultation with the Appointments 
Commission, it is proposed that the following members, who have completed a 5 year term 
to date, are re-appointed for a further 5 years to begin from the date of States approval.” 
3.107 Although there may be practical benefits of fixed-term judicial appointments, and such 
arrangements do exist in some countries, we consider that the better arrangement is to have 
permanent appointments. The Latimer House Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and 
Judicial Independence, adopted by the Commonwealth as a statement of best practice, 
provides: “Judicial appointments should normally be permanent; whilst in some jurisdictions, 
contract appointments may be inevitable, such appointments should be subject to appropriate 
security of tenure”.66  
3.108 The definition of terms of office is an important way of enhancing judicial independence and 
impartiality. Relatively short terms of office, subject to reappointment, are widely regarded as 
less than ideal as this opens up the risk that judges will effectively be removed from office 
because of the content their judgments. The perceived risk is heightened when Ministers and 
other politicians (the States Assembly) are involved in the appointment and reappointment 
processes. Nobody has suggested that this risk has ever materialised in relation to tribunals 
in Jersey. Nonetheless, in reforming the appointments process, the risk should be eliminated 
or reduced to ensure that Jersey meets international standards on judicial independence.  
3.109 We recognise that this is a significant change from the current law and practice of relatively 
short fixed-term appointments, some of which are renewable. That practice has arisen 
because tribunal appointments are viewed as being akin to appointments to other public 
bodies; but they are not – tribunal members exercise judicial rather than executive or advisory 
functions and accordingly special constitutional considerations apply to them. 
3.110 We therefore recommend that all members of JAAT – the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, 
ordinary legal members, expert members, and lay members – should have permanent 
appointments. There should be no fixed end-date at the time of appointment. 
3.111 A tribunal member should be able to resign from office. There is precedent in Jersey law for 
having an express provision about resignation: a member of the Data Protection Tribunal “may 
resign from that office by giving at least one month’s notice in writing to the Minister”.67 
3.112 In our consultation report, we suggested that there should be a mandatory retirement age of 
72 years for members of JAAT. All but one of the responses supported this proposal; the 
response that expressed a different view referred to age discrimination and said that a 
member’s ability to contribute to the work of the tribunal was more important than age. 
3.113 In the current tribunals, only one has a mandatory retirement age: a member of the Mental 
Health Tribunal ceases to be a member “at midnight on 31st December immediately following 
the member’s 72nd birthday”.68 In selecting an age of retirement, we had regard to other judicial 
posts. The mandatory retirement age of the Bailiff of Jersey is 70 years and for Jurats it is 72 
                                                
66 Guideline II.1. 
67 Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005 Article 9. 
68 Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016 Article 48. 
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years. The standard age of retirement for holders of judicial office in the United Kingdom is 70 
years. In legal systems across the Commonwealth, retirement ages range from 60 to 75. 
3.114 In preferring 72 years, we are mindful that a part-time tribunal role may be difficult for people 
to combine with the pressures of work; a significant number of current tribunal members are 
retired. There should be a reasonable amount of time between retirement from work and 
retirement from tribunal membership, to enable members to have sufficient time in the role.  
3.115 In line with the proposed general retirement age for judges proposed by the Department of 
Community and Constitutional Affairs in its July 2017 consultation paper, we recommend that 
appointments to JAAC should end when a member reaches 72 years of age.69 The rule on 
retirement should be framed to permit a member to continue to hear and determine any appeal 
that is started before the member’s 72nd birthday. 
3.116 We recommend that members of JAAT should be subject to the general provisions on 
discipline and removal from judicial office proposed in the July 2017 consultation paper by the 
Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs.70 
Chairman of JAAT’s annual report 
Recommendation 3.11: The Chairman of JAAT should have a legal duty to prepare an annual 
report on the operation of the Tribunal and submit it to the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister 
should have a legal duty to present the report to the States Assembly. 
3.117 As part of the arrangements to make the operation of Jersey’s administrative justice system 
transparent and accountable, we recommend that the Chairman of JAAT should have a legal 
duty to make an annual report. The Chairman, assisted by staff of the Judicial Greffe, should 
set out data on number of appeals made, time taken to hear the appeals (or dispose of them 
without a hearing), the success rate of appeals, and highlight significant judgments. The report 
should be considered by the Chief Minister (in exercise of his specific ministerial functions 
relating to justice policy) and by the States Assembly. 
3.118 In a response to our consultation report, the Tribunal Service (part of the States Greffe) told 
us that annual reporting is a good idea in principle but “investment in data collection and 
administrative support will be needed to ensure this can happen. A database … which can 
capture all data from all tribunal areas and provide data which can be interrogated” would be 
needed. In relation to the Jersey Employment and Discrimination Tribunal, “currently reporting 
takes up a large amount of time due not having received investment in electronic filing systems, 
so all data is manually collected and not centrally stored. This results in a large amount of work 
at the end of the year to collect data and there is limited scope to scrutinise new information 
without going back to each original case file”. 
3.119 There should be practical coordination of the proposed Chairman of JAAT’s report, with that 
of the proposed report on administrative justice by the Chief Minister (see Recommendation 
2.2), the Jersey Court Service Annual Report made by the Judicial Greffe and Viscount’s 
Department’s, and annual report of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. Read together, 
these annual reports should provide a basis for a joined-up approach to administrative 
decision-making. 
                                                
69 See Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Judicial Independence and 
the Establishment of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (July 2017) para 119. 
70 See Department for Community and Constitutional Affairs, Consultation Paper: Judicial Independence and 
the Establishment of a Judicial and Legal Services Commission (July 2017). 
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Training for members of JAAT 
Recommendation 3.12: The Chairman of JAAT and the Judicial Greffe should have a legal 
duty to make arrangements for the training of all JAAT members 
3.120 During the research interviews, we heard different accounts of the quantity and quality of 
training provided to tribunal members. Recent developments in training for members of the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal were described as having a transformative effect, deepening 
understanding of the relevant legislation and human rights considerations that need to be 
brought to bear in this category of appeal. Some members (including legal members) involved 
in the work of other tribunals were critical of the lack of training provided to help them carry out 
their judicial functions. Overall, nobody appears to have leadership responsibility for providing 
training. Continuing professional development is a feature of all mature professions and the 
tribunal judiciary should be no exception.  
3.121 We recommend that ultimate responsibility for ensuring appropriate training should rest with 
the Chairman of JAAT and the Judicial Greffier. The legal duty should be contained in the 
proposed Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law. 
Making procedural rules for JAAT 
Recommendation 3.13: Create a legal duty on the Superior Number of the Royal Court, with 
the advice and assistance of a Rules Committee, to make JAAT Rules to regulate how 
appeals are made and determined. 
3.122 As a new judicial tribunal, JAAT will require a set of procedural rules to govern how appeals 
are made and determined. We recommend that the appropriate body to formally adopt these 
JAAT Rules is the Superior Number of the Royal Court (the Bailiff or Deputy Bailiff and five or 
more Jurats). A Rules Committee, including the Chairman of JAAT, should be responsible for 
preparing the JAAT Rules and keeping them under review. The JAAT Rules Committee should 
consult on a draft version of the Rules. 
3.123 We note that procedural rules for some of the existing tribunals are made by Ministers, as are 
the procedures for the Jersey Employment and Discrimination Tribunal.71 We do not consider 
it appropriate for Ministers to make rules for a judicial body that will adjudicating on legal 
challenges to administrative decisions made by or in the name of Ministers. The Superior 
Number of the Royal Court is responsible for adopting procedural rules for the Petty Debts 
Court and would be well suited to adopt the JAAT Rules. 
3.124 The current procedural rules for the existing administrative appeals tribunals in Jersey are 
found in various pieces of primary and secondary legislation and guidance published on 
Government of Jersey and Judicial Greffe web pages. These will be replaced by the JAAT 
Rules. 
                                                
71 Employment and Discrimination Tribunal (Procedure) (Jersey) Order 2016. 
72 Government of Jersey website, “How to appeal a notice issued by the taxes office” 
www.gov.je/TaxesMoney/IncomeTax/Technical/Guidelines/Pages/HowToAppeal.aspx 
Existing tribunal Procedural rules 
Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes Income Tax (Jersey) Law 1961 does not create any 
power to make procedural rules. Some basic 
information is available on the Government of Jersey 
website.72 If appeals to the Commissioners is 
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The content and style of the JAAT Rules 
Recommendation 3.14 
The JAAT Rules should be designed and written with appellants’ needs in mind and 
expressed in a user-friendly style. 
The JAAT Rules should include provision for determining the composition of panels to hear 
different types of appeals; this should include provision that the Chairman of JAAT, the 
Deputy Chairman or another legally qualified member should preside over any panel. 
The JAAT Rules should include an “overriding objective” of enabling JAAT to deal with cases 
fairly and justly. 
The JAAT Rules should include power for the Chairman of JAAT to regulate the publication of 
judgments and other documents relating to appeals. 
The JAAT Rules should state that a party may appoint a legally qualified or lay representative. 
3.125 In Recommendation 3.14, we draw together a number of considerations that the JAAT Rules 
Committee should have regard to in developing the JAAT Rules. 
                                                
73 Tribunal Service, “Health and Safety” www.jerseyemploymenttribunal.org/tribunals/health-safety/  
intended to be independent of the Government of 
Jersey, it is questionable whether the appeal 
procedures should be determined and published by 
the Government. 
Social Security Tribunal Social	Security	(Determination	of	Claims	and	Questions)	
(Jersey)	Order	1974,	Articles	9-14. 
Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal Social Security (Determination of Disablement 
Questions) (Jersey) Order 1974, Article 8 states “The 
procedure for appeals to a Tribunal shall be in 
accordance with the procedure set out in Article 16 of 
the Income Support (General Provisions) (Jersey) 
Order 2008 for the Medical Appeal Tribunal 
constituted under Article 15 of that Order, as if the 
appeal was in respect of any matter determined in 
accordance with that Order”. 
Income Support Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
Income Support (General Provisions) (Jersey) Order 
2008, Articles 15-16. 
Mental Health Review Tribunal Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016, Schedule.  
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal Health and Safety at Work (Jersey) Law 1989 and 
Health and Safety at Work (Appeal Tribunal) (Jersey) 
Regulations 1989 make provision for a tribunal but do 
not contain any procedural rules. The Tribunal Service 
website provides some basic information – an 
address and appeal form.73 
Data Protection Tribunal Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005, Schedule 6 and 
Data Protection (Appeals) (Jersey) Regulations 2006.  
Rate Appeal Board Rates (Jersey) Law 2005, Article 45. 
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Make the JAAT Rules as user-friendly as possible 
3.126 The JAAT Rules should designed with the needs of appellants in mind. The vast majority of 
appellants will bring appeals without the benefit of legal advice or representation. This means 
that the JAAT Rules should be as simple as possible and expressed in straightforward 
language. Flow diagrams and other visual aids should be used to replace or supplement text 
where this will help appellants understand the process. Forms should be similarly designed 
with the needs of appellants paramount. 
JAAT Rules should contain provisions about composition of panels 
3.127 The JAAT Rules should set out the rules that govern how three-member panels will be selected 
for different categories of appeal. The following table shows how, if at all, the composition of a 
JAAT panel would differ from the current arrangements.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panels should be chaired by a Legal member 
3.128 We recommend that the JAAT Rules should state that presiding member of panels should 
normally be a legal member (the Chairman, Deputy Chairman or an ordinary legal member). 
JAAT will be a judicial body and is more likely to follow legal principles of fair procedures if 
controlled by somebody with a background in the law. Almost all responses to our consultation 
report agreed with our interim recommendation on this point. One response disagreed in 
relation to the Commissions of Appeal for Tax: a currently serving member of CAT told us that 
“Our present system works well with three lay members sitting at each hearing and a legally 
                                                
74 Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005, Schedule 6. 
Existing tribunal, whose jurisdiction 
would be transferred to JAAT 
Composition of JAAT panel to hear appeal 
Commissioners of Appeal for Tax The panel would change from  
• three lay members advised by a legally-qualified 
clerk (an advocate in private practice) to  
• a legally-qualified chairman and two lay members. 
Social Security Tribunal No change. The JAAT panel would consist of a legally 
qualified chairman and two lay members. 
Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal No change. The JAAT panel would consist of a legally 
qualified chairman and two medical members. 
Income Support Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
No change. The JAAT panel would consist of a legally 
qualified chairman and two medical members. 
Mental Health Review Tribunal No change. The JAAT panel would consist of a legally 
qualified chairman, a medical member, and a lay 
member.  
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal Probably no change. The legislation does not 
expressly specify the composition of panels; 
presumably it is either the legally-qualified 
chairman/deputy chairman sitting with the two lay 
members. 
Data Protection Tribunal No change required. The legislation requires a panel 
consisting of a legally qualified chairman and two lay 
members or a legally-qualified chairman, another 
legal member and a lay member.74  
Rate Appeal Board Change. The legislation permits an appeal panel to 
consist of between 3 and 9 members (drawn from the 
5-9 overall membership). There is no requirement for 
the panel to be chaired by a legally-qualified member. 
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qualified person present in the role of Clerk to the Commissioners … Laymen of merit and 
good character should be appropriate, as at present”. This is, in our view, a sub-optimal 
arrangement. There is a risk that by reason of being advised by a lawyer who is remunerated 
by a Minister, CAT loses the structural independence required of a judicial body. In saying this, 
we make no criticism of the current or former clerks. The need for a panel to have immediate 
access to legal knowledge on questions of substance and procedure is better fulfilled by a rule 
that panels contain a legal member rather than a panel of lay persons advised by a non-
member who is a lawyer.   
JAAT Rules should contain an overriding objective 
3.129 In our April 2016 consultation report, we noted that the Royal Court Rules Review Group had 
recently recommended the adoption of an “overriding objective” in the Royal Court Rules. We 
said that, similarly, the JAAT Rules should have an overriding objective. All the responses to 
our consultation that favoured creating JAAT also agreed that there should be an overriding 
objective. 
3.130 Overriding objectives have been included in new procedural rules introduced in England and 
Wales for civil, family and criminal cases as part of a move to have clearer management of the 
progress of litigation by judges. The overriding objectives are a point of reference for the judge, 
any lawyers representing parties, and the parties themselves setting out guidelines that are 
used in interpreting and applying procedural rules. The overriding objectives are particularly 
helpful in situations where a judge must exercise discretion and undertake a balancing 
exercise, for example deciding whether to grant an adjournment. 
3.131 We recommend that the JAAT Rules Committee takes as its starting point the “overriding 
objective and parties’ obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal”, used in England and Wales in 
for the First-tier Tribunal:  
2.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases 
fairly and justly. 
(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes— 
(a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the 
complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties and of the 
Tribunal; 
(b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; 
(c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the 
proceedings; 
(d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and 
(e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. 
(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— 
(a) exercises any power under these Rules; or 
(b) interprets any rule or practice direction. 
(4) Parties must— 
(a) help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and 
(b) co-operate with the Tribunal generally. 
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JAAT Rules should contain provisions about open justice   
3.132 During the research leading to our consultation report, we investigated practices in relation to 
public access to hearings and the publication of judgments in the current tribunals in Jersey. 
Open justice is an important constitutional principle and an aspect of the right to a fair trial. The 
right to a public hearing and public judgment is not only for the parties in the case; there is a 
wider public interest in open justice. In assessing how practise in Jersey should develop, 
regard must be had to the requirements of ECHR Article 6 (part of the law of Jersey under the 
Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000), which sets out minimum standards for judicial proceedings 
relating to ‘civil rights and obligations’. This states, with emphasis added: 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the 
press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the 
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice.” 
JAAT rules on public hearings 
3.133 During the research interviews and consultations, the issue of public hearings proved 
controversial with strongly held views in both directions.  
3.134 Speaking in favour of more open justice, one interviewee told us that information about when 
and where social security tribunal hearings were scheduled to take place is not readily 
accessible. Though case listings did appear online, confusingly they were on the Jersey 
Employment and Discrimination Tribunal website. Another issue raised in the interviews was 
that chairmen of panels are too ready to accede to requests from appellants for the hearing to 
take place in private (though other interviewees said this was not their experience). In response 
to our consultation report, Citizens Advice Jersey and the Jersey Consumer Council supported 
greater openness.  
3.135 There was, however, also concern in the other direction: that steps to make tribunal hearings 
more open to the public (and publication of judgments: see below) would have an adverse 
effect on potential appellants.  Some interviewees suggested that information about family and 
relationship matters, financial circumstances and medical conditions are particularly sensitive 
in a small community such as Jersey. There is a general perception that greater openness 
would act a deterrent to people bringing appeals.  
3.136 During the consultation phase of this project, three responses from experienced tribunal 
members also cautioned against tribunal hearing being open to the public. 
• A former legal member of a social security tribunal stated: “In my experience, applicants 
are often very stressed by the hearing and the presence of members of the public 
increases their anxiety.  The application may involve details of their finances and health 
issues and may involve medical information about children. Complaints about hearings 
being in private are made more commonly by interested members of the public.  The right 
to a public hearing is, I understand, for the benefit of the applicant and if that is going to 
cause them distress, it is reasonable to exclude members of the public”. (We do not agree 
that this is a correct understanding of the legal and constitutional reasons for open justice). 
• A member of the Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes told us: “Open justice. Yes, I believe 
in this but just how would it affect the hearing when under the wing of the JAAT? I cannot 
see that the general public would be interested in attending our open hearings but there 
are always on or two who have nothing better to do and will be there. Contentious cases 
should not be open to the public as of right and I have in mind the quite recent Doctors 
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appeal where much highly personal and indeed commercially confidential information was 
presented to us. It would be wrong for such a case to be heard at an open meeting, in my 
opinion”. (We disagree: the legal and constitutional right to open justice does not depend 
on whether members of the public, or journalists, are interested in attending hearings or 
the identity of people who do want to attend. Commercial sensitivity is not, generally 
speaking, an acceptable legal justification for excluding the public).  
• A lay member of a tribunal said: “Applicants should be offered a choice of whether or not 
they want a private/public hearing. Many are extremely nervous at hearings”. “From my 
long experience of these matters, the most satisfactory tribunal hearing is those were the 
applicants have felt comfortable and confident in the presence of the tribunal so as to free 
you are free we answer questions or raise points in their own words. It should be for the 
applicant to decide whether or not they want members of the public when their personal 
details are discussed and the tribunal should whenever possible agree to the request as 
your reference to ECHR our article 6 refers.  There have been some Social Security 
tribunals where members of the public have been present and taken notes, no doubt for 
‘blogging’ to others. Because these members of the public are seated behind the applicant, 
I have sometimes wondered whether the applicant has been aware of such activity. 
Therefore, in my opinion, the best interests of the applicant should always to take priority.” 
(We disagree: open justice is not dependent on the choice of appellants but is a 
fundamental legal and constitutional right to the benefit of everybody). 
3.137 We could not gather sufficient information on which to make firm findings on whether practices 
relating to public hearings in Jersey tribunals meet the minimum requirements for open justice 
guaranteed by ECHR Article 6. ECHR Article 6 recognises that “where the interests of juveniles 
or the protection of the private life of the parties so require” hearings and judgments may be in 
private. Across the United Kingdom and in Jersey, this is understood to require hearings and 
judgments of tribunals dealing with mental health matters to be in private (unless the appellant 
patient requests a public hearing).  
3.138 Tax matters are not regarded as “civil rights or obligations” and so fall outside the protective 
scope of ECHR Article 6. There is therefore no human rights law requirement for tax appeals 
to be held in public. We are not, however, persuaded that there is a compelling case for 
exempting contentious tax matters from the general principle of open justice: JAAT should 
normally sit in public (and in public premises) when hearing contested tax appeals. 
3.139 We recommend that the JAAT Rules should state that all hearings must be held in public, 
unless the presiding member of a panel orders otherwise (having regard to the factors set out 
in ECHR Article 6) or the appeal falls into a category where hearings are normally held in 
private. The “normally private” appeals should include (a) appeals where the rights of a child 
are central to the case, for example special educational needs and (b) appeals involving 
patients under mental health legislation.  
3.140 In recommending that mental health appeals should normally be held in private, we note that 
arrangements differ across legal jurisdictions (for example, they are normally private in 
England and Wales but normally public in New South Wales, Australia). We make our 
recommendation having regard to the close alignment of mental health legislation between 
Jersey and England and Wales and considerations of life in a relatively small community.  
JAAT Rules on public judgments 
3.141 The European Court of Human Rights75 has ultimate responsibility for interpreting the ECHR. 
It has interpreted the ECHR Article 6 requirement that “judgments shall be pronounced 
                                                
75 The European Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg, has responsibility under international law for 
adjudicating on the European Convention on Human Rights (after a person has exhausted all rights of appeal 
or review within his or her national legal system). The Convention is made part of Jersey law by the Human 
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publicly” flexibly. “Pronounced publicly” is normally understood to mean the reading out or 
publication of a reasoned explanation for the decision. If there is no such public explanation, 
the European Court has accepted that other means of publicity are acceptable, for example 
where archived copies of judgments are open to inspection and selected important decisions 
are officially published.76 
3.142 The Employment and Discrimination Tribunal routinely publishes its written judgments on 
www.jerseylaw.je. The Data Protection Tribunal is also required to publish its determinations. 
Article 18 of the Data Protection (Appeals) (Jersey) Regulations 2006 provides: “(4) The 
Tribunal shall publish its determination. (5) In doing so, the Tribunal shall have regard to the 
desirability of – (a) safeguarding the privacy of data subjects; (b) safeguarding commercially 
sensitive information; and (c) restricting, in the public interest, any details of the determination. 
(6) For the purposes of paragraph (5), the Tribunal may in publishing a determination edit the 
text.” 
3.143 When we carried out the research in 2014-16, administrative appeals tribunals in Jersey did 
not publish judgments or make them available for public inspection. When we requested 
access to a decision (of a case which we had observed) we were required to give an 
undertaking that the judgment would not be shared. 
3.144 Interviewees explained that current practice was typically that at the conclusion of a hearing, 
the chair will (after an adjournment if necessary) announce the outcome of the appeal, though 
not necessarily the reasons for it, and state that written reasons will be provided later. Written 
judgments were provided to the appellant and the department but were not published. Nor 
were they circulated to tribunal members beyond those sitting on the particular panel hearing 
the case. Two people with experience of sitting as tribunal members were critical of the fact 
that they saw only the judgments of the appeals in which they were directly involved: they 
regarded the failure to circulate judgments to all members as a missed opportunity for 
developing expertise and knowledge. Members of the public are not generally permitted to 
consult and use archived copies of written judgments. 
3.145 While many (perhaps most) tribunal judgments turn on assessments of facts and professional 
judgements, from time to time points of law or points of practice are decided. Where a point of 
law or practice is of general importance, at present these do not enter the public domain. One 
interviewee (with experience sitting as a member of a tribunal) described an episode in which 
a tribunal panel had been critical of an approach the States department was taking to 
exercising a significant decision-making power. The criticisms were set out in a written 
judgment but have not emerged into the public domain.  
3.146 In our consultation report, we noted that non-publication of judgments may also give States 
departments an advantage over individual appellants. In the tribunal hearing observed during 
research for our consultation paper, at one point in proceedings the lawyer from the Law 
Officers’ Department representing the States department referred the panel to “the consistent 
jurisprudence of this tribunal”. If that “jurisprudence” (meaning, in this context, previously 
decided cases) is not in the public domain, assertions such as that cannot be rebutted. 
3.147 We said our provisional assessment was that practices relating to the pronouncement of 
judgments in Jersey’s administrative tribunals are in breach of the minimum standards for open 
justice. We set out options for reform: 
                                                
Rights (Jersey) Act 2000. The European Court of Human Rights is not part of the European Union; the Court 
of Justice of the EU, based in Luxembourg, is responsible for adjudicating on EU law. 
76 See Moser v Austria, Application no. 12643/02, 21 September 2006, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
76956.  
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• (a) publication of all judgments in full on the Jersey Legal Information Board (JLIB)’s 
website in the same way as Employment and Discrimination Tribunal and Royal Court 
judgments, unless the JAAT panel orders otherwise 
• (b) publication of judgments redacted to remove sensitive personal information on the JLIB 
website 
• (c) publication of selected judgments (“starred” or “landmark”) involving a point of law or 
practice of general public importance on the JLIB website; the chairman of the tribunal 
panel in conjunction with the President of JAAT would decide which judgments fall into this 
category.  
• (d) no judgments would be published in full but the President of JAAT would on a regular 
basis (for example, every six months) prepare and publish brief summaries of all cases 
heard. 
• If options (c) or (d) are adopted, archived copies of all judgments should be open to 
inspection on application to the Judicial Greffe. 
3.148 We received two consultation responses specifically on the question of publishing judgments.  
• A former legal member of a tribunal said in principle that judgments should be published 
but cautioned that “in a small community, and given the nature of the information discussed 
(e.g. health conditions), it would be appropriate for the decisions to be anonymised”.  
• Another response from a person with experience of sitting as a lay member of a tribunal 
said that option (c) above would be the most appropriate. 
3.149 In January 2017, the Jersey Legal Information Board started to publish social security appeal 
judgments online.77 Between January and September 2017 ten judgments were published: 
seven from the Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal,78 one from the Income Support 
Medical Appeal Tribunal,79 and two from the Social Security Tribunal.80 Viewers are able to 
“refine by subject” to identify different subject matter – currently listing Long Term Incapacity 
Allowance, Short Term Incapacity Allowance, and Income Support. The appellant and any 
other person referred to in the judgments are anonymised by use of letters (A, B, C, etc).  
3.150 We welcome this development: it is a significant contribution to open justice in Jersey. In light 
of this change in practice, we recommend that the Judicial Greffier makes arrangements for 
JAAT judgments to be published online in anonymised format unless the Chairman of JAAT 
issues directions otherwise in relation to categories of case. The Chairman should have regard 
to the requirements of ECHR Article 6 and the constitutional principle of open justice in making 
such directions.  
3.151 Decisions of the Mental Health Review Tribunal should normally be published. Access to 
MHRT judgments, in anonymised format, will provide opportunities for advisers to learn from 
rulings on points of law and practice. Even if a MHRT judgment is decided on its own particular 
facts, anonymised publication provides an important degree of transparency. 
                                                
77 See www.jerseylaw.je/judgments/tribunal. 
78 G v Minister for Social Security [2017] TRS 007; C v Minister for Social Security [20017] TRS 003; D v 
Minister for Social Security [2017] TRS 004; E v Minister for Social Security [2017] TRS 005; F v Minister for 
Social Security [2017] TRS 006; H v Minister for Social Security [2017] TRS 008; J v Minister for Social 
Security [2017] TRS 010. 
79 A v Minister for Social Security [2017] TRS 001. 
80 B v Minister for Social Security [2017] TRS 002; K v Minister for Social Security [2017] TRS 011 
(consequences of a woman’s failure to claim old age pension within 3 months of attaining the age of 60). 
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Rights of audience 
3.152 In our consultation report, we sought views on what regulation is needed (if any) on rights of 
audience to represent appellants at hearings before JAAT. We identified four options: 
• limiting rights of audience to Jersey advocates and solicitors 
• additionally: rights of audience to lawyers qualified in other jurisdictions working under the 
supervision of a Jersey advocate or solicitor.    
• additionally: rights of audience to specified professionals who are not lawyers, for example 
accountants.  
• having no limitation on rights of audience so that appellants may choose any person to 
present their case. In England and Wales, there are no restrictions on rights of audience 
before the First-tier Tribunal, except in relation to immigration cases. The absence of 
restriction enables the Free Representation Unit (a charity) to train and organise law 
students, who are not yet qualified lawyers, to represent clients in some tribunals. 
3.153 Where a public body responding to an appeal is legally represented, this is normally through 
the Law Officers’ Department (LOD). The lawyer employed by the LOD will not necessarily be 
a qualified Jersey advocate or solicitor. 
3.154 During consultations, we received two responses on this point, both from people with 
experience of sitting as tribunal members. Both favoured having no restrictions on rights of 
audience and favoured permitting lay representatives to address the tribunal directly.  
3.155 The evidence we gathered suggests that there are variable practices across Jersey’s tribunal 
system. 
• One lay member of a tribunal told us in consultation: “The applicant in my last [tribunal] 
was represented by her brother, who did an excellent job and won her appeal”.  
• A former legal member of a tribunal said: “None of the applicants at the tribunal I sat on 
were legally represented.  Some brought family members and a few were assisted by 
politicians.  In the absence of legal aid, the applicants need to be free to ask any person 
to come and support them and speak in support of their appeal”. 
• At a social security hearing we observed, the appellant was accompanied by a non-legally 
qualified person who sat next to him and assisted with finding relevant documents. The 
supporter was, however, refused permission by the presiding member to address the 
tribunal directly when the appellant was struggling to respond to points made by the Social 
Security Department’s legally qualified representative.  
3.156 We recommend that the JAAT Rules should state that a party may appoint a representative 
(whether legally qualified or not) to represent that party in the proceedings. 
Legal advice and representation paid for by public funds, where 
necessary for a fair trial 
Recommendation 3.15. The Chairman or Deputy Chairman of JAAT should have power to 
order that an appellant receives legal advice and representation paid for by public funds 
where this is necessary to ensure a fair hearing. 
3.157 In Jersey, people aggrieved by administrative decisions may obtain advice from several 
different sources.  
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• In relation to social security matters, the Citizens Advice Bureau offers advice and can 
help to write letters and fill in forms but does not assist with representation at tribunal 
hearings.  
• Appellants may obtain advice and assistance from lay people, such as family members 
and work colleagues. 
• A small number of elected States Members specialise or are willing to offer advice and 
some attend and speak on behalf of appellants at tribunal and States of Jersey Complaints 
Panel hearings.  
• There is a small informal network of people, identifying themselves as social justice 
campaigners, who offer advice and attend social security hearings to assist appellants.    
• In relatively new arrangements, patients using the Mental Health Review Tribunal are 
eligible to receive advice and representation from a lawyer allocated to them from a panel 
of accredited Jersey advocates. This service is publicly funded from the Judicial Greffe’s 
budget. When the scheme is fully implemented, the lawyers will work on a fixed fee-basis 
(currently they undertake the work as part of their legal aid obligation). 
• Appellants who can afford to do so, may engage the services of a Jersey lawyer on normal 
commercial rates. 
3.158 Tribunal proceedings are excluded from the Island’s main legal aid scheme, which is 
administered by the Jersey Law Society on behalf of the legal profession. It is not funded by 
the Government of Jersey. During their first 15 years of practice, advocates and solicitors (or 
their firms) undertake to accept legal aid cases allocated by the Acting Bâtonnier. Applicants 
for legal aid cannot choose their lawyer. The lawyer may charge a reasonable (but normally 
significantly less than commercial) fee for advice and representation under the scheme. 
Paragraph 1.5.12 of the current Legal Aid Guidelines provides:81  
“Legal aid will not be granted for tribunal hearings or other disputes or matters which do not 
constitute matters which could be litigated before the Royal Court, Magistrate’s Court or Petty 
Debts Court in Jersey. For the avoidance of doubt this includes, but is not limited to, 
proceedings before: (a) employment tribunals, (b) social security tribunals, (c) mediation 
carried out within the Petty Debts Court or, (d) disputes with the Minister for Housing 
concerning housing qualifications.” 
3.159 Although it may be daunting to many applicants, in our view it is reasonable to expect most 
appellants to prepare and present their case to a tribunal (other than the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal) without the need for legal advice. Tribunals are designed to be more informal than 
courts.  
3.160 In our consultation report, we said that our interim view was that the Legal Aid Guidelines do 
not need to be extended to cover all tribunal hearings. We were, however, concerned that 
there is a category of case where the absence of legal aid creates a danger that the principle 
of equality of arms under ECHR Article 6 will be breached. Three interviewees with 
considerable experience of tribunal hearings said that social security appeals were becoming 
more ‘legalistic’ and complex. This trend was attributed partly to the increasingly complicated 
social security legislation and partly to the willingness of some appellants to seek to raise legal 
points. Advice is available from the Citizens Advice Bureau but representation at tribunal 
hearings is not. The type of appeal in which legal representation may be needed includes 
where  
                                                
81 Legal Aid Guidelines (as amended 7 June 2010) 
www.legalaid.je/pdfs/Legal%20Aid%20Guidelines%20final%20ver-020810.pdf. The Jersey Law Society is 
consulting on reforms to the legal aid scheme and anticipate launching new arrangements in January 2018 
(see www.jerseylawsociety.je/legal-aid-jersey).  
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• the appellant is a vulnerable person (an adult who by reason of mental or physical 
disability, age or illness may be unable adequately to present their appeal to the tribunal) 
• the appeal raises a point of law with which it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant 
to deal 
• the appeal depends on complex facts or expert evidence with which it would be 
unreasonable to expect the appellant to deal  
• the public body responding to the appeal will be represented by a lawyer (rather than a 
non-legally qualified presenting officer). 
3.161 We sought views on how provision of appropriate legal representation before the Jersey 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal should be organised. We suggested that the following were 
among the ways in which this could be achieved. 
• Paragraph 1.5.12 of the Legal Aid Guidelines could be amended to enable the Acting 
Bâtonnier to grant legal aid under the general scheme where in the interests of justice this 
is necessary. 
• A scheme based on the model adopted for the Mental Health Review Tribunal could be 
created. A panel of lawyers would undertake work on a fixed fee basis (paid for by a budget 
within the Judicial Greffe). If this model is used, who would make decisions about whether 
an appellant was eligible for assistance, and at what point would the decision be made? 
One possibility is that the power to order publicly funded representation would lie with the 
President of JAAT or another legally qualified member, but if this takes place on receipt of 
the appeal this may be too late in the process. 
3.162 During the consultation phase of our project, the Law Society of Jersey told us: 
“The Law Society of Jersey wishes to comment on one element of the consultation, in relation 
to how the provision of appropriate legal representation before the Jersey Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal should be organised. While the rationale for the provision of legal 
representation at certain tribunals where particularly complex legal issues arise, the appellant 
is a vulnerable person or the public body is represented by a lawyer (such that an ‘equality 
of arms’ argument could be pursued), is understood and is, in principle, supported, it is 
considered inappropriate for the Legal Aid scheme to be extended for this purpose.  There 
is no justification for a further burden being imposed on law firms in respect of Legal Aid. It 
is suggested that, if it is determined that legal representation in particular circumstances or 
for certain tribunals (e.g. Social Security appeals) is warranted and is pursued, a similar 
approach to that adopted for Mental Health Review Tribunals (an accredited panel of locally 
qualified lawyers) should be followed, with payment of the lawyers on a fixed fee basis, 
funded by the Judicial Greffe.”    
3.163 A lay member of a tribunal expressed a different view, favouring the extension of the Legal Aid 
scheme to tribunals. A member of the public suggested “external legal assistance being 
administered by JAAT – video links could be a possibility and facilities within the premises of 
the JAAT”. 
3.164 We recommend that the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of JAAT should have power to order 
that an appellant receives legal advice and representation paid for by public funds where this 
is necessary to ensure a fair hearing. Decisions about legal advice and assistance should be 
made at a case management meeting at as earlier a stage of the proceedings as possible. 
This recommendation is not intended to alter the current arrangements for legal representation 
before the Mental Health Review Tribunal, which we envisage would continue in relation to 
mental health appeals heard by JAAT. 
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Creating a right of appeal from JAAT to the Royal Court 
Recommendation 3.16: There should be a right of appeal on a question of law from JAAT to 
the Royal Court 
3.165 The right, if any, to challenge the decisions of the current Jersey administrative appeal tribunals 
by a “second appeal” to the Royal Court vary. 
Table on rights of second appeals 
Name of existing tribunal Right to a second appeal 
Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes Income Tax (Jersey) Law 1961 Article 36: 
“Immediately after the determination by the 
Commissioners of an appeal under this Law, either 
party, if dissatisfied with the determination, may give 
notice to the Commissioners of the party’s intention to 
appeal and the Commissioners shall immediately 
notify the Judicial Greffier that such notice of appeal 
has been given to them”. The time limit for making an 
appeal is 21 days.  
Social Security Tribunal Social Security (Determination of Claims and 
Questions) (Jersey) Order 1974, Article 14 (as 
amended):   
(1) A person aggrieved by a decision of the Tribunal 
may, on a point of law only, appeal to the Royal Court. 
(2) An appeal under paragraph (1) may be made – (a) 
in the first instance, only with leave of the Tribunal; or 
(b) in the second instance, only with leave of the 
Royal Court where the Tribunal has in the first 
instance refused leave to appeal. 
(3) The Tribunal shall, if it is unable to reach a 
decision as to whether or not to grant leave to appeal, 
refer the application for leave to appeal, to the Royal 
Court”. 
Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal Social Security (Determination of Disablement 
Questions) (Jersey) Order 1974 does not contain any 
provisions on appeal to the Royal Court. It is not clear 
to us whether there is a right of appeal to the Royal 
Court; if not, a party could seek judicial review of the 
SSMAT’s decision. 
Income Support Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
Income Support (General Provisions) (Jersey) Order 
2008, Article 18: “(1) A person aggrieved by a 
decision of the Medical Appeal Tribunal or the Social 
Security Tribunal under this Part may appeal to the 
Royal Court on a point of law. (2) The Medical Appeal 
Tribunal, the Social Security Tribunal or a determining 
officer may refer any point of law to the Royal Court 
for the Court to give a ruling on the point.” No time 
limit for appeal is contained in the Order. 
Mental Health Review Tribunal Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016, Article 54(1) “A 
person aggrieved by a decision of the Tribunal may 
appeal to the Court on a point of law”. (4) “No decision 
of the Tribunal shall be invalidated solely by reason of 
procedural irregularity, unless that irregularity was 
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3.166 We recommend that there should be a right of further appeal from JAAT to the Royal Court. 
As the Island’s senior court, the Royal Court has a constitutional role in ensuring the rule of 
law, which should include supervisory powers over “inferior” tribunals and courts. If no right of 
appeal is created, the Royal Court would nonetheless have power to determine applications 
for judicial review (under Royal Court Rules 2004 Part 16) but this is a less satisfactory process 
compared to an express right of appeal. 
3.167 In designing the right of appeal, several factors need to be considered. First, should the right 
of appeal be limited to “points of law” (as in the case of the current Social Security Tribunal) or 
should the available grounds of appeal be broader and include disagreements of findings of 
fact (as in the “dissatisfied with the determination” appeal from the current Commissions of 
Appeal for Taxes). On balance, we prefer limiting appeals to points of law. Tribunals are 
created to be effective in making factual and expert assessments and we are not persuaded 
that reopening these issues before the Bailiff or Deputy Bailiff and Jurats in the Royal Court is 
necessary. Should a panel of JAAT make a decision “so unreasonable that no reasonable 
tribunal could have made it” (Wednesbury unreasonableness), this would be a question of law 
that could be taken to the Royal Court. 
3.168 Second, should there be any further substantive limitation on the right of appeal to the Royal 
Court? We note that under the Mental Health (Jersey) Law 2016, Article 54(4), “No decision of 
the [current Mental Health Review Tribunal] shall be invalidated solely by reason of procedural 
irregularity, unless that irregularity was such as to prevent a party to the appeal from presenting 
his or her case fairly before the Tribunal”. We do not recommend such a restriction, as it risks 
undermining the rule of law. A tribunal that makes a procedural irregularity acts unlawfully and 
a party should be entitled to have a decision affected by that illegality set aside without the 
Royal Court carrying out an assessment of the irregularity’s impact on the overall fairness of 
the tribunal appeal process. 
3.169 Third, should there be a requirement that a party seeking to appeal from JAAT obtain “leave” 
(or permission) to do so from JAAT or the Royal Court? We recommend that there should be 
a leave requirement, as there currently is from the Social Security Tribunal. This is a useful 
mechanism to ensure there is an arguable ground of appeal.  
3.170 Fourth, what should be the time limit for seeking leave to appeal? Selecting a time limit is 
inevitably an arbitrary exercise. The period must balance the need to have legal certainty as 
to whether a tribunal decision stands and a practical assessment of what is a fair and 
reasonable period in which to expect an appellant to make a decision about appealing (which 
may involve seeking legal advice). We consider that 21 days is an appropriate time frame.82 
                                                
82 In Recommendation 7.3, we recommend that there is a standard time limit for starting and administrative 
appeal of 28 days. This is longer than the proposed 21 days for making a second appeal because here the 
appellant is already “in the system” and can reasonably be expected to act more promptly. 
such as to prevent a party to the appeal from 
presenting his or her case fairly before the Tribunal.” 
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal Health and Safety at Work (Jersey) Law 1989 does 
not create a right of further appeal to the Royal Court; 
a party could seek judicial review of the HSAT’s 
decision. 
Data Protection Tribunal Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005, Schedule 6 does 
not create a right of further appeal to the Royal Court; 
a party could seek judicial review of the DTA’s 
decision.  
Rate Appeal Board Rates (Jersey) Law 2005 does not create a right of 
further appeal to the Royal Court; a party could seek 
judicial review of the RAB’s decision. 
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Table of lay member appointments to Tribunals, January 2011 – May 
2017  
This table relates to the discussion at paragraph 3.88 on diversity of lay members. Where an individual 
appears more than once, he or she is colour coded to make this clear. 
Appointment round 
(Proposition reference) 
 
Income Support Medical 
Appeal Tribunal lay 
members appointed in May 
2017 for a 4-year term.  
P.35/2017 
Male. A retired member of 
staff of the States of Jersey 
Police Force; has served 10 
years as a member of the 
Jersey Employment and 
Discrimination Tribunal. 
(Sam Le Breton) 
Male. Retired member of 
staff of the Ambulance 
service. A past President of 
the Jersey Civil Service 
Association. Also serves on 
the Social Security Tribunal. 
(John Moulin) 
  
Commissioners of Appeal 
for Taxes appointed in 
March 2016 for a 5-year 
term 
P.22/2016 
Male. Semi-retired Chartered 
Accountant and Chartered 
Tax Adviser. (Jonathan 
Crowther) 
 
Male. Worked for major 
professional services firm 
for 33 years and is now a 
consultant. (Graeme Guy) 
Male. Retired after 42 
years in the marine 
insurance market for a 
number of international 
insurance companies. 
(Michael Harrison) 
Male. Chartered 
Accountant, a 
Chartered Certified 
Accountant. 
(Christopher 
McFadyen) 
 
Rate Appeal Board 
appointed for a 3-year term 
in April 2016 
 
P.41/2016 
 
Male. Retired Law 
Draftsman. (Clive 
Borrowman) 
Male. Retired structural 
engineer and company 
director (Roger Goodwin) 
Female. Semi-retired 
from project 
management. Served 
for 9 years on the 
States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel. 
(Christine Vibert) 
 
 
Reappointed for a further 3-
year term 
 
 
Male. Self-employed 
(Graeme Marett). 
Male. Finance director in 
private sector; former 
finance director in States of 
Jersey and Jersey Post (Ian 
Ridgeway). 
Male. Manages a 
property portfolio of 30 
units (Peter Routier) 
 
Social Security Tribunal 
lay members appointed in 
February 2016 for a 5-year 
term. 
P.11/2016 (re-issue) 
Male. A retired member of 
staff of the States of Jersey 
Police Force; has served 10 
years as a member of the 
Jersey Employment and 
Discrimination Tribunal. 
(Sam Le Breton) 
Male. Retired member of 
staff of the Ambulance 
service. A past President of 
the Jersey Civil Service 
Association. Also serves on 
the Social Security Tribunal. 
(John Moulin) 
Male. A retired head of 
internal audit of the 
Jersey Electricity 
Company; has served 
10 years as a member 
of the Jersey 
Employment and 
Discrimination Tribunal. 
(Alan Hall) 
 
Commissioners of Appeal 
for Taxes reappointed April 
2015 for a 3-year term 
P.37/2015 
Male. Has worked in a 
number of finance roles. 
(Craig Leach) 
Male. Retired senior civil 
servant. (John Mills) 
Male. Retired Director 
of Jersey Airport 
(Michael Lanyon). 
 
Health and Safety Tribunal 
lay members appointed in 
May 2015 for a period of 3 
years 
P .54/2015 
 
Male. A member of staff of 
the Probation Service. (Nigel 
Collier-Webb) 
Male. Works as in project 
management within the 
construction industry; 18 
years’ experience in the 
Honorary Police (David 
Rothband) 
  
Social Security Tribunal 
lay members appointed in 
August 2014 for a 5-year 
term 
Male. Retired from IT roles in 
the finance industry; involved 
in charitable work. (Stewart 
Hill) 
Female. A member of the 
Youth Court Panel; former 
member of a Parish welfare 
panel. (Judith Querée) 
Male. Retired civil 
servant, involved in 
Mental Health 
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P.145/2014 
 
Services. (Geoff 
Esnouf) 
Social Security Tribunal 
lay members appointed in 
October 2013 for a 5-year 
term. 
P .120/2013 
 
Male. Member of staff in the 
Ambulance Service (David 
Moody) 
Female. Former sales 
assistant who is a full-time 
carer (Sandra Le Monnier) 
  
Income Support Medical 
Appeal Tribunal lay 
members appointed in 
September 2013 for a 4-year 
term (all reappointments).    
P.111/2013 
Female. Retired senior 
nurse. (Barbara Bedford) 
Male. Member of staff in the 
Ambulance Service. (David 
Moody). 
Female. Former sales 
assistant who is a full-
time carer (Sandra Le 
Monnier) 
 
Rate Appeal Board 
appointed for a 3-year term 
in January 2013 
P.9/2013 
Male. Finance director in 
private sector; former finance 
director in States of Jersey 
and Jersey Post (Ian 
Ridgeway). 
Male. Self-employed 
(Graeme Marett). 
Male. Manages a 
property portfolio of 30 
units (Peter Routier) 
 
 
Reappointed for 3-year term Male. Proposition does not 
include biographical 
information. (Thomas 
Slattery) 
Male. Proposition does not 
include biographical 
information (Timothy 
George Cartwright) 
Male. Proposition does 
not include 
biographical 
information (Jethro 
Adams). 
 
Health and Safety Tribunal 
lay members appointed in 
March 2012 for a period of 3 
years.  
P.32/2012 
Male. A member of staff of 
the Probation Service. (Nigel 
Collier-Webb) 
Male. Retired member of 
staff of the States of Jersey 
Police. (John McCourt) 
  
Commissioners of Appeal 
For Income Tax appointed 
in March 2012 for a 3-year 
term 
P .25/2012 
Male. Retired corporate 
banking manager. (Philip J. 
Barber) 
Male. Retired accountant. 
(Charles R. Blampied) 
Female. Retired 
accountant. 
(Jacqueline Collins) 
Male. Retired from 
finance industry. 
(Peter G. Farley) 
 
 
Female. Vice-Chairman of 
the Jersey Appointments 
Commission and has been a 
Commissioner of Appeal for 
Income Tax since 1995. 
(Elizabeth Rees) 
Re-appointment: 
Male. Retired senior civil 
servant. (John Mills) 
Re-appointment: 
Retired Director of 
Jersey Airport (Michael 
Lanyon). 
 
Social Security Tribunal 
lay members appointed in 
January 2011 for a 5-year 
term.  
P.12/2011 
Male. Retired member of 
staff of the Ambulance 
service. A past President of 
the Jersey Civil Service 
Association. Also serves on 
the Social Security Tribunal. 
(John Moulin) 
Male. Retired member of 
staff of the Ambulance 
service. A past President of 
the Jersey Civil Service 
Association. Also serves on 
the Social Security Tribunal. 
(Sam Le Breton) 
Female. Trust 
administration career; 
volunteer at Jersey 
Hospice Care 
(Margaret Howard) 
Male. A retired 
head of internal 
audit of the Jersey 
Electricity 
Company; has 
served 10 years as 
a member of the 
Jersey 
Employment and 
Discrimination 
Tribunal. (Alan 
Hall) 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENDING APPEALS AND REVIEWS TO MINISTERS 
When is it appropriate for administrative appeals to be heard by 
Ministers? 
4.1 Our research indicates that there are currently six Laws in Jersey that give a Minister power 
to hear appeals against an administrative decision made by another public office-holder or 
official. In five of these, our assessment is that this arrangement is not appropriate and should 
be replaced by a right of appeal to the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(JAAT).83 
4.2 Our starting point is that a Minister – a political figure in the Government of Jersey and an 
elected member of the States Assembly – is not generally an appropriate person to hear 
appeals about administrative decisions.  
4.3 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which sets out international human 
rights minimum standards about fair trials, requires disputes about “civil rights and obligations” 
to be heard ultimately by “an independent and impartial tribunal”. The word “tribunal” in this 
context also including courts as well as judicial bodies called “tribunals”. In Jersey, the 
proposed JAAT and the Royal Court clearly meet the relevant standards of independence and 
impartiality. 
4.4 A Minister holding elected political office can never be “independent” in the sense required by 
ECHR Article 6: he or she lacks the attributes that make a judge independent (for example, 
security of tenure) and as part of the government is likely to be conflicted.  
4.5 This is not mean that a Minister can never be involved in appeals about civil rights and 
obligations. Some countries have designed administrative redress systems in which elected 
politicians have a role in adjudicating on disputes. Appeals relating to the grant or refusal of 
planning permission is such a category in Jersey (and also in the United Kingdom). Planning 
decisions often involve questions of public policy. Courts interpreting and applying ECHR 
Article 6 have accepted that a minister, politically accountable to Parliament, may be a 
satisfactory appellate or review body from decisions made by planning authorities. In these 
circumstances, there must however be a right for the aggrieved person to make a further 
appeal or seek judicial review to fully independent judicial body with power to review the 
minister’s decision to ensure that, ultimately, there is sufficient judicial control and that the rule 
of law is protected.84 
4.6 In the recommendations below, we recognise that one of the six Laws in Jersey giving a 
Minister power to hear an administrative appeal is similar to a planning decision and therefore 
acceptable (licensing of “aerodromes”). The other five laws – including one recently enacted 
– we can see no justification for a Minister having an appellate function and we therefore 
recommend that the Laws are amended to make the proposed JAAT the body to hear appeals. 
The amendments could be achieved by the proposed Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law, 
which we envisage will be used to implement many of the proposals in this report. 
                                                
83 See Chapter 3 for our recommendations on creating JAAT. 
84 See, in England and Wales, the ‘Alconbury case’: R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions Ex parte Holdings & Barnes Plc [2001] UKHL 23. 
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Ending the Minister’s appeal role relating to administrative decisions 
about venues for civil marriages and civil partnerships  
Recommendation 4.1: The Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal should hear appeals from 
property owners about Connétables’ administrative decisions relating to wedding and civil 
partnership venues instead of the Minister for Home Affairs 
4.7 Under the Marriage and Civil Status (Approved Premises) (Jersey) Order 2002 and the Civil 
Partnership (Approved Premises) (Jersey) Order 2012, a property owner may apply to the 
Connétable of the relevant parish for permission to use a venue for solemnising civil 
marriages/partnerships. If the property owner is aggrieved by the refusal or revocation of 
permission, or by conditions attached to a grant of permission, “may apply to the Minister for 
a review of that decision”. The Minister in question is the Minister for Home Affairs.  
4.8 The subject matter does not relate to what is in the public interest or broad questions of public 
policy so should be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal rather than a Minister.  
Ending the Minister’s appeal role relating to administrative decisions 
taken by the Agent of the Impôt about duties 
Recommendation 4.2: The Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal should hear appeals 
relating to decisions of the Agent of Impôt instead of the Minister for Treasury and 
Resources. 
4.9 The Agent of the Impôt is an ancient administrative office in Jersey. Under Article 68 of the 
Customs and Excise (Jersey) Law 1999, a person aggrieved by a decision of the Agent of the 
Impôt relating to liability to pay a duty, eligibility to relief or to receive a repayment of duty, or 
impositions or applications of conditions, limitations, restrictions, prohibitions or other 
requirements under the Law may within one month apply to the Minister “to have the decision 
reviewed”.  
4.10 The Minister in question is the Minister for Treasury and Resources. Under Article 69, there 
is a right of appeal to the Royal Court against the Minister’s decision.  
4.11 The subject matter does not relate to what is in the public interest or broad questions of public 
policy so disputes should be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal rather than 
a Minister.    
Ending the Minister’s appeal role in relation to assessment of children’s 
special educational needs 
Recommendation 4.3: The Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal should hear appeals 
relating to assessment of children’s special education needs instead of the Minister for 
Education. 
4.12 Under Article 31 of the Education (Jersey) Law 1999, parents have a right to request and 
assessment of their children’s special educational needs (SEN). If a child is assessed to have 
SEN, the Minister must ensure that provision is made to meet the needs. There is a right ‘to 
appeal against any part of the results of the assessment’ to the Minister within 15 days after 
the parent is notified of the results of the assessment. Article 31(4) provides 
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“The Minister may by written direction delegate the power to receive and determine any 
appeal … to the Chief Officer or to a panel of persons appointed by the Minister for the 
purpose, subject to the conditions, exceptions or qualifications that the Minister may specify 
in the direction.” 
4.13 The 1999 Law does not create a right of appeal to the Royal Court. 
4.14 During 2015, the States of Jersey Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel conducted an 
inquiry into SEN.85 Key finding 5.19 was that “The legislation and policies relating to SEN in 
Jersey provide a suitable framework for the provision of a high quality service” but 
recommended that “The Minister … must improve lines of communication with parents of SEN 
children”. The Panel’s report did not, however, deal specifically with any issues relating to 
appeals.  
4.15 The subject matter does not relate to what is in the public interest or broad questions of public 
policy so disputes should be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal rather than 
a Minister. 
4.16 Questions relating to SEN often raise sensitive issues: it would be appropriate for the JAAT 
panels hearing SEN appeals to include a tribunal member with relevant professional expertise 
and a lay member alongside a legally qualified chairman. In England and Wales, appeals 
relating to SEN lie to the First-tier Tribunal (Special Educational Needs and Disability), part of 
the Health, Education and Social Care Chamber. If our recommendation is accepted, further 
work will be needed to seek out lessons to be learnt and transferred to Jersey. 
Ending the Minister’s appeal role relating to Motor vehicle registration 
Recommendation 4.4: The Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal should hear appeals about 
decisions of the Inspector under Article 8 of the Motor Vehicle Registration (Jersey) Law 1993 
instead of the Minister for Infrastructure.  
4.17 Under Article 8 of the Motor Vehicle Registration (Jersey) Law 1993, a person aggrieved by a 
refusal of an “Inspector to issue or renew a trade licence may appeal to the Minister and the 
Minister shall, on any such appeal, give such directions in the matter as he or she thinks just, 
and the Inspector shall comply with such directions”.  
4.18 The Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure. The subject matter does not relate to what is in 
the public interest or broad questions of public policy so disputes should be determined by an 
independent and impartial tribunal rather than a Minister. 
                                                
85 States of Jersey Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel, Special Education Needs, Presented to the 
States on 14 July 2015, S.R.3/2015. 
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Ending the Minister’s appeal role relating to Prison discipline 
Recommendation 4.5: The Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal should hear appeals about 
disciplinary matters at HM Prison La Moye instead of the Minister for Home Affairs. 
4.19 HM Prison La Moye (“the Prison”) has 200 cells and 255 prison places. In 2016, the average 
daily population was 140. In relation to discipline, 228 misconduct reports were submitted 
during 2016 for contravening Prison Rules.86   
4.20 After several years of political debate, in early 2017 the States Assembly agreed to 
Government of Jersey reform proposals on the monitoring of conditions in the Prison. The 
Prison Board of Visitors (consisting of Jurats) was replaced by the Independent Prison 
Monitoring Board.87 The main driver for the reforms was concern that arrangements in Jersey 
did not comply with the United Nations Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT), and Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which require a system for independent 
monitoring of prisons. Jurats were regarded as lacking the necessary character of 
independence for the purposes of prison monitoring because of their role in the Royal Court 
in sentencing prisoners. 
4.21 The package of reforms also changed arrangements under which prisoners may appeal 
against disciplinary findings. Previously, appeals against adjudications by the Governor were 
heard by a panel of three members of the Prison Board of Visitors (i.e. Jurats). As part of the 
reforms, a new system for adjudicating on breaches of prison discipline was introduced by 
amendments to the Prison (Jersey) Rules 2007. Following amendment of Rule 94:88 
• if the prisoner is appealing against a determination of an officer appointed by the Governor 
to inquire into the charge, the appeal is first to an internal three-person “disciplinary 
appeals panel” (DAP) of Prison staff;89 if the prisoner is aggrieved by the decision of the 
DAP, the prisoner may ask the Governor to review the determination. If “the Governor 
considers that the decision of the disciplinary appeals panel and punishment was correct, 
the Governor, if requested to do so by the prisoner, must refer the appeal to the Minister”.  
• if the prisoner is appealing against a determination of the Governor (instead of a DAP), 
there is a right of appeal to the Minister for Home Affairs. 
4.22 The Minister’s powers on appeal are: to quash any finding of guilt; remit or mitigate any 
punishment; substitute another less severe punishment; or refuse the appeal.  
4.23 In our assessment, replacing the previous appeal to a panel of Jurats with an appeal to the 
Minister is a retrograde development in ensuring access to appropriately independent 
adjudication. The subject matter of prison discipline appeals does not relate to what is in the 
public interest or broad questions of public policy so disputes should be determined by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. We recommend that that judicial body should be the 
Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
                                                
86 See States of Jersey Prison Service: HM Prison La Moye – Annual Report 2016 (R.36/2017), presented to 
the States on 18 April 2017 by the Minister for Home Affairs. 
87 Prison (Independent Prison Monitoring Board) (Jersey) Regulations 2017. 
88 Prison (Amendment No. 2) (Jersey) Rules 2017 (in force from 7 September 2017). 
89 Discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
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Minister’s role in appeals relating to aerodrome licenses 
4.24 Under the Civil Aviation (Jersey) Law 2008, the Director of Civil Aviation makes decisions 
relating to grant, revoke and renewal of aerodrome licenses. The term “aerodrome” covers 
airports and helipads. Under Article 16 of the 2008 Law, an aggrieved person may appeal to 
the Minister within 30 days of the Director giving reasons for his decision. The Minister in 
question is the Chief Minister. The Article creates a further right of appeal to the Royal Court. 
4.25 We make no recommendation for changing this redress scheme. The site and operation of an 
aerodrome (for example, a helipad) is likely to raise the same sort of public interest and public 
policy issues as a planning decision. The possibility of an appeal to the Royal Court provides 
sufficient judicial control over the decision-making process to satisfy ECHR Article 6.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ENDING THE RÔLE OF THE STATES OF JERSEY COMPLAINTS 
PANEL 
What is the Complaints Panel? 
5.1 The States of Jersey Complaints Panel is an administrative redress body unique to Jersey. 
It currently operates under the Administrative Decisions (Review)(Jersey) Law 1982. The 
1982 Law was amended in significant ways in 1996 and 2006. 
5.2 The remit of the Complaints Panel is to consider disputes arising from decisions taken by 
Ministers and civil servants in departments of the Government of Jersey. Complainants are 
required to use any internal complaints systems within a Government of Jersey department 
before approaching the Complaints Panel. Complaints are received by the office of the States 
Greffe (part of the States Assembly). There is no charge for using the process. 
5.3 If the complaint falls within the Complaints Panel’s jurisdiction, the Chairman may attempt to 
resolve the grievance informally. If this is tried but fails, or is thought not to be appropriate, a 
hearing, normally in public, is held in front of a “board” of three members of the Complaints 
Panel, at which the complainant presents his or her case, followed by a response on behalf 
of the Minister. The board prepares a written decision, which is made as a report to the States 
Assembly by the Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC). This may uphold the 
complaint and make recommendations to the Minister for providing a remedy. Any 
recommendations are not binding on the Minister, who may reject them in whole or in part. 
If the Minister does this, the Complaints Panel may make another report, via PPC, to the 
States Assembly drawing attention to this. 
Historical development of the Complaints Panel 
5.4 To understand the current operation of the Complaints Panel it is necessary to trace its 
historical development. The “States of Jersey Administrative Appeals Panel” was first 
established by Regulations in 1979.90 It was placed on a permanent footing by the 
Administrative Decisions (Review)(Jersey) Law 1982. Complaints were received by the 
States Greffier (the senior administrative officer of the States Assembly), who had broad 
discretion to decide whether to refer complaints to members of the Panel.  
5.5 During the first phase of its existence (1979-95), the Panel consisted of elected States 
members. At this time, the government of Jersey was conducted through committees of the 
States Assembly. The presidents of the States committees and other elected members who 
had served for three years or more were eligible to sit on the three-person boards that were 
convened to consider complaints against “any decision made, or any act done or omitted, 
relating to any matter of administration by any Committee or Department of the States or by 
any person acting on behalf of any such Committee or Department”. The role of the Panel 
was therefore to provide political control over administrative decision-making. 
5.6 A board, having inquired into the matter, had power to request the original decision-maker to 
reconsider the matter if satisfied that the decision 
“(a) was contrary to law; or 
                                                
90 Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Regulations 1979. 
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(b)  was unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory, or was in accordance with a 
provision of any enactment or practice which is or might be unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory; or 
(c)  was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; or 
(d) could not have been made by a reasonable body of persons after proper consideration 
of all the facts; or 
(e)  was contrary to the generally accepted principles of natural justice”. 
These criteria remain in force. 
5.7 From its inception, the Panel’s power to grant remedies has been limited to making 
recommendations. It has no power to compel a Minister or department to do anything.  
5.8 In 1996, the composition of the Panel was altered significantly.91 Instead of elected States 
members, the Panel became composed of people appointed by the States Assembly, 
including a chairman and “two suitably qualified deputy chairmen” and “a sufficient number 
of persons to constitute the Panel”. 
5.9 In 2000, the Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey, chaired 
by Sir Cecil Clothier QC, was highly critical of the operation of the Panel, concluding “We 
consider these arrangements to be quite unsatisfactory”.92 In particular, the Clothier Report 
objected to the discretion of the States Greffier not to refer complaints to the Panel, the delays 
in dealing with complaints, and “If a complaint reaches the Board and is upheld, there is no 
satisfactory sanction which can be applied to the errant administrator or committee to oblige 
them to make amends”.93 
5.10 In 2002, political responsibility in the States Assembly for the administrative appeals system 
was transferred from the “Special Committee to Consider the Relationship Between 
Committees and the States” to the Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC).94 
5.11 Further criticism of the Panel emerged from a review carried out by PPC in 2004.95 The 
Committee noted 
“Various concerns and criticisms of the present system have been expressed by States 
members and others in recent years and these include – 
the fact that the system has no ‘teeth’ and the findings of Boards can be ignored by 
Committees and Departments. This can lead to frustration for both complainants and 
members of the Panel who feel they have wasted their time; 
a perception that there is no clear ‘follow-up’ procedure when the findings of Boards are not 
implemented; 
criticism by some Committees that certain findings have not, in their opinion, been based on 
a full knowledge of policies and procedures of the Committee concerned; 
                                                
91 Administrative Decisions (Review) (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1995. 
92 States of Jersey, Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey, para 9.4. 
93 States of Jersey, Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey, para 9.3. 
94 PPC is a committee of elected States members “responsible for the procedures of the States Assembly, for 
members’ facilities and the code of conduct for members”. PPC acts as a conduit through which the 
Complaints Panel communicates with the States Assembly. 
95 Privileges and Procedures Committee, Administrative Appeals System: Proposals for Improvement – 
Consultation Report, Presented to the States on 4 May 2004. 
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a perceived lack of independence from the States because of the rôle of the Greffier of the 
States in deciding whether or not to refer a complaint to a Board (although the members of 
the Panel have made it clear that they very much value the administrative support given by 
the States Greffe that they would like to retain); 
the fact that the system is too slow and ‘formal’ and does not provide a simple, quick, informal 
method to resolve minor complaints; 
the small number of complaints each year (no more than 20 to 25) leading to a perception 
that some persons who are aggrieved do not bother to use the system; 
a lack of firm and binding guidelines on the operation of the system.” 
5.12 The review by PPC led to amendments to the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) 
Law 1982 in 2006.96  
• The Panel was renamed the “States of Jersey Complaints Panel”.  
• A new initial procedure was created, including providing the chairman or a deputy chairman 
with express powers to “attempt informal resolution of the matter”.  
• The power of the Greffier of the States to dismiss a complaint without reference to the 
chairman was replaced with power for the chairman (or a deputy chairman) to decide that a 
review by a board is not justified. The role of the Greffier of the States (in practice, delegated 
to the Deputy Greffier of the States) is limited to enquiring into the facts of the matter and 
presenting a dossier to the chairman of the Panel. 
• The Panel was given powers to “issue rules of practice and procedure”.  
• The Panel is required to make an annual report to PPC, and PPC was placed under a duty 
to present the report to the States Assembly. 
5.13 The chairmen of the Panel since its composition changed to non-States members have been:   
• Mr (formerly Senator) Reg Jeune CBE (1997-2003), a Jersey solicitor for over 50 years who, 
as a States Member, had set up the special committee that led to the Administrative 
Decisions (Review)(Jersey) Law 1982. 
• Mrs Carol Canavan (2003-12), a Jersey solicitor, served as a Complaints Panel member for 
15 years, nine as chairman.  
• Advocate Richard Renouf (2012-14), a Jersey advocate, who resigned as chairman when 
elected as a States Member in 2014. 
• Mr Nigel Le Gresley (2014-15), a Jersey solicitor.  
• Mr Geoffrey Crill (appointed in July 2015 on a 5-year term), a retired Jersey solicitor.  
5.14 The Panel underwent a significant renewal of leadership during 2014-15 with the 
appointment of a new chairman (Mr Geoffrey Crill) and two new deputy chairmen.  
5.15 At a meeting of PPC in July 2015,97 “The Chairman Designate [Mr Crill] informed the 
Committee that the Panel would be reconstituted shortly with reappointments and new 
members. Once its membership had been restored, the first task of the Panel would be to 
review its current practices. Of particular importance was ensuring that the work of the Panel 
covered all intended branches of government, to include newer bodies and departments. 
The Chairman Designate also indicated that the Panel might seek to accelerate and improve 
the process governing the initial assessment of complaints. Above all, the Chairman 
Designate considered it crucial for the public to be aware of the work of the Panel and for 
                                                
96 Administrative Decisions (Review) (Amendment No. 2) (Jersey) Law 2006. 
97 Privileges and Procedures Committee (13th Meeting), Minutes, 7 July 2015, TM/SC/194. 
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States Departments to view its contribution positively. Members noted that the Panel might 
attend upon a future meeting of the Committee in order to discuss potential enhancements 
to its own procedures”. 
Composition of the Complaints Panel 
5.16 As of October 2017, the Complaints Panel consists of 12 members; there is no legal limit on 
the number of members who can be appointed by the States Assembly.98 
Member Gender Profile99 
Geoffrey Crill   Male First appointed in 2013; appointed as Deputy Chairman in 2015; 
appointed as Chairman in July 2015 for a 5-year term. Retired 
solicitor. Educated in Jersey. See P.180/2014. 
Christopher 
Beirnie 
Male First appointed in 2009; reappointed as a member for a further 4 
years in 2015 and as Deputy Chairman. Headmaster and Chief 
Executive of Beaulieu Convent School since 2006. Jersey resident 
since 1996. See P.71.2015 and P.133/2015. 
Stuart 
Catchpole QC 
Male First appointed in 2013; appointed as Deputy Chairman in July 
2015 for a 5-year term. A senior barrister at the Bar of England 
and Wales, specialising in “international arbitration, construction, 
professional negligence, commercial litigation, energy and natural 
resources and insurance and re-insurance”. See P.180/2014. 
Robert (Bob) 
Bonney 
Male First appointed in 2009; reappointed as a member for a further 4 
years in 2015. Member of the States of Jersey Police Force for 28 
years until retirement in 2005. See P.71.2015. 
Patrick David 
McGrath 
Male First appointed in 2012; reappointed as a member for a further 4 
years in 2015. Member of the States of Jersey Police Force for 27 
years until retirement in 2002. 
Graeme 
George Marett 
Male First appointed in 2012; reappointed as a member for a further 4 
years in 2015. Retired computer consultant. Educated in Jersey. 
Janice Eden Female First appointed in 2013; reappointed for a further 5-year term in 
March 2017. Qualified in counselling, she has held many voluntary 
roles and is the owner/manager of a card shop in St Helier. See 
P.8/2017. 
John Moulin Male First appointed in 2013; reappointed for a further 5-year term in 
March 2017. Mr Moulin retired from the Civil Service in 2009 
following nearly 29 years of service. President of the Jersey Civil 
Service Association between 2003 and 2009. He also serves as a 
member of the “Social Security Low Income Support Appeal 
                                                
98 Under the Draft States of Jersey (Appointments Procedures)(Jersey) Law 201-, lodged au Greffe on 13 
October 2017, appointments will in future be made by the Privileges and Procedures Committee rather than 
the States Assembly as a whole. 
99 Summarised from the biographies included in Propositions to the States Assembly for the appointments of 
each member. 
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Tribunal” [sic] and the “Medical Incapacity Appeal Tribunal” [sic]. 
Born in Jersey. See P.8/2017. 
Susan Cuming Female Appointed in May 2017 for 5 years. “Retired from the civil service 
in 2015 after 32 years’ service, mostly working in human 
resources”. Since 2015, she has been a member of the Jersey 
Employment Discrimination Tribunal. A Jersey resident since 
1983. See P.20/2017. 
Gavin M Fraser Male Appointed in May 2017 for 5 years. “A senior finance professional 
and non-executive director with 40 years’ experience in 
investments, banking, trusts, insurance and education.” A Jersey 
resident since 1985. See P.20/2017. 
David 
Greenwood 
Male Appointed in May 2017 for 5 years. “Head of International for 
HSBC Bank International, being responsible for the Company’s 
strategic customer and deposit growth objectives”. A Jersey 
resident since 2013. See P.20/2017. 
Gwyn Llewellin Male Appointed in May 2017 for 5 years. Senior Clinical Medical Officer 
for the States of Jersey Public Health Department 1988-2002. 
During his employment as a Civil Servant, he served as President 
of the Jersey Civil Service Association between 1997 and 2002. 
He was a member of the Health and Safety at Work Appeal 
Tribunal 2002-2008. A Jersey resident since 1976. See P.20/2017. 
5.17 The Complaints Panel considers itself to be a diverse body. Speaking to PPC in July 2015, 
the new chairman, Mr Crill, “assured the Committee that the Panel retained a broad 
membership, with volunteers from a wide range of professional and social backgrounds”.100 
In its response to our consultation, the Complaints Panel (referring to itself as “the SCP”) 
said: 
“The members are voluntary, and the present membership incorporates a wide diversity of 
backgrounds and life experiences. The Panel is able to draw on that diversity to formulate a 
Board that is most appropriate to consider any given complaint. However, what is absolutely 
critical to the credibility of the SCP, both with the public and with the executive, is that the 
SCP is seen to comprise a broad cross-section of members of the community who between 
them have no obvious political affiliations but have sufficient experience and expertise to 
justify the confidence of both ‘sides’ that a Board can reach an independent, reasoned 
decision based only on the evidence put before them. It is that broad cross-section of the 
membership of the SCP that provides confidence to the public that it is not an ‘establishment’ 
body that is hearing their complaint, but rather a group of their peers.” 
5.18 During our research interviews, one former member of the Complaints Panel told us “Many 
recent appointments have been retired public sector employees who are more likely to have 
heard of the Panel and be familiar with government processes. They are good members but 
those with different backgrounds can bring valuable insights”. 
5.19 We do not share the Complaints Panel’s confidence that it can be regarded as a diverse 
body. Most strikingly in its current composition, there are only two women out of the 12 
                                                
100 Privileges and Procedures Committee (13th Meeting), Minutes, 7 July 2015, TM/SC/194. 
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members. Eight of the 12 are retired or semi-retired. To point this out is not to criticise any of 
the Complaints Panel’s individual members but simply to question to what extent the Panel 
is meeting its stated aim of being a “broad cross-section”. 
5.20 In Chapter 3, in relation to membership of the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeal 
Tribunal, we are recommending that those responsible for making appointments have regard 
to the need for diversity among members.101 In our consultation report, we made a similar 
proposal in relation to the Complaints Panel, saying that there should be a legal duty on the 
States Assembly to have regard to the desirability of Panel members, between them, being 
broadly reflective of Jersey society.   
5.21 We decided to make no final recommendation about changing the law in relation to diversity 
in respect of the Complaints Panel (if it is retained). This is because the process of appointing 
members is already subject to the oversight of the Jersey Appointments Commission (though 
it is not directly involved in making appointments). In recent appointments processes, 
selection of new members has been undertaken by the Chairman and two Deputy Chairman 
of the Complaints Panel. They should follow the Jersey Appointments Commission’s 
guidelines set out in Recruitment and Selection Guidance for Independent bodies.102  
The Complaint Panel’s caseload 
5.22 Over the past six years, the number of complaints received has varied between 8 and 17, 
with an average of 11 a year.103 The number of public hearings held is smaller, ranging from 
one to four (and average of 2.3 a year).  
Table: Case load of States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
  
5.23 The type of complaints has varied over time. The Panel’s annual reports for 2010 and 2011 
note that most of the complaints received related to decisions made by the Minister for 
Planning and Environment in relation to planning applications, and speculated that “the 
increase in Planning related complaints could be a result of the perceived prohibitive costs 
of a Royal Court or Third Party Appeal process”. New, more accessible arrangements for 
planning appeals has resulted in planning cases to the Complaints Panel drying up. 
                                                
101 See Recommendation 3.7. We also noted there that this is an aspect of a much broader issue of diversity 
in public appointments and membership of public bodies in the Island. It will be for the Chief Minister to take 
steps to put in place an “effective island diversity strategy … essential in addressing the challenges of an 
increasingly diverse community”, as recommended by the Report of the Independent Jersey Care Inquiry in 
July 2017. 
102 See 
www.gov.je/Government/Departments/ChiefMinisters/ChiefMinistersSections/JerseyAppointmentsCommissio
n/Pages/GuidelinesRecruitmentSeniorEmployeesAppointeesIndependents.aspx  
103 Source: Annual Reports and other information on the States Assembly website. 
Year New complaints 
received 
Not proceeded 
with 
Hearings 
held 
Informal 
resolutions 
Complaints 
upheld 
2015   9 0 1 0 1 
2014 13 11 1 4 0 
2013 17 5 4 1 4 
2012 7 4 1 1 1 
2011 8 No information 4 No information 0 
2010 12 No information 3 No information No information 
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5.24 The annual reports for 2012-2015 present a different picture of the caseload, explaining that 
the complaints received “related to decisions made by a wide variety of Ministers, when in 
previous years they had been mostly concentrated on planning matters”. The introduction of 
a new planning appeals system established by the Planning and Building (Amendment No. 
6) (Jersey) Law 2014, which creates a new right of appeal to the Minister advised by planning 
inspectors in place of a right of appeal to the Royal Court, is likely to further diminish the 
Panel’s oversight over applications for planning permission. 
Outcomes of complaints after hearings 
5.25 To understand the operation of the Complaints Panel, we have looked in more detail at the 
11 complaints that led to hearings and reports, or responses to reports, between January 
2013 and October 2017. These have been identified from annual reports of the Complaints 
Panel and the “reports” section of the States Assembly website.104 
5.26 Of the 11 complaints, three were not upheld by the Complaints Panel (colour coded green in 
the Chart and Table below).  
5.27 Of the eight cases upheld, the Minister or other public body accepted the findings and 
recommendations in two cases (blue) and rejected the main findings and recommendations 
in five cases (red) and in one case rejected findings but nonetheless reconsidered the 
decision and made an outcome favourable to the complainant (purple). We view this high 
proportion of cases in which Ministers reject Complaint Panel findings and recommendations 
(and in some cases, are highly critical of the Complaint Panel’s approach) as creating an 
unstable relationship, which undermines the efficacy of the Complaints Panel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
104 As noted below, there is no easy accessible systematic collection of the Complaint Panel’s reports. 
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Table of complaint outcomes 
1 2017 complaint not 
upheld by 
Complaints Panel 
Mrs and Mrs A complained against a decision of the Minister 
of Education regarding an appeal in respect of a higher 
education student grant for their son. In September 2017, 
following a private hearing, the Complaints Panel (G. Crill, G. 
Marett and S. Cuming) did not uphold the complaint but 
made suggestions that the Education Department respond 
within 2 months outlining ways in which it would review 
aspects of its decision=making (R.108/2017). 
2 2017 complaint 
upheld by 
Complaints Panel 
Findings rejected by 
States Employment 
Board 
Mrs X, a lab technician in Jersey schools for many years, 
complained about the way in which her request for ill-health 
retirement was handled. In May 2017, following a private 
hearing the Complaints Panel (C. Beirnie, R. Bonney and J. 
Moulin) upheld Mrs X’s complaint, finding that “Mrs X 
received insufficient guidance and support from the 
Employer, who had a responsibility to provide an appropriate 
level of care”. The decision was found to be “unjust, 
oppressive or improperly discriminatory, or was in 
accordance with a provision of any enactment or practice 
which is or might be unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory”, “could not have been made by a reasonable 
body of persons after proper consideration of all the facts”; 
and “was contrary to the generally accepted principles of 
natural justice”. The Complaints Panel recommended that the 
States Employment Board (SEB) reconsider its decision 
(R.53/2017). In its formal response in July 2017, the SEB 
substantially rejected the Complaint Board’s findings 
(R.53/2017 Res.). In a further report, the Chairman of the 
Complaints Panel stated, “I am disappointed with the 
response provided by the States Employment Board, which I 
find to be poorly balanced, highly selective, and which 
ignores the context of the events surrounding the decision” 
(R.53/2017 Res.Res.(re-issue)). 
3 2016 complaint 
upheld Complaints 
Panel. 
 
Findings rejected by 
SEB. 
Mr Alwitry complained about the withdrawal of an offer of 
employment to the position of consultant ophthalmologist.  
Following a 2-day public hearing, the Complaints Panel (G. 
Crill, S. Catchpole and J. Eden) issued a 159-page report 
concluding that the complaint was well-founded. It concluded 
by saying, “We agree that this case is a paradigm example of 
introspective and poor decision-making by a small group of 
senior public officials. While we are only concerned with the 
procedure that was adopted rather than the substantive 
merits of the decision itself, the only conclusion that one can 
reach is that the process was manifestly unfair, was based 
on incorrect information and advice, took account of 
irrelevant considerations and failed to take account of all of 
the relevant ones (precisely because the process was not 
designed to ensure that relevant information was confirmed 
and considered impartially by an independent body). It 
follows that we also agree that the description … of the 
procedure (or lack of it) that was followed in the present case 
as ‘appallingly shabby’ is apt” (R.75/2016). On 7 July 2016, 
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the Minister issued a press release saying, “… I am 
concerned that the terms of reference [of the Complaints 
Panel’s board] have vastly expanded without the opportunity 
for officers to provide the appropriate evidence for the new 
areas under review.  Regrettably, staff have had their 
integrity and their honesty called into question in a public 
document, without any opportunity to put forward the facts of 
the case as they were at the time”.105 In his formal response, 
the Minister said “The SEB considers that the Complaints 
Board did not conduct the hearing in accordance with its own 
directions and that it strayed into areas that it had specifically 
and repeatedly told the SEB and the Complainant that it 
would not deal with such as the reasonableness of the 
decision to withdraw Mr Alwitry’s contract of employment” 
(R.75/2016 Res.). In December 2016, the Chairman of the 
Complaints Panel made a further 18-page report, describing 
SEB’s formal response as “deeply unsatisfactory”, saying the 
Panel was “concerned and confused by SEB’s response” 
(R.75/2016 Res.). 
4 2016 complaint not 
upheld by 
Complaints Panel 
Unite the Union complained about a decision of the Minister 
for Infrastructure about actions under the Connex bus 
contract. Following a public hearing, the Complaints Panel 
(C. Beirnie, G. Marett and J. Eden) made a report concluding 
that the Minister had correctly interpreted his duties and 
accordingly did not uphold the complaint (R.31/2016). 
5 2015 complaint 
upheld by 
Complaints Panel. 
Minister accepts 
some 
recommendations 
Mr Sullivan and Mr Sullivan, commercial fishermen, 
complained against the Minister for Economic Development 
regarding enforcement of a contract to use facilities at Bouley 
Bay. Following a public hearing, the Complaints Panel (G 
Crill, C. Beirne, and J. Moulin) made a report in February 
2014 upholding the complaint and made a series of 
recommendations (R.24/2015). In his response, the Minister 
said he accepted and acted upon some recommendations 
(R.40/2015). 
6 2014 complaint not 
upheld by 
Complaints Panel 
  
Mr Manning made a complaint against the Minister for 
Treasury and Resources regarding overcharging on a loan 
made to him by the States of Jersey in 1999. Following a 
hearing, the Complaints Panel (Advocate R. Renouf, D. 
McGrath and C. Boscq-Scott) issued a report in April 2014 
that did not uphold the complaint. It did however recommend 
that the Minister give consideration in future circumstances to 
address any perceptions that loan agreements are unclear or 
ambiguous (R.67/2014). 
                                                
105 Government of Jersey website, “Health Minister responds to Complaints Board report”, 
www.gov.je/news/2016/pages/ministerrespondstocomplaintsboardreport.aspx. The SEB issued a similar 
statement  www.gov.je/news/2016/pages/sebstatement.aspx.  
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7 2014 complaint 
upheld by 
Complaints Panel. 
Findings rejected by 
Minister. 
Mr Manning made a complaint against the Minister for 
Planning and Environment relating to an enforcement notice. 
Following a public hearing, the Complaints Panel (C. Vibert, 
J. Mills and G. Crill) found that service of the enforcement 
note was contrary to law and the department’s subsequent 
handling of the case was contrary to natural justice, and 
requested the Minister to reconsider the matter (R.144/2013). 
The Minister’s response was published in December 2013 
(R.154/2013), saying that he did not accept that it was 
correct to say that service of the enforcement notice was 
ultra vires.  On 11 February 2014, PPC published 
correspondence from the Deputy Chairman of the 
Complaints Panel, saying that it is “disappointing for the 
[Complaints Panel] to have its findings insufficiently 
considered or implemented” (R.15/2014). 
8 2013 complaint 
upheld by 
Complaints Panel 
 
Minister took 
positive action in 
response to findings 
and 
recommendations 
Mr Berry complained about the decision to dismiss him from 
his post as Deputy Chief Officer of the States of Jersey 
Police on grounds of ill-health. Following a public hearing, the 
Complaints Panel (Advocate R. Renouf, F. Dearie and S. 
Catchpole) upheld the complaint holding that the new Deputy 
Chief Officer did not have legal power to dismiss Mr Berry 
and relevant policy was not rationally applied (R.157/2013). 
In his response, the Minister for Home Affairs expressed 
concern about the lack of clear definition of the Complaint 
Panel’s jurisdiction but accepted the finding that there was a 
lack of legal powers. The Minister noted that it was 
unfortunate that Mr Berry had not immediately challenged his 
dismissal by an application for judicial review to the Royal 
Court (R.13/2014). 
9 2013 complaint 
upheld by 
Complaints Panel 
 
Minister rejects 
findings and 
recommendations 
Mr Bisson complained against a decision of the Minister for 
Transport and Technical Services about a decision of the 
Driver and Vehicle Standards section of the Transport and 
Technical Services Department to place restrictions on the 
public service vehicle licence issued to a business known as 
“Pet Cab”. Following a public hearing, the Complaints Panel 
(C. Vibert, C. Beirne and G. Marett) upheld the complaint, 
stating in its June 2013 report that the decision to issue the 
licence with a condition was unreasonable (R.67/2013). In his 
response, the Minister “highlighted a number of concerns … 
in relation to the proceedings and findings” of the Panel, 
rejected the recommendation and said that it was “unclear 
what condition would be acceptable” to the Complaints 
Panel. The Minister proposed an alternative solution 
(R.93/2013). 
10 2013 complaint 
upheld by the 
Complaints Panel 
Minister rejects 
findings and 
recommendations 
Mr Bellas complained against the Minister for Social Security 
regarding the handling of an application for Income Support 
in relation to whether a sum of money paid by a former 
employer should be regarded as income or capital.  
Following a public hearing, the Complaints Panel (Advocate 
R. Renouf, C. Beirne and D McGrath) upheld the complaint in 
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November 2013 (R.142/2013). The Minister rejected the 
findings and recommendations (R.156/2013). 
11 
 
2012 complaint 
upheld by the 
Complaints Panel 
Minister rejects 
findings and 
recommendations 
(but retakes decision 
to the benefit of the 
complainant) 
Mr and Mrs B complained against a decision of the Minister 
for Education, Sport and Culture to transfer their son to 
School A rather than their preferred choice of School B. 
Following a private hearing, the Complaints Panel (Advocate 
R. Renouf, F. Dearie and R. Bonney) upheld the complaint 
(R.102/2012). In his response, the Minister rejected several 
of the Complaints Panel’s findings and recommendations 
(R.108/2012) but did agree to transfer the child to School B. 
Ministers often do not accept findings and recommendations of the Complaints Panel 
5.28 As we explored above, it is evident that Ministers reject a significant proportion of the 
adverse findings and recommendations of the Complaints Panel. The reasons for rejecting 
findings and recommendations in summary are as follows. 
• Case 2 (see Table above): the Minister saw “no merit in carrying out a further” report; he 
rejected a finding that that a decision was unreasonable when the Complaints Panel had 
accepted that the decision was appropriate given the information available at the time; and 
rejected the conclusion that the decision was contrary to principles of natural justice 
(R.53/2017 Res.). 
• Case 3: “The SEB considers that the Complaints Board did not conduct the hearing in 
accordance with its own directions and that it strayed into areas that it had specifically and 
repeatedly told the SEB and the Complainant that it would not deal with such as the 
reasonableness of the decision to withdraw Mr Alwitry’s contract of employment” 
(R.75/2016 Res.). 
• Case 7: the Minister said that the Complaints Panel “reached different conclusions to the 
Royal Court as regards the legitimacy of the temporary storage of telegraph poles”; the 
Minister “cannot accept that it is correct” to say, as the Panel did, “that the service of the 
[enforcement notice] was ultra vires” (R.154/2013). 
• Case 9: in his response, the Minister “highlighted a number of concerns … in relation to the 
proceedings and findings” of the Panel, rejected the recommendation and said that it was 
“unclear what condition would be acceptable” to the Complaints Panel (R.93/2013). 
• Case 10: the Minister noted that the complainant had a right of appeal to the Social Security 
Tribunal, which was withdrawn; the department’s decision was just and would not be 
changed; and the claim had been assessed correctly (R.156/2013). 
• Case 11: the Minister’s response opened by saying “I wish to place it on record that there 
are several points on which I disagree with the summary and findings of the Complaints 
Board”; among the points the Minister made, was that the Complaints Panel had reached 
a different interpretation of the law relating to parental choice of schools from that of the 
Law Officers’ Department; and he rejected Complaint Panel’s findings of fact; and was 
critical of how the Panel had described an aspect of the case “in such emotive terms”.  
 
It is not appropriate for the Jersey Law Commission to “re-litigate” the complaints process to 
assess whether the Complaints Panel or the Minister is correct. Our point is that the high level 
of disagreement between Ministers and the Complaints Panel does not provide a sound basis 
for the relationship of mutual respect that must exist in a system where the Panel’s findings 
and recommendations are not binding orders. 
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Our principal recommendation: The Complaints Panel should be 
replaced by an ombudsman 
Recommendation 5.1: The States of Jersey Complaints Panel should be replaced by a Jersey 
Public Services Ombudsman. 
5.29 Our overarching finding is that, notwithstanding previous attempts at reforms, several serious 
problems persist with the remit of the Complaints Panel, the framework within which it 
operates, the procedures it uses, and its track record in providing effective redress to people 
in Jersey. Our criticisms are not directed at the individuals (past and present) who contribute 
their time without remuneration to serve on the Complaints Panel. As with the other elements 
of administrative redress in Jersey, our focus is on getting the system right. 
5.30 We have considered two general ways forward: to abolish the Complaints Panel and replace 
it with a public sector ombudsman; or to adopt an evolutionary approach and introduce a 
range of further reforms to make the Complaints Panel more coherent and effective (noting 
that substantial changes have already been made in 1996 and 2006).  
5.31 Our principal recommendation is that the Complaints Panel should be replaced by a Jersey 
Public Services Ombudsman (which we discuss in Chapter 6). Closure of the Complaints 
Panel would be achieved by repeal of the Administrative Decisions (Review)(Jersey) Law 
1982. Our principal recommendation is based on the following considerations. 
• The volume of complaints received by the Complaints Panel is very low, suggesting that 
people are unaware of the Complaints Panel or are aware of it but do not want to use it. In 
Chapter 6, we look at ombudsman schemes in small jurisdictions: these attract 100-200+ 
complaints a year, compared to the Complaint Panel’s average of 11 complaints a year (of 
which, fewer than 3 a year are on average fully adjudicated). The low caseload also results 
in Panel members having insufficient opportunity to develop their skills as they are involved 
in hearings only occasionally. 
• There is a range of significant problems with how the Complaint Panel’s remit is defined and 
how it operates; we discuss these below and provide some alternative recommendations 
on how these could be addressed. We are not, however, confident that these 
recommendations will provide a satisfactory solution. 
• There is an opportunity cost to keeping the Complaints Panel. While the Complaints Panel 
is retained, there will not be a public services ombudsman in Jersey. As we discuss in 
Chapter 6, we believe that an ombudsman could have a transformational influence on the 
Island’s administrative justice system which the Complaints Panel cannot aspire to have. 
• There is, on our analysis, a worrying pattern in the relationship between Ministers and the 
Complaints Panel. A situation in which the majority of the Complaints Panel’s findings and 
recommendations are rejected by Ministers does not provide a stable and effective basis for 
the relationship between the Complaints Panel and the Government of Jersey.   
Why we are making alternative recommendations 
5.32 During the consultation phase of this project, we received strongly expressed responses from 
the Complaints Panel and from the States Assembly’s Privileges and Procedures Committee 
(PPC) arguing against our interim recommendation to abolish the Complaints Panel to 
replace it with an ombudsman. 
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5.33 The Complaints Panel described our April 2016 consultation report as containing 
“unsubstantiated generalisations”, “sweeping allegations … without any evidence or 
apparent justification”, and said that it “cannot avoid the feeling that [the consultation report] 
has been written from the conclusion (that there should be a remunerated public services 
ombudsman with power to make binding orders) backwards, rather than looking at the 
structure of the complaints process, and then seeing how it may be improved”. We did not 
and do not recommend that the proposed public services ombudsman should have powers 
to “make binding orders”. We do not accept the criticisms made by the Complaints Panel of 
our approach to developing our interim recommendations. On the contrary, we have drawn 
evidence-based conclusions for improving administrative redress based on analysis of 
relevant laws and practice. 
5.34 On 16 August 2016, the Chairman of the Jersey Law Commission (Mr Clive Chaplin) and the 
Topic Commissioner (Professor Andrew Le Sueur) attended a closed meeting of PPC, at 
their invitation. We subsequently received a detailed 5-page letter dated 17 August 2016 
from Connétable Len Norman, the Chairman of PPC, rejecting our research findings (set out 
in our consultation report) that “an atmosphere of mutual distrust has arisen between the 
Panel and the government”, that the “Panel makes little or no tangible contribution to 
improving the quality of public administration”, that “The Panel has outlived its usefulness”, 
and that the Panel “offers poor value for money”. We stand by our assessments. 
5.35 In 2000, the Clothier report (discussed above) concluded that the Complaints Panel was 
“quite unsatisfactory” and that change was patently needed in the form of an ombudsman. 
Our fresh review of the law and evidence 16 years later leads us to the same conclusion.  
5.36 In light of responses from the Complaints Panel and PPC, we anticipate that there will be 
political opposition to our recommendation to end the role of the Complaints Panel. We have 
therefore developed a series of alternative recommendations for reform of the Complaints 
Panel: these are discussed in this Chapter and summarised in Annex B: List of Alternative 
Recommendations on the Future of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. Although 
these proposals would, in our assessment, improve the operation of the Complaints Panel 
we do not have sufficient confidence in them to recommend them as providing a long-term 
solution to the various problems with the Complaints Panel. 
Alternative recommendation on training for Complaints Panel members 
Alternative recommendation 5.2: The Greffier of the States should have a legal duty to 
provide a programme of training to members of the Complaints Panel. 
5.37 In our April 2016 consultation report, we made the interim recommendation that all members 
of the Complaints Panel should receive good quality training on all aspects of the Panel’s 
work, including informal resolution. There was strong agreement with this proposal. The 
Complaints Panel told us that it “wholeheartedly supports” this proposal, noting that “while it 
is a priority that the members of the [Complaints Panel] are drawn from a wide Island 
community and have broad life experience, they will only retain credibility if they clearly 
demonstrate that they are fulfilling their duties properly and appropriately, and this 
necessitates maintaining a level of ongoing training”.106 A former member of the Complaints 
Panel said that training was “very important, particularly if the Panel is to be enhanced”, 
adding “I believe this would be welcomed by Panel members”. 
                                                
106 Selected responses to consultation are published on the Jersey Law Commission website. 
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5.38 During the research interviews, we were told no training in mediation and other alternative 
dispute resolution methods is provided to members of the Complaints Panel, though some 
Panel members have experience of ADR through their past or present employments.  
5.39 To ensure that training is provided and properly resourced, we consider that it is necessary 
to create a legal obligation to do so. We propose that the most appropriate public office holder 
to have this legal duty is the Greffier of the States. It would be appropriate for the Complaint 
Panel’s annual report to provide an account of the training that has been provided.  
Alternative recommendation on publicity about the Complaints Panel 
Alternative recommendation 5.3: The States Assembly should invest resources in developing 
a website, other publicity material and a programme of activities to publicise the work of the 
Complaints Panel. 
5.40 In our consultation report, we proposed that the Panel should have its own website, which 
should be developed into a resource for complainants and their advisers. There was broad 
support for this proposal. The Complaints Panel told us that it agreed “wholeheartedly that 
the findings of the Board should be properly publicised. It further agrees that the [Complaints 
Panel] should have its own website, which it considers would be the appropriate place for 
reports to be published, with links to the site from the JLIB and gov.je websites”. A former 
member of the Complaints Panel commented on better publicity that “This has been spoken 
about for years!”. 
5.41 Earlier in this Chapter, we hypothesised that one reason why the Complaints Panel receives 
few complaints compared to ombudsman systems in some other small jurisdictions is 
because of low levels of public awareness of the existence and function of the Complaints 
Panel. To bring about higher levels of public awareness of and confidence in the work of the 
Complaints Panel, better online information is a necessary but not sufficient action. As we 
note in Chapter 6, some ombudsmen have used a range of activities to raise public 
awareness. In Jersey, the Complaints Panel could have a stall in King Street, have a 
programme of talks to local groups, and use social media. Public bodies also have a 
responsibility to ensure that users of their services are aware that the Complaints Panel may 
be able to assist them should they have a grievance that the public body is not able to 
resolve. 
Alternative recommendation on widening the scope of the Complaints 
Panel’s jurisdiction 
Alternative recommendation 5.4: The scope of the Complaints Panel’s jurisdiction should be 
broadened to include a wider range of public bodies. 
5.42 Article 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 states 
“Where any person (referred to in this Law as the ‘complainant’) is aggrieved by any decision 
made, or any act done or omitted, relating to any matter of administration by any Minister 
or Department of the States or by any person acting on behalf of any such Minister or 
Department, the person may apply to the Greffier to have the matter reviewed by a Board.” 
5.43 The Complaints Panel’s remit is therefore not comprehensive; it covers only some areas of 
public administration in the Island. It does not cover the following areas of administrative 
decision-making public bodies: 
• administrative decisions taken by Parishes     
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• arm’s length bodies such as the Jersey Financial Services Commission and the Jersey 
Competition Regulation Authority 
• decisions previously made within States departments that have in recent years been 
transferred to corporate entities wholly owned by the States of Jersey, operating at arm’s 
length from Ministers: JT Ltd (Jersey Telecom Group Ltd, a telecommunications business); 
Jersey Post Ltd (the mail service); Ports of Jersey Ltd (running the harbour and airport since 
2015); and Andium Homes Ltd (in July 2014 the States of Jersey’s housing stock and 
responsibilities of the States of Jersey Housing Department were transferred to Andium) 
• decisions made by non-ministerial bodies, which include: the Overseas Aid Commission; 
the Bailiff’s Chambers; the Judicial Greffe; the Viscount’s Department; the Office Analyst; 
the Office of the Lieutenant Governor; the office of the Dean of Jersey; the Data Protection 
Commission; Probation; and the Comptroller and Auditor General 
• decisions made by “minor entities”, which include the Government of Jersey London Office 
and the Jersey Legal Information Board. 
5.44 During the research interviews, a former member of the Complaints Panel expressed 
disagreement with this idea, taking the view that only Ministers should be subject to review 
by the Panel as there would be nothing that the States Assembly could do with a report 
relating to corporate entity or Parish. The value of the Complaints Panel’s work in relation to 
such bodies is that they would seek to provide a good quality complaints handling service 
external to the body complained about. Recommendations would be made to the 
incorporated entity, Parish etc and the Complaints Panel would report in their annual reports 
on the responses received. The Complaints Panel would have no sanction for non-
compliance except the pressure of political and public opinion; this is no different from the 
position in relation to Ministers. 
5.45 In our consultation report, we proposed that the Complaint Panel’s remit should be extended 
to cover a wider range of public bodies. One response disagreed (without giving a reason); 
all other responses supported the proposal (though it was suggested to us that the work of 
the Viscount should not fall under the oversight of the Complaints Panel or an ombudsman).   
5.46 The Complaints Panel supported widening its jurisdiction, saying that “its remit should extend 
to any corporate entity to which public administration is devolved, be that Andium Homes, 
Ports of Jersey, Property Holdings, Jersey Post or whoever. When considering such 
devolution, the States Assembly should have serious and fundamental regard to the manner 
and extent to which the rights of redress of ordinary members of the public might be 
protected. The same comments apply to all States-funded bodies – be they quangos or 
independent entities – whose prime function is to deliver States policy or manage public 
funds.” 
5.47 A former member of the Complaints Panel referred to “Parishes, States owned incorporated 
bodies, Charities Commission” as bodies that should fall within its remit. 
5.48 If the Complaints Panel is retained, we recommend that the Panel’s remit should be widened 
to cover a broader range of public authorities than it currently does. The guiding principle 
should be that any office-holder or organisation performing functions of a public nature 
should fall within the remit of the Complaints Panel. For clarity and certainty, these public 
bodies should be listed or defined in the amended Law governing the Complaints Panel.107 
                                                
107 A point of reference for developing a wider definition could be the Freedom of Information (Jersey) Law 
2011, in which Article 1 provides a definition of “public authority”. 
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Alternative recommendation on reformulating the grounds of review 
Alternative recommendation 5.5: The grounds of review used by the Complaints Panel should 
be reformulated. 
5.49 Article 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 (as currently in force) 
states  
“Where any person (referred to in this Law as the ‘complainant’) is aggrieved by any 
decision made, or any act done or omitted, relating to any matter of administration by 
any Minister or Department of the States or by any person acting on behalf of any such 
Minister or Department, the person may apply to the Greffier to have the matter reviewed by 
a Board.” 
5.50 The definition of the Complaint Panel’s jurisdiction and the grounds of review have remained 
substantially unaltered since the 1979. The grounds on which a three-person board should 
decide whether to uphold a complaint are set out in Article 9(2) of the 1982 Law: 
“Where a Board after making enquiry as aforesaid is of opinion that the decision, act or 
omission which was the subject matter of the complaint – 
(a) was contrary to law; 
(b)  was unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory, or was in accordance with a 
provision of any enactment or practice which is or might be unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory; 
(c) was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; 
(d) could not have been made by a reasonable body of persons after proper consideration 
of all the facts; or 
(e) was contrary to the generally accepted principles of natural justice, 
the Board, in reporting its findings thereon to the Minister, Department or person concerned, 
shall request that Minister, Department or person to reconsider the matter.” 
5.51 In our consultation report, we identified what we considered to be significant problems with 
this legal framework and how it has been interpreted by the Complaints Panel.  
Questions of law 
5.52 The grounds of review set out in Article 9 of the 1982 Law have a strong focus on legal 
questions, referring to: “contrary to law”; “based wholly or partly on a mistake of law”; “could 
not have been made by a reasonable body of persons” (a test that alludes to the legal 
principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness,108 a ground for challenging the legality of a 
decision in an application for judicial review to the Royal Court); and “was contrary to the 
generally accepted principles of natural justice” (alluding to the case law developed by courts 
since the 17th century on procedural fairness in decision-making).109  
5.53 It is surprising that the grounds on which the Complaints Panel reviews decisions are based 
so closely on legal questions, given the initial composition of the Panel (elected States 
                                                
108 See H Woolf, J Jowell, A Le Sueur et al, de Smith’s Judicial Review, 7th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
2013). 
109 See H Woolf, J Jowell, A Le Sueur et al, de Smith’s Judicial Review, 7th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
2013). 
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members)110 and the current composition of the Panel (predominantly non-legally qualified 
members).    
5.54 There is evidence to suggest that, over the years, the Complaints Panel has struggled to 
understand its proper role in relation to legal questions. For example: 
• On 9 March 2010, the chairman of PPC answered a written question from the Deputy of St 
Martin, raising an issue that the Deputy had first raised on 30 June 2009, about the 
Complaints Panel’s role when a complaint raises a point about human rights (which is a 
legal issue).111 The question was prompted by perceptions that a board had been reluctant 
to address an issue related to a Convention right at a hearing. The chairman of PPC said: 
“It would be inappropriate for the Complaints Board to operate as a kind of Human Rights 
Tribunal, as this is not the reason why it was established by Law in 1982. However, if Human 
Rights issues arise while reviewing a complaint about a specific decision, a Board will look 
into them, and if appropriate, seek legal advice”. (We comment: if the source of advice is 
the Law Officer’s Department, grounds for a perception of lack of independence or 
impartiality in the Complaints Panel may be created if the Complaints Panel is receiving 
legal advice from the same source as the Minister whose decision is being challenged).  
• The Deputy Greffier of the States, who acts as the executive officer for the Complaints 
Panel, told a meeting of PPC on 6 March 2014 that “It was within the Board’s remit to be 
concerned with matters of law in accordance with Article 9(2) of the Administrative Decisions 
(Review) (Jersey) Law 1982”.112  
• In its annual report for 2014, the Complaints Panel provides information on progress dealing 
with a complaint relating to a decision of the Minister for Transport and Technical Services 
(now the Minister for Infrastructure) in respect of an undertaking given by the Public Services 
Committee to a trade union. It notes that the then chairman (Mr Le Gresley) “was of the very 
firm opinion that asking the Complaints Panel to look into legal matters fell beyond its remit, 
and that the correct course of action should really be a judicial review”. A board of the 
Complaints Panel, consisting of three non-legally qualified members, heard the complaint 
and reported to the States Assembly in April 2016, concluding that “that the Minister had 
correctly interpreted his duties”.113 
5.55 We are confident that Article 9 of the 1982 Law requires the Complaints Panel to deal with 
complaints based on errors of law or which depend on a board reaching a conclusion on a 
question of law. This includes questions of law under the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000.  
5.56 In response to consultation, one former member of the Complaints Panel agreed with our 
interim proposal: “Even if the Chair is a lawyer, a Board is not constituted as a legal forum 
and it is inappropriate for it to make findings on questions of law”. Another response said “In 
my view, either the existing statutory appeals or judicial review are best suited to deal with 
questions of law”. 
5.57 The Complaints Panel disagreed, telling us: “On the question of whether the SCP should 
deal with questions of law, the SCP considers that it should retain this power. If questions of 
law were to be excluded, it is envisaged that there could be significant arguments over 
whether or not complaints involved a question of law, not least because most administrative 
decisions derive from statutory powers. The SCP would therefore be deciding as a question 
                                                
110 Though the first chairman of the Panel was Senator Reg Jeune, a Jersey lawyer. 
111 States of Jersey, 240/5(5175). 
112 States of Jersey, AG/SC/080. 
113 States of Jersey, States of Jersey Complaints Board: Findings – Complaint Against a Decision of the 
Minister for Infrastructure Regarding the Minister’s Actions Under Clause 18.3 of the Connex Bus Contract, 
Presented to the States on 1st April 2016 by the Privileges and Procedures Committee, R.31/2016. 
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of law whether or not something was a question of law and thus within its remit. It is 
acknowledged that important questions of law could arise during its deliberations, and in 
such circumstances, it should be possible for the SCP to refer such matters as it felt were of 
such importance or beyond its capabilities to determine to the Royal Court for determination. 
In practice, however, the SCP is of the view that in such circumstances the complainant 
would have already chosen to follow a judicial route for the resolution of the dispute, rather 
than the process laid down under the Law”. 
5.58 In our consultation report, we said that the composition of the Complaints Panel is not well 
suited to determining questions of law. This remains our view for three reasons. 
5.59 First, the Complaints Panel is institutionally ill-equipped to determine questions of law. There 
is no express requirement that the Chairman of the Complaints Panel is legally qualified 
(though in practice all Chairmen have been). Equally significantly, there is no requirement 
that a board convened to hold a public hearing shall always include a legally qualified 
member. Complaints involving points of interpretation have been heard by entirely non-
lawyer boards.114 The suggestion that a board will be able to seek legal advice if necessary 
does not commend itself as a practical work-around: this is likely to delay proceedings and 
runs the risk of a board deferring to the views of legal adviser rather than reaching a 
conclusion of its own (as a court or tribunal would do). 
5.60 Second, there are reasons to doubt that a public hearing involving a point of law will be fair 
to a complainant. In such cases, the Minister will invariably be legally represented but there 
is no provision for legal aid for a complainant who cannot afford to fund his or her own legal 
representation. There is a risk of inequality of arms. 
5.61 Third, it is undermining of the constitutional principle of the rule of law for questions of law to 
be determined by a body whose remedy is limited to making recommendations. In recent 
years, the majority of recommendations have been rejected by Ministers. Ministers should 
not be able to choose whether or not to accept rulings on questions of law.  
Maladministration 
5.62 During the research interviews, several interviewees described the Panel’s role in relation to 
“maladministration”. Indeed, in its reports for 2013 and 2014, the Panel “acknowledged that 
the majority of complaints received were considered not to relate to matters of 
maladministration and therefore had not justified a hearing being convened”. The States 
Assembly Hansard also provides several examples of States Members referring to the 
Complaints Panel and maladministration. Our finding is that there is widespread confusion 
in Jersey over the meaning of maladministration and its application to the Panel’s role. 
5.63 The concept of “maladministration” seems to have come to Jersey via contact with the public 
sector ombudsmen in the United Kingdom.115 The principal remit of ombudsmen is to 
investigate complaints from a member of the public who “claims to have sustained injustice 
in consequence of maladministration in connection with action taken by or on behalf of” of a 
public body.116 In the UK legislation, maladministration is not expressly defined. It is, 
however, understood to cover “bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, 
                                                
114 For example, Connex complaint (see previous note). 
115 See www.statesassembly.gov.je/AssemblyReports/2002/17021-24410.pdf#search=maladministration.  
116 There are currently three main public sector ombudsman operating in England and Wales. The 
Parliamentary Commission for Administration covers central government departments and the Health Service 
Ombudsman covers NHS complaints. Both institutions in practice operate as a single entity, often referred to 
as ‘the PHSO’. The Local Government Ombudsman covers local authorities. There are current proposals to 
create a single public sector ombudsman: see Cabinet Office, A Public Sector Ombudsman: a consultation 
(2015) and the Draft Public Services Ombudsman Bill (Cm 9374, December 2016). 
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perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on”.117 Maladministration also includes: “rudeness 
(though that is a matter of degree); unwillingness to treat the complainant as a person with 
rights; refusal to answer reasonable questions; neglecting to inform a complainant on request 
of his or her rights or entitlements; knowingly giving advice which is misleading or 
inadequate; ignoring valid advice or overruling considerations which would produce an 
uncomfortable result for the overruler; offering no redress or manifestly disproportionate 
redress; showing bias, whether because of colour, sex, or any other grounds; omission to 
notify those who thereby lose a right of appeal; refusal to inform adequately of the right to 
appeal; faulty procedures; failure by management to monitor compliance with adequate 
procedures; cavalier disregard of guidance which is intended to be followed in the interest of 
equitable treatment of those who use a service; partiality; and failure to mitigate the effects 
of rigid adherence to the letter of the law where that produces manifestly inequitable 
treatment”.118 
5.64 The Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 does not use the word 
“maladministration” to define the Complaint Panel’s remit and the grounds of review in Article 
9(2) do not constitute a statement of the concept of maladministration. In our consultation 
report, we said that if the Complaints Panel is to be retained its focus on maladministration 
should be clarified and made explicit. 
5.65 Except for the Complaints Panel, responses to consultation broadly supported this proposal. 
The Complaints Panel told us: “Is interesting to note that UK legislation does not expressly 
define “maladministration”, yet the Paper recommends that (were it to be retained) the SCP’s 
grounds of review of complaint should be expressly defined in terms of maladministration. 
We do not see that this clarifies the grounds available to the SCP under the Law as at 
present. On the contrary, we consider the grounds set out in Article 9(2) of the Law to be 
clear and unambiguous, yet broad enough to encompass any behaviour which might fall 
under the description of “maladministration’”.  
5.66 Ombudsman schemes around the world, including across the United Kingdom, have 
produced valuable guidance – for public bodies and for members of the public – on the 
meaning of maladministration. Our view remains that that there would be considerable 
advantage in redefining the grounds of review in Article 9(2) of the 1982 Law.  Using the 
concept of maladministration would emphasise that the Complaint Panel is not a body whose 
main function is to adjudicate on questions of law and could help explain to people in Jersey 
that the Complaints Panel provides an “ombudsman-style” dispute resolution service.      
Alternative recommendation on avoiding duplication of remedies 
Alternative recommendation 5.6: The Complaints Panel should not accept complaints where 
the aggrieved person has or had a right of appeal to JAAT or another tribunal, a right of 
appeal to the Royal Court, or it would be reasonable for the person to challenge the 
lawfulness of the administrative decision by making an application for judicial review to the 
Royal Court. 
5.67 The Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 does not expressly state what the 
Complaints Panel will do if an alternative remedy, such as an appeal to a tribunal or the 
                                                
117 These factors are called “the Crossman catalogue” as they are words used by Anthony Crossman MP, the 
minister in charge of the bill creating the first ombudsman in the UK. 
118 Quoted in the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman’s 1993 Annual Report and endorsed by Treasury Ministers in 
November 1994 in evidence to the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. 
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Royal Court, is potentially available to the aggrieved person. The Complaints Panel appears 
to have no consistent practice on what to do in such circumstances.  
5.68 For example: in 2013, the Complaints Panel held a public hearing and made adverse findings 
against the Minister for Transport and Technical Services in respect of conditions imposed 
on a PSV licence for a “pet taxi”. One of the reasons given by the Minister for rejecting the 
Complaints Panel’s report is that the complainant had a right of appeal to the Royal Court 
against the imposition of conditions, which the complainant did not use. 
5.69 By contrast, as noted above, the Complaints Panel in its 2014 annual report provided 
information on progress dealing with a complaint relating to a decision of Minister for 
Transport and Technical Services in respect of an undertaking given by the Public Services 
Committee to a trade union. It notes that the then chairman (Mr Le Gresley) “was of the very 
firm opinion that asking the Complaints Panel to look into legal matters fell beyond its remit, 
and that the correct course of action should really be a judicial review” application to the 
Royal Court.119 
5.70 It is important that across the administrative redress system there are good “fits” between 
the type of grievances a person needs to pursue and the institution and process that handles 
it. We therefore recommend that the Complaints Panel should not accept complaints where 
a person has (or had) a right of appeal to a tribunal or court on the specific issue in question. 
Alternative recommendation on informal resolution by the Complaints 
Panel 
Alternative recommendation 5.7: All members of the Complaints Panel – not only the 
Chairman and Deputy Chairmen – should have power to attempt informal resolution of 
complaints. 
5.71 Since 2006, the Complaints Panel has express powers to seek to resolve complaints 
informally under Article 3(3) of the 1982 Law as amended:  
If the Chairman (or Deputy Chairman) decides that a review of the matter by a Board is 
justified, he or she may nevertheless first attempt informal resolution of the matter and in that 
case may use whatever means that he or she considers reasonable in the circumstances to 
achieve such a resolution. 
5.72 During the research interviews, we were given several examples of successful informal 
resolution. In one (before States housing was transferred to Andium Homes Ltd), the Minister 
had refused to change arrangements for a designated children’s play area; we were told that 
the Complaints Panel, working with the relevant elected States members, was able to ensure 
that ‘common sense prevailed’. Another example given was a complaint that roads had been 
closed by ministerial order for a road race; the Complaints Panel got the Department for 
Transport and Technical Services and the event organisers to agree a better procedure for 
subsequent races. 
5.73 Some interviewees were doubtful about informal resolution. We we told that typically 
complaints were not suited to informal resolution. Moreover, if the chairman was involved in 
attempting to achieve informal resolution and this failed, there could be concerns about the 
chairman’s ability to preside at the public hearing that might follow because it was possible 
that he or she may need to be involved in discussions with the department when the 
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complainant is not present (which could raise issues about impartiality). It was important that 
a board hearing a case ‘comes fresh’ at the issues. 
5.74 We were told during the research interviews that only the chairman and deputy chairmen are 
involved in informal resolution. Indeed, on a strict reading of Article 3(3), only they are 
empowered to do so. The reason for barring other Complaints Panel members from informal 
resolution is unclear.  
5.75 With a Panel consisting of 12 members there would be sufficient manpower to consider 
encouraging some ordinary members of the Panel to engage in informal resolution.   
5.76 During the research interviews, we were told no training in mediation and other alternative 
dispute resolution methods is provided to members of the Complaints Panel, though some 
Panel members have experience of ADR through their past or present employments. As part 
of the package of training envisaged in Recommendation 5.2, Panel members should be 
expected to develop their skills in this area. 
Alternative recommendation on ministerial responses to Complaints 
Panel reports 
Alternative recommendation 5.8: The Chief Minister should prepare a report to the States 
Assembly reviewing responses to the Complaints Panel’s findings and recommendations 
since October 2011 and making proposals for the Government of Jersey’s future working 
relationship with the Complaints Panel. 
5.77 The Panel’s remedial powers are limited to making a “request that the Minister, Department 
or person to reconsider the matter”.120 If the Panel “considers that its findings have been 
insufficiently considered or implemented”, it may “present a report to that effect to the 
Privileges and Procedures Committee” and, in turn PPC must make a report to the States 
Assembly.  
5.78 The Panel’s remedial powers differ from tribunals and courts in that the Panel’s findings are 
only recommendations and are not enforceable against the Minister or other public body. 
5.79 In the United Kingdom, the public sector ombudsmen also have powers limited to making 
recommendations.121 There are, however, important differences with the position in Jersey. 
First, there is a very high level of official and political acceptance of ombudsmen decisions: 
a failure to implement an ombudsman recommendation is exceptionally rare. In Jersey, by 
contrast, Ministers routinely disagree with the Panel’s findings. Secondly, in relation to the 
Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) a distinction is drawn between ‘findings’ of fact and 
‘recommendations’ of the action needed to cure the injustice. The LGO’s findings on facts 
are binding on local authorities: if a local authority disagrees with a finding it must seek 
judicial review of the LGO’s decision and demonstrate that it was not a decision that the LGO 
could lawfully make on the material before it. Local authorities have more discretion to decide 
whether or not to accept recommendations. This distinction does not exist in Jersey. 
5.80 As described above, the outcome in a large proportion (more than half) of complaints that go 
to a hearing is that the Minister rejects the Complaints Panels findings and 
recommendations. The Complaints Panel views this state of affairs with concern. In its 2013 
report, the Panel notes that it is “troubled by the inflexible stance adopted by some Ministers, 
despite being presented with the considered, independent and impartial findings of the 
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121 See Part 5. 
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various Boards” and “is concerned that Ministers and officers seem reluctant to acknowledge 
that mistakes are occasionally made”.122  
5.81 During the research interviews, civil servants and others involved in government expressed 
little confidence in the operation of the Complaints Panel; the Panel’s reports are regarded 
as poorly written and straying outside the Panel’s jurisdiction; Panel members were regarded 
as amateurs who had little understanding of public administration. In contrast, some 
interviewees with experience serving on the Complaints Panel painted a quite different 
picture. One identified 2005 as a turning point, suggesting that the introduction of ministerial 
government to the island had given chief officers and civil servants a more prominent role in 
administrative decision-making and Ministers feel compelled to defend civil servants’ 
decisions. 
5.82 In our consultation report, we said that our research finding was that there is an atmosphere 
of mutual distrust has arisen between the Complaints Panel and government. In its response, 
the Complaints Panel described this as a “sweeping allegation”, “made without any evidence 
or apparent justification” and referred to: “the fact that many complaints are not considered 
by the SCP to warrant further examination; the fact that the States’ departments are prepared 
to consider and enter into informal negations with the SCP; and the fact that individual Boards 
have frequently been commended by Minister and senior officials for their conduct of 
hearings (irrespective of their findings), support the unanimous view of the SCP members 
that they approach all complaints with an open mind, with an acknowledgement that the 
administration of executive responsibility is frequently difficult and that decisions are not 
always easily reached”. 
5.83 Our assessment – based on views gathered during the research interviews and from the 
public record of ministerial responses to Complaints Panel’s reports – is that a difficult 
relationship exists. We therefore recommend that, if the Complaints Panel is to be retained, 
the Chief Minister should make an evaluation of the current relationship in a report to the 
States Assembly as a way of resettling the relationship in an open and transparent way. 
Consideration needs to be given to the reasons given by Ministers for not accepting findings 
and recommendations (see paragraph 5.28). 
Use of public hearings to adjudicate on complaints 
5.84 The Complaints Panel refers a small number of complaints to a 3-person ‘board’ of Panel 
members to determine complaints each year (between one and four in the years 2010-14). 
These are normally held in public but may be held in private, for example where a child is 
involved or sensitive personal information will be discussed. 
5.85 During the research interviews the centrality of public hearings was strongly defended as a 
‘good fit’ for the Complaint Panel’s remit. We were told that the Complaints Panel ‘is not an 
arbitrator, is not an ombudsman service’. Ministers, we were told, should be compelled to 
justify their decisions in public. It was salutary to have a journalist from the Jersey Evening 
Post in the corner of the room when the minister did so, according to an interviewee with 
experience of serving on the Panel. We were told that hearings allow complainants to ‘have 
their “day in court” without too much expense’.  
5.86 A variety of premises have been used for hearings, including parish halls and rooms in the 
States Assembly building. Site visits have also been made when a complaint relates to a 
planning matter. During the research interviews, we were told that some venues had poor 
                                                
122 R.51/2014. The matter was reported in the news media: H Chalmers, ‘Public complaints: Ministers “ignored 
recommendations”’, Jersey Evening Post, 26 April 2014, p 4. 
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acoustics. Another criticism was that there was inadequate public notice in advance of 
hearings, which hindered members of the public concerned about the issue from attending. 
5.87 One interviewee suggested that the Complaints Panel’s questioning of Ministers was 
superior to the ‘quite amateurish’ approach of States Assembly Scrutiny Panels and 
questioning by backbenchers and was therefore a valuable addition to political accountability 
in the island. 
5.88 Other interviewees reported that complainants are usually very anxious about the public 
hearing stage of their complaint: they ask ‘will it be like a court?’ and ‘will I need to wear a 
suit?’ (inquired by a complainant who did not own one). We were told that it has become 
routine for the Minister to be represented by a lawyer and that departments come to hearings 
‘mob handed’ (meaning with a full legal and official team). This, one interviewee observed, 
has created a different atmosphere to that which typically existed in the past. An interviewee 
connected to the Complaints Panel said the Panel tried to avoid hearings becoming ‘a court 
room scenario’ but this was now difficult or impossible as legal representatives raised 
‘pedantic’ and ‘legalistic’ points.  
5.89 The procedure adopted at hearings appears to be flexible. We were told that at some 
hearings elected States members asked and were permitted to address the board (and this 
is confirmed in reports on some complaints). One criticism of the procedure made during the 
research interviews is that it is unfair that civil servants who are to give evidence may sit in 
during the hearing, enabling them to listen to evidence given by the complainant. 
5.90 In our consultation report, we said we were unconvinced that adjudication at public hearings 
is the best way to resolve complaints about maladministration. We are not aware of any other 
complaint handling schemes that work in this way. The more normal technique is 
investigation, in which the facts of the case are gathered through interviews and access to 
official files leading to the informal resolution or formal publication of a report. While there 
are strong constitutional and other reasons for courts and tribunals to sit in public,123 the 
same considerations do not apply to complaint handlers whose focus is on 
maladministration.   
5.91 In its response the Complaints Panel told us: 
“The SCP does not agree that public hearings of complaints should be dispensed with. It is 
critically important that any scrutiny process by which the executive is held to account is open 
and transparent, not only to reassure the public that complaints are being considered 
exhaustively, but also because the executive knows that it will have to justify its decisions in 
public. We consider this to be a very valuable incentive in achieving the best possible 
standard of public administration.  
Article 7 of the Law requires a Board to “enquire into any complaint” and allows the SCP to 
determine its own procedure. Other than attempts at informal resolution, it is accepted that 
the default procedure is to consider the complaint at a public hearing. The SCP has not 
enquired into any complaint through an investigatory process, but the SCP accepts that there 
may be cases where that would be a more appropriate method of enquiry than a public 
hearing. The principle disadvantages that come to mind of an investigatory process as 
opposed to a public hearing are first, the benefits of the process being in public are lost, and 
second, there is a risk that an investigation would be more drawn out than a once and for all 
hearing. In an investigation, the onus is on the investigator to ensure that the investigation is 
exhaustive, whereas with a hearing it is for the parties to submit the papers and the witnesses 
on which they will rely (with the Board retaining the right to call for further documents or 
information it may require).” 
                                                
123 See Parts 1 and 2. 
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5.92 We welcome the Complaint Panel’s openness to consider using investigations in future. In 
light of this response, we do not propose any change in the 1982 Law. 
Starting the complaints process 
5.93 In our consultation report, we suggested that there might be benefits in moving the point of 
entry to the Complaints Panel from the States Greffe in the States Assembly to the Judicial 
Greffe (which has responsibility for supporting the work of tribunals courts). Our thinking was 
that this would provide a more joined-up approach for people with complaints, as it would be 
easier to undertake triage of grievances at the outset to ensure they were being directed to 
be most appropriate channel (Complaints Panel, Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 
Royal Court). 
5.94 Although the proposal received some support during the consultation phase of the project, 
the Complaints Panel and a former member of the Complaints Panel disagreed. On 
reflection, we agree that it would not be practical for this change to be made. We therefore 
make no final recommendation on this point. 
Style of reports 
5.95 In our consultation report we said: Reports by boards are written as a narrative of events and 
points raised at the hearing. They are not, in our view, consistently well written. One 
interviewee with experience as a member of the Complaints Panel told us that the reports 
should be more succinct and directed at the errors complained about. We agree. 
5.96 In its response, the Complaints Panel told us: 
“The SCP agrees that the published report of any Board finding should focus on the process 
of the making of the decision complained of, rather than the details of the specific decision. 
However, it should not be overlooked that the complaint is primarily a personal one, and the 
complainant can only be satisfied by the detailed findings that the complaint has been fully 
and properly considered. Article 9(1) of the Law requires a Board to report its findings in 
writing to the complainant, the Minister or department concerned, and also to present a copy 
of its report to the States’ Privileges and Procedures Committee. The report is therefore 
required to be as full as is necessary to explain its conclusions. In some cases, that may 
require a full and detailed account of the facts surrounding the decision complained of. The 
SCP has in all cases made it clear to complainants that they may request details to be kept 
private, and each request is considered on its own merits. The SCP is of course particularly 
sensitive to matters relating to personal health, personal means and matters involving 
children.  
The SCP considers that it may be appropriate that, rather than publishing a Board’s findings 
in extenso, an editorial panel (drawn perhaps from JLIB or the Jersey Law Review editorial 
board) may extract a summary of the findings from the Board’s report which would focus on 
the process of the making of the decision complained of, and that summary would be the 
extent of the publication. The full report would be archived, but available for inspection.” 
5.97 We do not understand why an editorial panel is necessary to achieve this or why the editorial 
committee of the Jersey and Guernsey Law Review is relevant. The style of reports, and any 
summaries, are matters within the responsibility of the Complaints Panel. If the Complaints 
Panel is retained, clearly this is a matter that it will want to consider. We make no 
recommendation because no change in the law is needed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROPOSAL FOR A JERSEY PUBLIC SERVICES OMBUDSMAN 
What is an ombudsman? 
6.1 The term “ombudsman” originated in Sweden in the early 19th century. During the 1960s and 
1970s, many countries around the world set up ombudsman schemes to deal with complaints 
against government. These developments were driven by concerns about the growing power of 
government and the relative inaccessibility of legal remedies due to cost and formality.  
6.2 Typically, the remit of an ombudsman is to investigate cases of alleged maladministration in 
public administration causing injustice. More recently, ombudsman schemes have been set up 
in the private sector (for example, banking, insurance and financial services)124 as a way of 
dealing with complaints in an independent way. 
6.3 The Ombudsman Association, an international organisation of ombudsman bodies, defines the 
role of an ombudsman as follows:125 
Ombudsmen offer their services free of charge, and are thus accessible to individuals who 
could not afford to pursue their complaints through the courts. 
They are committed to achieving redress for the individual, but also, where they identify 
systemic failings, to seek changes in the work of the bodies in their jurisdiction, both 
individually and collectively. 
They can generally undertake a single investigation into multiple complaints about the same 
topic, thus avoiding duplication and excessive cost. 
They are neutral arbiters and not advocates nor “consumer champions”. 
They normally ask the body concerned and the complainant to try to resolve complaints 
before commencing an investigation. 
They usually seek to resolve disputes without resort to formal investigations where this is 
possible and desirable. 
Where they identify injustice, they seek to put this right. 
6.4 The role of ombudsmen in “identifying systematic failings” in public administration is of particular 
importance. The UK public sector ombudsmen work proactively with central and local 
government to improve the quality of decision-making and complaint handling.   
6.5 In some countries, the ombudsman has the status of an officer of parliament. In the United 
Kingdom, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (sometimes referred to as “the 
PCA” or the “Parliamentary Ombudsman”) set up in 1967 has this position. The PCA determines 
complaints against central government departments. Complaints cannot go directly to the PCA 
but must be referred by a Member of Parliament; this feature of the system has been criticised 
for many years. An ombudsman does not have to be an officer of parliament. In England, the 
Local Commission for Administration (often called “the Local Government Ombudsman”) set up 
in 1974, which deals with complaints against local authorities, does not have this status. 
                                                
124 In 2014, the governments of Jersey and Guernsey cooperated to establish the Channel Island Financial 
Services Ombudsman: see www.ci-fo.org.  
125 See www.ombudsmanassociation.org/about-the-role-of-an-ombudsman.php.    
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6.6 In the UK, the Government has proposed reforms of the structure of the ombudsmen system, 
merging the PCA, Health Service Commissioner and the Local Government Ombudsman.126 
Comparison with the States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
6.7 The States of Jersey Complaints Panel, examined in Chapter 5, is often regarded as the Jersey 
institution that stands in the place of an ombudsman. Indeed, the Complaints Panel has 
“associate membership” of the Ombudsman Association as a “complaint handler member”. But 
in several important respects, an ombudsman and the Complaints Panel are different. 
 Feature Ombudsman (typically) States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
Office holder A salaried professional expert  A group of 12 unremunerated members 
of the public appointed by the States 
Assembly   
Staff Case workers and support 
staff 
All support work is carried out by the 
Deputy Greffier of the States 
Criteria of 
review 
“Maladministration” The list of criteria in Article 9(2) of the 
Administrative Decisions 
(Review)(Jersey) Law 1982   
Methods of 
work 
Informal resolution if possible. 
Formal private investigation 
leading to a published report 
where informal resolution is 
not possible. Reports are 
anonymised. 
Some use of informal resolution by the 
Chairman or Deputy Chairmen.  
Adjudication at a formal hearing leading 
to a published report. The hearings are 
normally in public and the reports are 
not normally anonymised.   
Remedies Power to make 
recommendations. 
High level of compliance by 
public authorities 
Power request that Minister 
reconsiders. 
Rejected by Ministers in high proportion 
of cases 
Role in 
promoting 
good 
standards of 
administration 
and dispute 
resolution 
within public 
authorities 
 
Ombudsman actively engage 
with Ministers and civil 
servants to encourage 
continuous improvement in the 
quality of public administration. 
 
This is not part of the remit of the 
Complaints Panel (though some 
specific recommendations in published 
reports may seek to make 
improvements in particular contexts) 
Public 
awareness 
activities 
Ombudsmen engage in a wide 
variety of activities to make 
Little or no activity by the Complaints 
Panel to publicise its work to the public. 
                                                
126 See Cabinet Office, A Public Service Ombudsman: a Consultation (2015); a Draft Public Services 
Ombudsman Bill was published in December 2016. 
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public aware of ombudsman’s 
role. 
Own-initiative 
powers to 
investigate 
where there is 
evidence of 
systemic 
problems 
Some ombudsmen have this 
power. 
The Complaints Panel does not have 
this power. 
Debates about a public sector ombudsman for Jersey 
6.8 In 2000, one of the principal recommendations of the Report of the Review Panel on the 
Machinery of Government in Jersey (the Clothier report) was the creation of an ombudsman.127   
We recommend the institution of a proper Ombudsman to hear complaints of 
maladministration by Government Departments. This would be a matter of little difficulty and 
no great expense. The Ombudsman should be an independent person and endowed with 
powers to order the production of papers and files and to command the attendance of 
witnesses. If a finding is made in favour of the citizen, and the responsible Department does 
not volunteer to remedy the grievance, the power of compulsion should lie in the States, to 
whom the Ombudsman reports and whose officer he is. The States should jealously guard 
the authority of the Ombudsman if they find his report acceptable. 
6.9 In May 2004, the Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC) presented a report to the States 
Assembly reviewing the operation of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (as it is now called) 
and assessing the case for introducing an ombudsman scheme. PPC  
• accepted “that the establishment of an Ombudsman in Jersey might, in itself, be sufficient 
to re-establish confidence in a system of informal dispute resolution 
• noted that the number of complaints made to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel “is 
very small at present” – implying that the case load could not justify the introduction of an 
ombudsman scheme 
• rejected the idea that a public sector ombudsman scheme could be combined with an 
ombudsman for financial services:128 it was thought unlikely that an ombudsman could be 
appointed who had sufficient expertise in both financial services and public administration; 
moreover, it was thought likely to cause confusion to amalgamate two different sectors 
• rejected the idea that a public sector ombudsman could be shared with Guernsey, noting 
“this would seem to imply that the Ombudsman might not always be readily available to 
deal with complaints which would run contrary to the desire to provide a swift response to 
complaints” 
• was concerned about the costs of setting up a public sector ombudsman, estimating 
operating costs of £300,000 a year, “which could be difficult to justify in present financial 
circumstances”. 
                                                
127 Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey Part 9. 
128 In November 2015, the Channel Islands Financial Ombudsman began work. This is a joint scheme 
between Jersey and Guernsey. In Jersey, the CIFO operates under the Financial Services Ombudsman 
(Jersey) Law 2014; there is corresponding legislation in Guernsey. 
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6.10 PPC concluded that it was “not minded to recommend that a public sector Ombudsman be 
established in the Island at the present time”. The States Assembly accepted PPC’s conclusions 
and subsequently introduced a range of reforms to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel.129 
6.11 The “Complaints Panel vs Ombudsman” debate seems to on sincerely held opposing views 
about two matters. 
6.12 The first is cost. As noted above, in 2004, PPC estimated that the annual operating budget of 
an ombudsman would be £300,000. We make no assessment of this figure; the cost would be 
related to the design of the new ombudsman service. Judgements about expenditure of public 
resources is ultimately for politicians. This assessment needs to be made having regard to the 
benefits that accrue from the investment.  
6.13 The second concerns who should carry out the work.  
• When originally set up as the States of Jersey Administrative Appeals Panel, complaints 
where heard by States Members: the model was of politicians reviewing fellow politicians 
and their civil servants.  
• In its current format, the Complaints Panel consists of local people, who are mostly not 
experts in public sector dispute resolution, carrying out the role of adjudicating on 
complaints. Jersey has a long tradition of valuing honorary service in public institutions, 
including in the Honorary Police. 
• If a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman was set up, the work would be carried out by 
professional experts – the Ombudsman him or herself (and if the case load required it, one 
or more case workers). 
Proposal for a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman 
Recommendation 6.1: The Government of Jersey should make an “in principle” decision to 
support next steps in the creation of a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman (JPSO). 
Recommendation 6.2: The Government of Jersey should request the Jersey Law Commission 
to develop institutional design options for the JPSO. 
6.14 As we noted in Chapter 5, there continues to be opposition to the idea of replacing the States 
of Jersey Complaints Panel with a public services ombudsman. The Complaints Panel and 
States Members on PPC criticised the proposal contained in our April 2016 Consultation Report 
for a fresh look at the benefits and costs of creating an ombudsman scheme for the Island. 
6.15 Against this political background, and mindful of our role as an independent law reform agency, 
we have sought to contribute in the ongoing debate in two ways.  
• In Chapter 5, we set out a series of “alternative recommendations” for changes to the law 
and practices of the Complaints Panel. As we indicated, however, we are not confident 
that these proposals would solve the problems we identified.  
• Here in Chapter 6, we propose that a further step should be taken in developing an 
institutional design for a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman (JPSO) . If the Government 
of Jersey supports further exploration of the proposal for a JPSO, the Jersey Law 
Commission would undertake further work to develop an outline design for the new 
institution and an assessment of its costs and benefits. If the Government of Jersey is 
                                                
129 See Part 4. 
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committed to maintaining the States of Jersey Complaints Panel, and sees value in our 
alternative recommendations in Chapter 5, we will not carry out further work about a JPSO.  
6.16 The proposed study would: 
• assess the operation and effectiveness of the ombudsman schemes established in other 
small jurisdictions (for example, Gibraltar, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands) 
• consider recent developments in the operation and effectiveness of the various public 
sector ombudsman schemes across the United Kingdom (where relatively new 
ombudsman schemes exist in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) and lessons to be 
learnt for Jersey 
• examine what public bodies should fall within the remit of a Jersey public services 
ombudsman. A point of particular importance is whether complaints in relation to health 
services would be included. 
• investigate the procedures that a Jersey public services ombudsman could use, including 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods130 
• consider the relationship between a Jersey public services ombudsman and other redress 
mechanisms (including appeals to tribunals and the Royal Court and the work of the Jersey 
Audit Office) 
• estimate the likely case load of a Jersey public services ombudsman 
• develop a design, or different design options, for a costed model for a Jersey public 
services ombudsman.  
6.17 The research would involve desk-based research, interviews (face-to-face where possible or by 
video conference calls where travel is uneconomic) and public consultation. 
Ombudsman schemes on other very small jurisdictions 
6.18 One development that has taken place since the 2004 PPC report to the States Assembly is 
that public service ombudsman schemes have been set-up in a number of other small 
jurisdictions. These will be a useful point of reference in further development of options for 
institutional design for a JPSO. 
Gibraltar Public Services Ombudsman 
6.19 The Gibraltar Public Services Ombudsman was established in 1999, serving a population of 
30,000.131 In 2015, its jurisdiction was extended to cover the Gibraltar Health Authority. It 
promotes a telephone helpline as a way of accessing its services and actively publicises its role 
to the public. It works proactively with government bodies to champion continuous improvement 
in the quality of public administration. 
6.20 The office consists of the Ombudsman and eight members of staff. In 2015, it received 164 
complaints. Many cases were resolved informally. Nine cases were subject to formal 
investigation leading to reports. It has a website containing useful information about how to 
make a complaint and the work of the GPSO. It distributes copies of its annual report from a 
stall in Main Street and conducts surveys to test levels of public awareness and understanding 
of the GPSO’s role. 
                                                
130 On ADR, see Chapter 8. 
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Ombudsman for Bermuda 
6.21 The Ombudsman for Bermuda serves a population of 65,000. It was established in 2004. Its 
mission is “To investigate administrative actions of an authority for the purpose of deciding 
whether there is evidence of maladministration on the part of the authority” and “Pursuant to an 
investigation, to make recommendations to an authority concerning administrative action that 
formed the subject of the investigation and, generally, about ways of improving its administrative 
practices and procedures”. 132   
6.22 The current Ombudsman has set as her strategic aims: great public access, greater public 
awareness, and championing best practice. The Ombudsman and her team take an active 
approach to raising awareness, including education sessions in schools, organisations and for 
government departments. The Ombudsman has a user-friendly website and publishes an 
informative annual report. 
6.23 In 2016, over 260 people contacted it and they recorded a total of 285 cases. In addition to the 
Ombudsman, the office has five members of staff. 
Office of the Complaints Commissioner 
6.24 In the Cayman Islands (population 63,000), the Office of the Complaints Commissioner (OCC) 
was created in 2004. Its aim is “To investigate in a fair and independent manner complaints 
against government to ascertain whether injustice has been caused by improper, unreasonable, 
or inadequate government administrative conduct, and to ascertain the inequitable or 
unreasonable nature or operation of any enactment or rule of law”.133 The OCC uses 
investigations, which are conducted in private. 
6.25 As well has receiving complaints, the OCC has powers to carry out “own initiative” investigations 
into aspects of public administration where there is evidence of systematic failure. The OCC 
engages in public education outreach, including promoting the OCC’s work at public festivals 
and an “open house” for members of the public to visit the OCC’s offices. 
6.26 During the financial year 2015-16, the Office received 26 enquiries, 133 complaints and 
completed 96 investigations. The office consists of an Acting Complaints Commissioner and 
four members of staff. We have not been able to ascertain the cost of running the OCC. 
What a JPSO would do 
6.27 In developing the institutional design for a JPSO, it will be important to specify the full range of 
functions to be carried out. 
6.28 Looking into individual complaints would be a core aspect of a JPSO’s work. We have already 
noted the stark contrast between the tiny number of complaints that reach the States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel and the significantly higher numbers that reach the ombudsman schemes in 
Gibraltar, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands (each of which has a population smaller than 
Jersey’s). 
6.29 A JPSO would also have a wider role of working with public bodies to improve the quality of 
public administration. This is a major emphasis of many ombudsman schemes and something 
that the States of Jersey Complaints Panel is unable to provide in a systematic way.  
6.30 In a written response to our Consultation Report, Dr Chris Gill (now of the University of Glasgow) 
draw our attention to his research on complaints handling in England, which we expect to be a 
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 Improving Administrative Redress – Topic Report 2017 | page 108 
point of reference in our future work on a JPSO.134 Dr Gill’s study investigates questions about 
the practical impact of the work of ombudsman, courts and tribunals have on the day-to-day 
work of public bodies. One of Dr Gill’s policy recommendations is that ombudsmen should be 
“learning champions”, which would have three facets: 
“Spokesperson: working collaboratively with courts and tribunals, the ombudsman could 
distil and disseminate important decisions taken by other redress mechanisms. This would 
draw on the institution’s skill in packaging messages in ways that are accessible to 
administrators. Rather than only drawing on its own casework, it could bring together and 
disseminate important, cross-cutting administrative justice principles. Drawing on its closer 
understanding of bureaucratic decision-makers, the ombudsman could be charged with the 
coherent presentation of administrative justice principles to bureaucratic audiences. 
Relationship manager: here the ombudsman would function as a conduit for interchange 
between decision-makers and redress mechanisms. The ombudsman could either create 
professional networks or develop existing ones, which would function as spaces in which 
administrative justice principles could be disseminated and as fora in which shared 
understandings of good practice could be jointly developed. This would capitalise on the 
ombudsman’s ability to enter into professional networks and would allow it to extend its scope 
as a policy actor. This would also allow the ombudsman to identify more clearly areas where 
the decision-makers require training or guidance. 
System fixer: The third dimension of the ombudsman as learning agent would require new 
powers of own-initiative investigation, which could be harnessed to trouble-shoot problem 
areas within the administrative justice system. For example, the ombudsman might launch 
an investigation in areas where there are high levels of successful appeals, or in response 
to concerns raised in the annual reports of the Senior President of Tribunals. The 
ombudsman might also investigate where new initiatives have a significant knock on effect 
on the administrative justice system, such as currently in relation to mandatory 
reconsideration. There is also potential for the ombudsman to follow up individual cases. 
Particularly where important legal precedents are set, the ombudsman could have a role akin 
to Special Masters in the US court system (Cannon 2004). Here, judges might refer cases to 
the ombudsman for follow up where public interest issues appear to be at stake. Such a 
proactive role is quite different from the fire-fighting approach currently adopted by the [Local 
Government Ombudsman in England]; however, this thesis’ findings suggest that the 
potential benefits of the ombudsman within the administrative justice system are currently 
underdeveloped”. 
6.31 A JPSO could work closely with the proposed Chairman of the Jersey Administrative Appeals 
Tribunals,135 the Jersey Audit Office,136 and public bodies. 
 
                                                
134 Selected responses to consultation are available on www.jerseylawcommission.org.  
135 See Chapter 3. 
136 The office of Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) was established in 2005 under the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (Jersey) Law 2014. The remit of the C&AG includes the audit of financial statements and 
wider consideration of public funds including internal financial control, value for money and corporate 
governance. As we noted in Chapter 2, there are close connections between effect complaints handling and 
value for money. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ROLE OF THE ROYAL COURT IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
The Royal Court  
7.1 The Royal Court of Jersey is the Island’s principal court, with jurisdiction over civil and criminal 
matters. The Bailiff and Deputy Bailiff (who are Crown appointments) serve as permanent 
judges. In addition, several non-permanent judges known as Commissioners are appointed by 
the Bailiff to hear cases. The Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff and Commissioners are judges of law, 
procedure and have the power to award costs. 
7.2 A distinctive and ancient feature of the Island’s judicial system is the 12 Jurats. The role of the 
Jurats is to decide facts. If the Jurats are divided on the finding of facts in a case, the Bailiff (or 
Deputy Bailiff or Commissioner) has a casting vote. The Jurats are members of the judiciary but 
most are not legally qualified; they are elected by an electoral college comprising the Bailiff, 
existing Jurats, Connétables, elected States members, and members of the Jersey legal 
profession. The Jurats are unpaid and hold office until the mandatory retiring age of 72 years. 
When the Royal Court sits as “The Inferior Number of the Royal Court”, the court consists of the 
Bailiff (or Deputy Bailiff or Commissioner) and two Jurats. “The Superior Number of the Royal 
Court” consists of the Bailiff (or Deputy Bailiff) sitting with at least five Jurats and is most 
commonly convened for sentencing of serious criminal offences. 
7.3 There is a right of appeal from decisions of the Royal Court to the Jersey Court of Appeal; and 
onwards to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.  
7.4 Jersey has been a pioneering participant in the worldwide “free access to law movement”. 
Almost all Royal Court judgments are published online at www.jerseylaw.je. Some judgments – 
those that involve significant points of law – are selected to be ‘reported’ (meaning formally 
published in print) in the Jersey Law Reports. Unlike England and Wales, the Jersey legal 
system does not rely on a strict doctrine of precedent but the Royal Court normally follows its 
own previous case law. 
Role of the Royal Court in administrative redress 
7.5 The Inferior Number of the Royal Court contributes to Jersey’s administrative redress system in 
two main ways, both of which are important in upholding the constitutional principle of the rule 
of law. 
7.6 Many Laws passed by the States Assembly create a right of appeal to the Royal Court in 
relation to an administrative decision. The procedure for making an appeal is contained in 
Part 15 of the Royal Court Rules 2004. Appeals may either be 
• directly from the decision of the public body (for example, the Minister) 
• from the decision of a tribunal so that the Royal Court is hearing a “second appeal” relating 
to the administrative decision. 
7.7 Where a person believes that an administrative decision is unlawful but the Law under which it 
was made contains no right of appeal to a tribunal or the Royal Court, the Royal Court has an 
inherent jurisdiction to hear applications of judicial review. The procedure for making 
applications for judicial review was created in 2000 and is contained in Part 16 of the Royal 
Court Rules. Few applications for judicial review are made each year (typically two or three).  
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7.8 The application for judicial review procedure adopted by the Royal Court in 2000 was modelled 
very closely on that in England and Wales. Since then, the procedure in England and Wales 
has been modified in several important respects.   
Appeals from administrative decisions 
Recommendation 7.1: Amend 54 Laws that provide a right of appeal from an administrative 
decision to the Royal Court to provide instead for the appeal to be heard by the Jersey 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT). 
7.9 Our analysis of legislation in force in mid-2015 shows that there are rights of appeal from 
administrative decisions to the Royal Court across a wide range of subject matter. The majority 
of appeals are from decisions taken by Ministers but appeals also exist from decisions taken by 
• Jersey Bank Depositors Scheme Board 
• Jersey Financial Services Commission 
• Registrar of Companies 
• Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority 
• Jersey Gambling Commission 
• consumer safety inspectors 
• Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 
• Connétables (in relation to licensing of firearms, explosives and fireworks) 
• Harbour Master 
• Highways authorities (which are either a Minister or a Parish Roads Committee). 
7.10 According to information supplied to us by the Judicial Greffe, the great majority of rights of 
appeal had not been used in the four years to mid-2015. Appeals have arisen only in relation 
to: 
• Minister’s decisions under the Customs and Excise (Jersey) Law 1999, Article 69 
• Minister’s decisions under the High Hedges (Jersey) Law 2008, Articles 12-13. 
7.11 It is difficult to research why people do not exercise rights of appeal. One hypothesis could be 
that Ministers and other public bodies in Jersey almost never make decisions that are legally 
questionable. All decisions could be made with complete legal accuracy (so that people never 
have grounds on which to bring an appeal). We do not know how many potentially appealable 
administrative decisions are made under each Law; the number could be very small or nil. 
7.12 There are, however, other possible hypotheses. It is possible to speculate that from time to time 
unlawful decisions are made but the person subject to the decision is either unaware that this 
may be the case or be uninformed about the right to challenge the decision.  
7.13 A further possibility is that a person knows about the right to appeal but is deterred from 
exercising that right, for example because of concerns about the cost or stress of doing so. 
There is some circumstantial evidence to suggest that this may be a factor. Until 2015, a third 
party right of appeal against planning permission lay to the Royal Court; when this right of appeal 
was replaced with a new system (appeals to planning inspectors), there was a notable increase 
in the number of appeals to 42 in 2015 compared to 11 during the last full year of appeals to 
the Royal Court. 
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Proportionality principle 
7.14 The principle of proportionality should inform the design and operation of the administrative 
redress system.137 The idea that the Royal Court should be reserved for complex or particularly 
important cases is already part of the design of the Island’s court system: the Magistrate’s Court 
deals with criminal offences of lesser importance and the Petty Debt’s Court deals with 
straightforward lower value contract disputes. A similar approach should in our view be adopted 
in relation to administrative redress. The creation of the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(JAAT) would enable this to be achieved in a more comprehensive way than currently. 
7.15 A proportionate approach has benefits for potential appellants. For individuals and small 
business owners, making an appeal to JAAT is likely to be a less daunting prospect. The venue 
and procedures of a tribunal are less intimidating than the Royal Court, especially for a litigant 
bringing an appeal without legal representation. An unsuccessful appellant using JAAT will also 
not be at risk of having to pay the Minister’s (or other public body’s) legal costs. 
7.16 A further benefit is that it would enable judicial resources to be used more efficiently. Where a 
dispute relates to relatively uncomplicated factors or straightforward points of law, a tribunal 
provides a more cost-effective forum. The resources of the Royal Court should be conserved 
for appeals likely to involve complicated issues of law. Where appeals are likely to involve 
relatively straightforward questions of fact or administrative judgement (whether an 
administrative decision is “reasonable”) JAAT, with its legal members, would be as well placed 
as the Royal Court, with the Jurats, to decide the matter.    
7.17 In our Consultation Report, we proposed that it would be more proportionate for many rights of 
appeal relating to administrative decisions that currently lie to the Royal Court (but are rarely if 
ever used) to go instead to JAAT. Most people responded in support of this proposal, including 
Citizens Advice Jersey and the Jersey Consumer Council. 
7.18 One response took a different view, saying that it was not a sustainable argument to say that 
the Royal Court is too expensive and suggesting that if appeals to the Royal Court are thought 
to be too formal, that can be easily dealt with by rules. It was suggested that if a court other than 
the Royal Court is needed for administrative appeals, this could be the Petty Debts Court. We 
do not agree with this analysis. In our view, JAAT will provide a user-friendly judicial body for 
dealing with straightforward disagreements, building on foundations already laid by the existing 
administrative appeal tribunals and administrative staff in the Judicial Greffe’s Tribunal Service. 
7.19 We therefore propose that some Laws that currently create a right of appeal to the Royal Court 
from administrative decisions should instead specify JAAT. These are appeals where (a) 
appellants are likely to be individuals or smaller businesses with limited financial resources, or 
(b) the ground of appeal against the administrative decision is that it is “unreasonable” or, more 
broadly still, that the appellant “is aggrieved”. 
7.20 A power to transfer appeals from JAAT to the Royal Court, and vice versa (discussed below) 
would enable flexibility. There would also be a possibility of a “second”’ appeal on questions of 
law from JAAT to the Royal Court, ensuring that the Royal Court retained ultimate control over 
the interpretation of law.  
7.21 The following Table lists the 52 Laws, identified in the first half of 2015, that we propose should 
be amended to create a right of appeal to JAAT in place of the Royal Court. It is likely that since 
June 2015 further Laws have created appeal rights to the Royal Court or some of the 52 may 
have been repealed. The table is therefore illustrative rather than definitive of our proposal.  
 
 
                                                
137 See Annex D: Research Statement. 
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 Administrative decision  Law conferring right of appeal Grounds of appeal 
1 Decisions by the Minister 
regarding control of sales and 
leases of agricultural land 
Agricultural Land (Control of 
Sales and Leases)(Jersey) 
Law 1974 
‘the decision was unreasonable having 
regard to all the circumstances of the 
case’ 
2 Decisions of the Board 
administering agricultural 
marketing scheme 
Agricultural Marketing 
(Jersey) Law 1953 
appellant ‘is aggrieved’ by the decision’ 
3 Decisions of Minister relating 
to licences to export 
agricultural produce 
Export of Agricultural Produce 
(Jersey) Order 1972 Art 5 
appellant ‘is aggrieved’ by the decision 
4 Minister’s licensing powers in 
relation to animals 
Animal Welfare (Jersey) Law 
2004 Art 21 
Grounds of appeal are not specified in 
the Law. Powers of the Court are not 
specified. 
5 Minister’s licensing powers in 
relation to animals 
Dangerous Wild Animals 
(Jersey) Law 1999 Art 19 
Grounds of appeal are not specified in 
the Law. The Court may confirm, reverse 
or vary the decision of the Minister. 
6 Minister’s functions in relation 
to regulation of trade in 
endangered species 
 
Endangered Species 
(CITES)(Jersey) Law 2012 Art 
31 
Grounds of appeal are not specified in 
the Law. The Court may confirm, reverse 
or vary the decision. 
6 Minister’s licensing powers Artificial Insemination of 
Domestic Animals (Bovine 
Semen)(Jersey) Order 2008 
‘An aggrieved person may apply to the 
Royal Court for a review of a decision of 
the Minister …’ 
7 Minister’s licensing powers 
 
Community Provisions 
(Bovine Embryos)(Jersey) 
Regulations 2010 
‘An applicant … may apply to the Royal 
Court for a review of the decision of the 
Minister’ 
8 Consumer safety inspector’s 
decisions about safety notices 
and detention of consumer 
goods 
Consumer Safety (Jersey) 
Law 2006 
Grounds of appeal are not specified in 
the Law. The Court has broad power to 
‘confirm, vary or revoke the notice or 
substitute a different type of notice’ 
9 Decision of a Minister 
following Minister’s review of a 
decision by the Agent of the 
Impôts  
 
Customs and Excise (Jersey) 
Law 1999 Art 69 
Grounds not specified in the Law.  The 
Court may confirm Minister’s decision or 
order Minister to rescind or vary the 
decision 
10 Minister’s functions about 
imported food said to be unfit 
for human consumption 
Imported Food (Jersey) Order 
1998 Art 6 
Grounds of appeal are not specified in 
the Law. 
11 Various decisions relating to 
housing and work controls 
Control of Housing and Work 
(Jersey) Law 2012 Art 41 
the decision is unreasonable having 
regard to all the circumstances of the 
case. 
12 Minister’s decision to refuse or 
cancel registration relating to 
day care of children 
Day Care of Children (Jersey) 
Law 2002 Art 9 
the decision is unreasonable in all the 
circumstances of the case 
13 Minister’s functions relating to 
registration of health care 
practitioners 
Health Care 
(Registration)(Jersey) Law 
1995 
the decision of the Minister was 
unreasonable having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case 
14 Minister’s decision (on 
recommendation of Health 
Services Disciplinary Tribunal) 
to withdraw approval of a 
medical practitioner in relation 
to the Health Insurance Fund 
Health Insurance (Jersey) 
Law 1967 Art 27 
Law does not specify grounds of appeal 
15 Minister’s decisions relating to 
trade effluent discharge 
certificates etc 
 
Drainage (Jersey) Law 2005 
as amended by Drainage 
(Amendment)(Jersey) Law 
2014 
Law does not specify grounds of appeal. 
The Court may confirm, reverse or vary 
the decision or requirement against 
which the appeal is brought. 
16 Minister’s decisions about 
registration of non-provided 
schools 
Education (Jersey) Law 1999 
Art 44 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal or the Court’s powers. 
17 Minister’s decisions about 
registration of employment 
agencies 
Employment Agencies 
(Registration)(Jersey) Law 
1969 Art 8 
the decision of the Minister was 
unreasonable having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case 
 Improving Administrative Redress – Topic Report 2017 | page 113 
18 Minister’s and Connétables’ 
functions licensing explosives 
including fireworks 
Explosives (Jersey) Law 1979 
Art 12 
unreasonable having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case 
19 Minister’s decisions relating to 
fire certificates for premises 
Fire Precautions (Jersey) Law 
1977 Art 7 
The appellant ‘is aggrieved’ 
20 Minister’s decision to exempt 
premises, stall or vehicle from 
food hygiene requirements 
Food Hygiene (General 
Provisions)(Jersey) Order 
1967 Art 33  
decision was unreasonable having 
regard to all the circumstances 
21 Minister’s decision about 
ending emergency prohibition 
order relating to a health risk 
in a food business 
Food Safety (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)(Jersey) Law 2000 
Art 4  
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
22 Minister’s refusal or 
cancellation of licence for ice-
cream vehicle or stall 
Food Safety (Ice-cream stalls 
etc)(Jersey) Order 1969 Art 4 
The appellant ‘is aggrieved’ 
23 Connétable’s functions 
licensing firearms 
Firearms (Jersey) Law 2000 
Art 55 
The appellant ‘is aggrieved’ 
24 Jersey Gambling Commission 
functions 
Gambling (Jersey) Law 2012 
Art 45 
unreasonable having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case 
25 Jersey Gambling Commission 
functions relating to social 
responsibility levy 
Gambling Commission 
(Jersey) Law 2010 Art 12 
In determining an appeal the Court is not 
restricted to a consideration of questions 
of law or to any information that was 
before the Commission. The Court may 
confirm the amount of the levy appealed 
against, declare that no levy is payable 
or determine for itself what the levy 
should be 
26 Minister and Habour Master’s 
functions licensing ships for 
hire 
Habours (Inshore 
Safety)(Jersey) Regulations 
2012 reg 6 
The appellant ‘is aggrieved’ 
27 Harbour Master’s designation 
of facilities or services in a 
harbour where permit is 
required 
Harbours (Jersey) 
Regulations 1962 
taking the action was not reasonable in 
the circumstances 
28 Highway authority (Minister or 
Roads Committee of a parish) 
withdraws licence to place 
anything below/on/above a 
highway 
Highways (Jersey) Law 1956 The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
29 Minister’s decision functions 
relating to neighbour disputes 
about high hedges 
High Hedges (Jersey) Law 
2008 Arts 12-13 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
 
30 
Minister’s functions regulating 
public service vehicles 
Motor Traffic (Jersey) Law 
1935 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
 
31 
 
Minister’s functions Motor Vehicles (Construction 
and Use) (Jersey) Order 1998 
A person aggrieved 
 
32 
 
Jersey Financial Services 
Commission regulation of not-
profit organisations 
Non-Profit Organizations 
(Jersey) Law 2008 
Unreasonableness 
 
33 
 
Minister’s registration of 
nursing and residential homes 
Nursing and Residential 
Homes (Jersey) Law 1994 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
35 Minister’s functions Lodging Houses 
(Registration) (Jersey) Law 
1962 
Unreasonableness 
36 
 
Minister’s function regulating 
carriers 
Pet Travel Scheme (Jersey) 
Regulations 2011 
Unreasonableness 
37 
 
Minister’s licensing functions   Petroleum (Jersey) Law 1984 Unreasonableness 
 
38 
 
Minister’s function registering 
pharmacists and pharmacy 
technicians 
Pharmacists and Pharmacy 
Technicians (Registration) 
(Jersey) Law 2010 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
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39 
Minister’s functions registering 
tattooists  
Piercing and Tattooing 
(Jersey) Law 2002 
A person aggrieved 
 
40 
Harbour Master’s licencing of 
pilots functions 
Pilotage (Jersey) Law 2009 A person aggrieved 
41 Minister’s registration 
functions 
Places of Refreshment 
(Jersey) Law 1967 
A person aggrieved 
42 Minister’s functions Plant Health (Jersey) Law 
2003 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
43 Minister’s licencing functions Poisons (Jersey) Law 1952 A person aggrieved 
44 Inspector’s functions to detain 
good and documents 
Price and Charge Indicators 
(Jersey) Law 2008 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
45 Highway authority’s refusal to 
grant to sent to break up or 
open a road 
Public Utilities Road Works 
(Jersey) Law 1963 
Public interest 
46 Minister’s decision relating to 
forfeiture of restricted radio 
equipment 
Radio Equipment (Jersey) 
Law 1997 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
47 
 
Registrar of Business Names 
(Jersey Financial Services 
Commission) refusal to 
register undesirable or 
misleading business names 
Registration of Business 
Names (Jersey) Law 1956 
The Law does not specify grounds of 
appeal 
 
48 
Inspector of Motor Traffic’s 
refusal to register driving 
instructor 
Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 
1956 
A person aggrieved 
 
49 
Parish decision to refuse 
driving licence to person on 
grounds of physical fitness 
Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 
1956 
A person aggrieved 
50 
 
Minister’s licensing functions Sea Fisheries (Jersey) Law 
1994 
A person aggrieved 
51 
 
Comité des Connétables’ 
review of a Connetable’s 
refusal to permit shop to open 
on Sundays 
Shops (Regulation of 
Opening) (Jersey) 
Regulations 2011 
A person aggrieved 
52 Minister’s licensing functions Slaughter of Animals (Jersey) 
Law 1962 
A person aggrieved 
53 Minister’s licensing functions 
relating to registration of 
premises 
Tourism (Jersey) Law 1948 A person aggrieved 
54 Minister’s licensing functions Waste Management (Jersey) 
Law 2005 
A person aggrieved 
Appeals that would be retained by the Royal Court 
7.22 There are some appeals that in our view should continue to be made to the Royal Court:. 
 Decision maker appealed 
against  
Law conferring right of appeal Grounds of appeal 
1 Jersey Financial Services 
Commission decisions 
Alternative Investment Funds 
(Jersey) Regulations 2012 
 Unreasonableness 
2 Jersey Financial Services 
Commission 
 Banking Business (Jersey) 
Law 1991 
Unreasonableness 
3 Jersey Financial Services 
Commission 
Collective Investment Funds 
(Jersey) Law 1988 
Unreasonableness 
4 Jersey Financial Services 
Commission 
Financial Services (Jersey) 
Law 1998 
Unreasonableness 
5 Jersey Financial Services 
Commission 
Insurance Business (Jersey) 
Law 1996 
Unreasonableness 
6 Jersey Bank Depositors 
Compensation Board 
Banking Business (Depositors 
Compensation) (Jersey) 
Regulations 2009 
Unreasonableness 
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7 
 
Jersey Financial Services 
Commission 
Control of Borrowing (Jersey) 
Law 1947 
Unreasonableness 
8 Jersey Financial Services 
Commission / Registrar of 
Companies 
Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 Unreasonableness 
9 
 
Registrar of Companies / 
Jersey Financial Services 
Commission 
Foundations (Jersey) Law 
2009 
Unspecified 
10 OFCOM Communications (Jersey) 
Order 2003 
Unreasonableness 
11 Jersey Competition 
Regulatory Authority 
Competition (Jersey) Law 
2005 
Not restricted to a consideration of 
questions of law or to any information 
that was before the Authority 
12 Jersey Competition 
Regulatory Authority 
Postal Services (Jersey) Law 
2004 
Not restricted to a consideration of 
questions of law or to any information 
that was before the Authority 
13 Jersey Competition 
Regulatory Authority 
Telecommunications (Jersey) 
Law 2002 
Not restricted to a consideration of 
questions of law or to any information 
that was before the Authority 
14 Minister Medicines (Jersey) Law 1995 Unreasonableness 
15 Jersey Milk Marketing Board Milk Marketing Scheme 
(Approval) (Jersey) Act 1954 
Unspecified 
16 Minister Water (Jersey) Law 1972 the Company aggrieved 
17  Water Pollution (Jersey) Law 
2000 
Unspecified 
18  Water Resources (Jersey) Law 
2007 
Unspecified 
19 Connétable’s refusal to add 
or remove a person’s name 
to the register 
Public Elections (Jersey) Law 
2002 
Unspecified 
Transfer of proceedings between the Royal Court and JAAT 
Recommendation 7.2: Amend the Royal Court Rules to enable the Royal Court to transfer the 
hearing of a case from the Royal Court to JAAT. See also Recommendation 3.14, which 
recommends that a comparable procedure for transferring a case from JAAT to the Royal 
Court. 
7.23 It is possible to envisage that an appeal lodged with the JAAT may, on initial inspection, seem 
to warrant the attention of the Royal Court, for example because a point of law of general public 
importance is raised by the appellant or respondent. We envisage that the JAAT Rules and 
Royal Court Rules should enable the transfer of appeals, should this be thought desirable under 
the “overarching objective” of the rules. 
Time limits for first appeals 
Recommendation 7.3: There should be a standard time limit for making administrative 
appeals (unless there is a strong public interest in specifying a different limit in a Law). The 
standard time limit should be 28 days from the appellant receiving notice of the decision 
appealed against. 
7.24 There are a wide variety of different time limits for exercising a right of appeal relating to an 
administrative decision. The following formula are used in current Jersey Laws: 
• either in term or in vacation within 90 days after the notification of the decision was given 
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• within 2 months 
• ‘no later than the day that is one month after the day on which notice was served on the 
person’ 
• within one month from the date on which notice in writing has been given to the person 
• within 30 days of the day on which notification of the Minister’s decision refusing or 
withdrawing the certificate of exemption was sent to the person 
• within 28 days after a company receives a notice of a direction  
• within 21 days 
• within 21 days after the appellant is served by the Minister with a written copy of the decision 
to which the appeal relates, or within such further time as the Royal Court may allow 
• within the 15 days next following the day on which notice of the decision of the Minister or 
the Connétable, was given to the person 
• within 14 days next following the day on which notice was served 
• An importer served with an export notice may, within 7 days of such service, appeal to the 
Royal Court. 
7.25 This wide variety of different time limited is potentially confusing and is difficult to justify. We 
therefore recommend that relevant laws are amended to create a standard time limit (this could 
be achieved by the Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law).  
7.26 The choice of time limit is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. We propose that it should be 28 days. 
If there is a compelling reason (for example, the need for certainty in the context of a specific 
area of administrative decision-making), a case should be made for a different time limit during 
the reform process. JAAT or the Royal Court should have discretion to extend time where justice 
requires. 
7.27 In setting the default time limit for starting an appeal at 28 days, we have had regard to the time 
limit for making an application for judicial review. An application for judicial review is the 
procedure that may be used to challenge the lawfulness of an administrative decision if no right 
of appeal exists. The Royal Court Rules 2004 state an application for judicial review “must be 
made promptly and in any event not later than 3 months from the date when grounds for the 
application first arose” (rule 16/3). The Royal Court has discretion to extend this time or to hold 
that a challenge has not been made sufficiently “promptly” within the 3 months.  
‘Second appeals’ from tribunals to the Royal Court 
Recommendation: see Recommendation 3.16 (which proposes there should be a right of 
appeal from JAAT to the Royal Court on questions of law). 
7.28 The previous section concerned appeals directly from an administrative decision-maker (such 
as a Minister) to the Royal Court. In addition to these, the Royal Court has a jurisdiction over 
“second appeals”, where the aggrieved person has already appealed to a tribunal or similar 
appellate body and either the aggrieved person or the public body has a right of further appeal 
to the Royal Court on a question of law. Second appeals to the Royal Court on questions of law 
are constitutionally important. They permit the Island’s principal court to determine questions of 
administrative legality and, if necessary, to correct errors of interpretation made during a “first 
appeal”.    
7.29 According to our analysis of legislation in force in mid-2015, there were six such ‘second 
appeals’ as shown in the following Table. Where the first appeal body will under our proposals 
be subsumed within JAAT, a new right of second appeal should be created to the Royal Court. 
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The general rule should be that there is a right of appeal on point of law from JAAT to the Royal 
Court. 
First appeal body Law Ground of appeal Time limit 
Social Security 
Tribunal or  
Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
 
Income Support (Jersey) Law 
2007 Art 9 and  
Income Support (General 
Provisions)(Jersey) Order 
2008 Art 18 (as amended by 
Social Security, Health 
Insurance and Income 
Support (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)(Jersey) Order 
2015) 
on questions of law Application for leave to 
appeal to the Court 
must be made to the 
Tribunal before the 
pend of the period of 4 
weeks beginning with 
the date of the 
Tribunal’s decision or 
order; the tribunal may 
vary this time limit ‘if, in 
the circumstances of 
the case, the Tribunal is 
satisfied that it would be 
fair and just to do so’ 
 
If the Tribunal refuses 
leave, an application 
may be made to the 
Court in accordance 
with Rules of Court 
Social Security 
Tribunal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health Insurance (Jersey) 
Law 1967 Art 28  
and  
Health Insurance 
(Determination of Claims and 
Questions)(Jersey) Order 
2008 Art 6 (as amended by 
Social Security, Health 
Insurance and Income 
Support (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)(Jersey) Order 
2015) 
on a point of law only Application for leave to 
appeal to the Court 
must be made to the 
Tribunal before the 
pend of the period of 4 
weeks beginning with 
the date of the 
Tribunal’s decision or 
order; the tribunal may 
vary this time limit ‘if, in 
the circumstances of 
the case, the Tribunal is 
satisfied that it would be 
fair and just to do so’ 
 
If the Tribunal refuses 
leave, an application 
may be made to the 
Court in accordance 
with Rules of Court 
Social Security 
Tribunal  
constituted under 
Art 8 of the Social 
Security 
(Determination of 
Claims and 
Questions) (Jersey) 
Order 1974. 
Christmas Bonus (Jersey) 
Law 2011 
A person aggrieved by a 
decision of the Tribunal on 
an appeal under this Law 
may appeal to the Royal 
Court on a point of law 
None specified in the 
Law 
Social Security 
Tribunal 
 
 
 
 
Food Costs Bonus (Jersey) 
Regulations 2014 reg 14 
A person aggrieved by a 
decision of the Tribunal, 
may on a point of Law only, 
appeal to the Royal Court. 
must be made before 
the end of the period of 
4 weeks beginning with 
the date of the 
Tribunal’s written 
decision. 
Minister hearing 
appeal against 
decision of Director 
of Civil Aviation 
Civil Aviation (Jersey)(Law) 
2008 
No ground specified: 
‘Director and the appellant 
each has a right to appeal 
to the Royal Court against 
the Minister’s decision’ 
None specified in the 
Law 
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regarding 
aerodrome licences 
 
Information 
Commissioner’s 
determination about 
freedom of 
information rights 
in relation to public 
authorities 
Freedom of Information 
(Jersey) Law 2011 Art 47 
in all the circumstances of 
the case the decision was 
not reasonable 
within 28 days of the 
Information 
Commissioner giving 
notice of his or her 
decision to the 
applicant. 
Applications for judicial review 
Recommendation 7.4: The Royal Court Rules Review Group should consider whether the 
application for judicial review procedure needs to be developed in light of changes to the 
procedures in England and Wales since 1999. 
7.30 If the States Assembly has not created a right of appeal, the Royal Court nonetheless has a 
residual power to control the legality of administrative decision-making. This is an important 
safeguard for the constitutional principle of the rule of law. 
7.31 The Royal Court’s role is to examine the legality of the administrative decision on the grounds 
that a decision is 
•  ‘illegal’, in the sense that the Minister or other public body did not understand or correctly 
apply the relevant Law when exercising their functions 
• ‘procedurally improper’, meaning that the correct procedures set out in relevant Laws or the 
judge-made principles of ‘natural justice’ were not followed  
• ‘unreasonable’, where court adjudicates on whether no reasonable public body could have 
made the administrative decision in question, or 
• contrary to the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000. 
7.32 Part 16 of the Royal Court Rules creates a two-step procedure. First, an applicant must seek 
the ‘leave’ of the Royal Court to make an application for judicial review. A judge of the Royal 
Court considers the applicant’s legal arguments and decides whether there is an arguable case. 
If the judge decides that there is an arguable case, the application is set down for a full oral 
hearing (usually several months later). 
7.33 A small number of applications for judicial review are made each year, typically two or three. 
The following are illustrations of the types of case that come before the Royal Court by this 
route.   
• Banyan Retail Ltd v The Licensing Assembly [2016] JRC 031 (Hon Michael Beloff QC, 
Commissioner). The applicant challenged the legality of the refusal of a 1st category licence 
for two restaurants. The application for judicial review was refused. 
• Organic Kids Ltd and another v Minister for Education Sport and Culture [2015] JRC 067 
(Sir Michael Birt, Commissioner and Jurats Kerley and Liston). This was a challenge to the 
legality of decisions taken by the Minister not to list the applicants in the directory of 
nurseries approved to operate under the nursery education funding scheme. The Royal 
Court quashed the Minister’s decisions and directed him to reconsider applications from the 
nurseries. 
• Meinl Bank Aktiengesellschaft v HM Attorney General and Jersey Financial Services 
Commission [2015] JRC 238 (JA Clyde-Smith, Commissioner). Several applicants 
commenced judicial review proceedings against decisions taken by the JFSC but withdrew 
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on the day scheduled for the hearing of the leave application. The Court concluded that the 
application was ‘fundamentally flawed and therefore hopeless’ and ordered the applicants 
to pay the JFSC’s legal costs. 
• Larsen and Volaw v Comptroller of Taxes and States of Jersey [2014] JRC 232 (leave 
application) and [2015] JRC 244 (full hearing before Hon Michael Beloff QC, Commissioner). 
Various applicants unsuccessfully challenged the legality of notices issued by the 
Comptroller requiring provision of certain documents to foreign tax authorities under the 
Taxation (Exchange of Information with Third Countries) Regulations 2008.  
• Chief of States of Jersey Police v The Panel of Jurats (Police Constable X, Interested Party) 
[2014] JRC 114B (Sir Christopher Pitchers, Commissioner, dismissed application); [2014] 
JCA 155 (application for extension of time for service of a Notice of Appeal refused). In this 
case the Chief of Police in disciplinary proceedings against a PC ordered that the PC be 
immediately dismissed from the force. The PC appealed to a Panel of Jurats, which reduced 
the penalty to a reduction of pay and refused to publish their reasons. The Chief of Police 
unsuccessfully challenged the legality of the Jurat’s decision. 
7.34 Detailed examination of the operation of the judicial review procedure falls outside the scope of 
this project. We are not aware of any systematic problems. That said, we note that Jersey 
judicial review procedure was modelled very closely on what existed in England and Wales in 
1999. Since then in England and Wales, the judicial review procedure has been modified in 
several important respects and it may therefore be beneficial to review what lessons might be 
learnt for the Royal Court Rules. We draw this observation to the attention of the Royal Court 
Rules Review Group.  
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CHAPTER 8 
USING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
What is alternative dispute resolution? 
8.1 The origins of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) can be traced back to the 1960s, when in 
some circles court-based procedures were considered too adversarial and legalistic. ADR has 
now moved into the mainstream and is actively promoted by governments in many legal 
systems.  
8.2 Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to a range of techniques that may be used for 
resolving disputes rather than formal adversarial adjudication by a court or tribunal or the States 
of Jersey. These techniques include: negotiation, arbitration, conciliation, early neutral 
evaluation and mediation.138   
8.3 ADR may be a free-standing process – for example, the parties may approach a mediator to 
help them reach agreement about a dispute. ADR may be attached to a formal process – for 
example, an aggrieved person may start an appeal to a tribunal or court and the tribunal/court 
may refer the parties to an ADR service rather than proceeding directly to a formal adversarial 
hearing. 
Mediation 
8.4 Mediation is a widely used form of ADR. In a mediation, a neutral person (the mediator) assists 
the parties to a dispute to reach an agreement to resolve their disagreement. The mediator 
helps set a structure and timetable for dialogue. The process is consensual (parties cannot be 
compelled to enter into mediation) and confidential (unlike tribunals, the Royal Court or the 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel, the outcome of the mediation is private). The precise role 
of the mediator may vary according to the nature of the dispute, the wishes of the parties, and 
the professional training of the mediator. Types of mediation include:  
• facilitative mediation, where the focus is on enabling the parties to discuss their dispute, 
without the mediator steering the parties to a particular outcome 
• evaluative mediation, where the parties agree that the mediator may express views on the 
parties’ positions and suggest a reasonable and fair settlement 
• rights-based mediation, where legal rights are identified at the start of the mediation process 
and the mediator may take a more directive role to ensure that the outcome agreed by the 
parties falls within relevant legal structures. This form of mediation may be the best fit in 
disagreements over administrative decision-making where the public body must operate 
within the constraints of a legal framework. 
8.5 Whereas professionals working the legal profession are highly regulated by law (in Jersey, by 
the Law Society of Jersey), there is relatively little centralised regulation of people providing 
services as mediators. In Jersey, there is no legal requirement that a person holding themselves 
out as a mediator, who is not a qualified lawyer, has any training or professional body 
overseeing their work. There are however several self-accreditation schemes in the United 
                                                
138 For background in the context of administrative redress, see for example: Northern Ireland 
Ombudsman/Jack Anderson, Alternatives to Court in Northern Ireland (Law Centre, Queen’s University 
Belfast, 2011). 
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Kingdom to which some mediators in Jersey may choose to subscribe139 and there are various 
professional training courses leading to the award of a qualification in mediation. 
8.6 There are costs associated with carrying out ADR as with all other forms of administrative 
redress.  
• Unless the mediator or other third-party individual is acting pro bono (i.e. without charging 
professional fees for his or her services), the cost of professional charges need to be paid 
by the parties using the service or by public funds. 
• Premises are needed for the mediation or other ADR activity if the parties need to be brought 
together in the same place (which they do in many forms of ADR). A mediation, for example, 
will normally require three rooms – one for each party and a neutral middle room for 
meetings during the process, which may last several hours. Because the mediation process 
should be and be seen to be independent of the pubic body against which the challenge is 
made, it may often not be appropriate to use the public body’s offices. 
• The parties may need to take independent legal advice about using ADR and lawyers may 
in some cases be involved in the mediation process. 
Advantages and disadvantages of ADR 
8.7 Formal hearings before a court, tribunal or the States of Jersey Complaints Panel are 
adversarial, usually leading to an outcome that one party is the “winner” and the other is the 
“loser”. ADR aims to achieve a more conciliatory process based around the need to solve a 
problem, leading to a more consensual outcome, where possible, that both sides can accept. 
This approach may be particularly significant where the two parties have an ongoing relationship 
that will continue after the dispute has been resolved.  
8.8 ADR can be helpful in providing the aggrieved person with an explanation of what happened to 
start the grievance and may result in an apology from the public body. 
8.9 ADR may provide a less stressful experience for individuals, for whom the prospect of 
presenting a case in front of a court or tribunal can seem daunting. The process of mediation 
may be valued by the parties as a learning experience, enabling them to gain insight into 
themselves, the other party and the situation that has given rise to the disagreement.140  
8.10 ADR is more flexible than a formal process leading to a hearing. There are no formal rules of 
procedure or evidence. The timing of ADR may be more flexible than court or tribunal hearings 
(for example, mediations may take place in evenings or weekends). 
8.11 But as noted above, ADR such as mediation is not cost free: there may be a professional charge 
by the mediator and the parties may have a need to seek legal advice. It is not possible to 
generalise and say that ADR is cheaper than determining a dispute at a formal hearing before 
a court or tribunal. The costs will vary according the context, even within the administrative 
justice system. There are some research findings that show that mediation can be a cost-
effective route for disagreement resolution.141 
                                                
139 For example, the Civil Mediation Council and the College of Mediators. 
140 See Timea Tallodi, “Mediation at its core: Insight into a qualitative research study on the lived experiences 
of parties to mediation”, UKAJI Blog, 27 July 2017 https://ukaji.org/2017/07/27/mediation-at-its-core-insight-
into-a-qualitative-research-study-on-the-lived-experiences-of-parties-to-mediation/.  
141 See in relation to disputes about special education needs: Mairi Ann Cullen et al, Review of arrangements 
for disagreement resolution (SEND): research report (Department for Education, Ministry of Justice, March 
2017) www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/603487/CEDAR_review.pdf  
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8.12 ADR is also often regarded as resolving disputes with less delay than court and tribunal 
proceedings. Such a sweeping assessment needs to be treated with caution.142 If ADR such as 
mediation fails to enable the parties to come to an agreement, it may be necessary for the 
aggrieved party to continue with a more formal type of redress. There are time limits within 
which a person must exercise rights of appeal to tribunals and the Royal Court, to make 
applications for judicial review, or to complain to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. In order 
to preserve the right to appeal/apply for judicial review/make a complaint, the aggrieved person 
may need to commence those formal processes to preserve their position, and seek permission 
from the tribunal/Royal Court/Complaints Panel to pause the formal process while they try ADR. 
8.13 A further advantage of ADR, for the parties to the dispute, is that the process and outcome are 
normally confidential. But in the context of disputes about administrative decisions, a 
disadvantage of ADR is that it takes place behind closed doors: there is a public interest in 
challenges to administrative errors being exposed to public scrutiny. 
ADR in Jersey 
8.14 In Jersey, there has been an increasing use and awareness of ADR in recent years, especially 
in relation to family breakdown, petty debts and “community mediation”.  
8.15 Community Mediation is a scheme set up by the Jersey Legal Information Board in 2009 and 
administered by Jersey Citizens Advice Bureau. During the research interviews, we were told 
that approximately eight people a year use the service. Mediations have included consumer 
and neighbour disputes. Each party pays £20 to use the scheme and the dispute is referred to 
a person on a panel of trained and accredited mediators. Mediators, some of whom are Jersey 
qualified lawyers, provide their services under the scheme free of charge. 
ADR in relation to disputes about administrative decisions 
Recommendation 8.1: Further research should be carried out to develop proposals for 
mediation and other forms of ADR related to disagreements about administrative decision-
making in the Island. 
8.16 In Jersey, as in England and Wales, the use of ADR techniques appears to be less prevalent 
in relation to administrative decisions than in other areas (such as family, commercial and 
consumer disputes).  
8.17 Further research work is needed to develop detailed proposals for more use of ADR in relation 
to disagreements about administrative decision-making. The practical outcomes could be 
proposals  
• for the Government of Jersey to develop a policy on when and how ADR is suitable for 
disagreements in this area (because unless public bodies are willing to engage with ADR, 
it cannot take occur) 
• for the Community Mediation scheme (sponsored by the Jersey Legal Information Board 
and Jersey Citizen’s Advice Bureau) to develop provision for mediation services related to 
administrative disputes. 
8.18 Until this further research is completed, our recommendations seek to keep open the possibility 
of using ADR while our other proposals are implemented. 
                                                
142 For a critique, see Varda Bondy and Linda Mulchahy, Mediation and Judicial Review: an empirical 
research study (The Nuffield Foundation/The Public Law Project 2009) p 86. 
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ADR and tribunals  
8.19 When the tribunal system in England and Wales was reformed in 2007,143 the government 
envisaged that ADR would be used by the First-tier Tribunal to help parties, where possible, to 
avoid a formal hearing. The overarching mission of the First-tier Tribunal was envisaged to be 
“dispute resolution” rather than merely hearing cases.144 The reality has not lived up to this initial 
high hopes. 
8.20 As a pilot study, an early neutral evaluation (ENE) scheme was introduced in relation to social 
security cases. When ENE is used, a tribunal judge carries out a preliminary assessment of the 
facts, evidence and legal merits of an appeal based on the papers lodged by the parties. The 
scheme was not compulsory: appellants chose to opt-in and whatever the outcome of the ENE, 
appellants retained the right to continue to an oral hearing in front of a tribunal. An evaluation 
of the pilot study found that judges carrying out ENE took between 25 minutes and two hours, 
with an average case taking 40-45 minutes to appraise.145 After the appraisal, the tribunal judge 
makes a telephone call to the party the judges believes is likely to lose the appeal – this could 
be the administrative decision-maker or the social security claimant (or the claimant’s 
representative). The evaluation of the pilot study reported “mixed findings concerning the 
operation and outputs achieved”: in the pilot, ENE did not deliver cheaper or speedier resolution. 
8.21 Another useful point of reference is the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).146 
The AAT offers a well-developed range of ADR: 
• conferences: the process of “conferencing” provides the tribunal and the parties to discuss 
and define the issues and dispute, identify further evidence that needs to be gathered, 
explore whether issues can be settled and discuss how the appeal will proceed; 
• conciliation: a judge or officer of the tribunal helps the parties to develop options on how 
they might reach agreement. The conciliator may make suggestions about the terms of the 
settlement and actively encourage the parties to reach an agreement; 
• mediation: a judge or officer of the tribunal (or a mediator appointed by the tribunal) helps 
the parties discuss the dispute but does not advise about the content of the dispute or the 
outcome; 
• case appraisal: a judge or officer of the tribunal provides a non-binding opinion on the 
facts and likely outcome of the appeal. This may encourage settlement before a hearing; if 
the case proceeds to a hearing, the case appraisal report may be referred to by the 
tribunal. 
• neutral evaluation: this is similar to a case appraisal but also includes evaluation of the 
legal issues. 
 
8.22 We are not convinced that using an elaborate range of ADR options is either necessary or 
desirable for the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT) during its start-up 
phase. The JAAT Rules should, however, be sufficiently flexible to permit different types of 
ADR in different types of case so that in due course the Chairman of JAAT can organise pilot 
schemes (see Recommendation 3.14). The rules should state expressly that ADR should 
take place only with the agreement of the parties. Further detailed work would be needed to 
develop the range of ADR options.  
                                                
143 See Chapter 3 above. 
144 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Transforming Public Services; Complaints, Redress and Tribunals, 
Cm 6243 (July 2004). 
145 See C Hay, K McKenna and T Buck, Evaluation of Early Neutral Evaluation ADR in the Social Security and 
Child Support Tribunal, Ministry of Justice Research Series 2/10 (January 2010) p 23. 
146  See www.aat.gov.au/steps-in-a-review.   
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ADR related to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
8.23 Our principal interim recommendation (discussed in Chapter 5 above) is that the States of 
Jersey Complaints Panel should be replaced by an ombudsman scheme. If this does not 
happen, we looked at ways in which the effectiveness of the Complaints Panel could be 
improved. 
8.24 Since 2006, the Complaints Panel has express powers to seek to resolve complaints informally. 
Under Article 3(3) of the Administrative Decisions (Review)(Jersey) Law 1982 Law as amended: 
If the Chairman (or Deputy Chairman) decides that a review of the matter by a Board is 
justified, he or she may nevertheless first attempt informal resolution of the matter and in that 
case may use whatever means that he or she considers reasonable in the circumstances to 
achieve such a resolution. 
8.25 During the research interviews, interviewees with experience of serving on the Complaints 
Panel expressed unease about the use of this power: there is a concern that if the chairman or 
deputy chairmen are involved in informal resolution this may bar their participation at a hearing 
(if the informal resolution fails) because they may no longer be regarded as impartial if they 
have had private meetings with civil servants.147 Another issue that emerged during the research 
interviews is that there is no requirement for the chairman or deputy chairmen to be trained in 
ADR or to be accredited mediators.  
8.26 In response to these problems, in Alternative recommendation 5.7 we propose that all 
members of the Complaints Panel (not only the Chairman and Deputy Chairmen) should have 
power to “attempt informal resolution”. The corollary of the widening of this power is that all 
Complaints Panel members should be undertake training in ADR. Also, the power to attempt 
informal resolution should include power to refer a complaint to mediation by an external third 
party (for example, a member of the Community Mediation panel), if both parties agree.   
ADR related to the proposed Jersey Public Services Ombudsman 
8.27 If a public service ombudsman is established in Jersey (as we recommend in Chapter 6), we 
envisage that some complaints would be resolved using ADR techniques (often referred to as 
“informal resolution” in this context)148 rather than a process of formal investigation leading to a 
published report. Use of ADR should be part of the detailed implementation research study that 
we recommend. Where ADR is used, the principle of transparency149 should require information 
about the extent and success in the use of ADR to be included in the ombudsman’s annual 
report. 
8.28 Looking at ombudsman schemes elsewhere gives cause to think that ADR is likely to play a 
limited role in the future work of a Jersey public services ombudsman. As we noted, in the early 
years of ombudsmen in the UK the work of the ombudsmen focused on carrying out a full 
investigation into complaints leading publication of a full report. More recently, UK ombudsmen 
have recognised that they needed to use a broader range working methods. Since 2007, the 
three main public sector ombudsmen in England have express power to “appoint and pay a 
mediator or other appropriate person” to assist in the conduct of an investigation.150 It appears 
that the ombudsmen have made relatively little use of ADR in practice – though the UK 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman acknowledged that there may be cases where 
                                                
147 See Part 4. 
148 See M Doyle, V Bondy, C Hirst, The use of informal resolution approaches by ombudsmen in the UK and 
Ireland (October 2014), a study funded by the Nuffield Foundation. 
149 See Recommendation 6.1 above. 
150 Regulatory Reform (Collaboration etc between Ombudsmen) Order 2007. 
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mediation is “especially appropriate in enabling the parties to explore their differences with a 
trained facilitator, achieve insight and empowerment, and devise for themselves a way 
forward”.151 The Local Government Ombudsman reported in March 2010 that they “do not 
routinely offer mediation as a means to resolve complaints; although a small number of 
mediations are being carried out as part of a pilot scheme in operation in the Coventry office”.152 
ADR related to the Royal Court 
8.29 As discussed in Chapter 7, the Royal Court is part of the Island’s administrative redress system 
through its roles in hearing statutory appeals against administrative decisions and applications 
for judicial review.  
8.30 In relation to statutory appeals, we recommend that the right of appeal under many Laws should 
be transferred to the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT); the Royal Court 
should remain the forum for appeals that are likely to raise more complex issues of fact or law 
and in all cases where JAAT determines an administrative appeal there should be a “second 
appeal” on point of law to the Royal Court.153 We see little or no scope for the use of ADR in the 
context of the Royal Court’s proposed jurisdiction over administrative appeals. The primary 
function of the Royal Court in this context should be to interpret and apply legal principles. There 
is a strong public interest in this happening in open court and published judgments. 
8.31 We recommend that Royal Court Rules Review Group extend its work to review the operation 
of Applications for Judicial Review Part 16 (see Recommendation 7.5). As part of this review, 
it would be possible to consider the experience in England and Wales relating to ADR and 
judicial review.154  
8.32 In 2001, the Court of Appeal in England issued strong words of warning in a judgment, urging 
applicants and their legal advisers to use ADR methods rather than judicial review.155 The Cowl 
case concerned a decision of a local authority to close residential accommodation for elderly 
people. Lord Woolf CJ referred to “heavy obligation” to resort to litigation only if it is really 
unavoidable. If litigation is necessary, the courts should deter the parties from “adopting an 
unnecessarily confrontational approach to the litigation”. The Administrative Court should, the 
court said “scrutinise extremely carefully” claims for judicial review so as to ensure that parties 
tried “to resolve the dispute with the minimum involvement of the court”. Ample powers existed 
under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) for the Administrative Court to hold, on its own initiative, 
an inter partes hearing at which both sides could explain what steps they had taken to resolve 
the dispute without the courts’ involvement using complaints procedures and other forms of 
ADR. In the years since Cowl, there has been little progress towards establishing a principled 
basis on which ADR can be used in public law disputes (some cases are not suited to ADR 
because they require a point of law to be determined), finding a suitable funding regime (who 
will pay for mediation?) or working out how ADR can take place in the short time before a claim 
for judicial review must be started (promptly and in any event within three months). 
8.33 In its October 2015 report, the Royal Court Rules Review Group recommended “issue of a 
practice direction and amendment to the form of the summons for directions to require mediation 
                                                
151 Ann Abraham, ‘The ombudsman and “paths to justice”: a just alternative or just an alternative’ [2008] Public 
Law 1, 4. 
152 See www.lgo.org.uk/guidance-inv/settling-complaints/mediation.  
153 See Chapter 7. 
154 See Varda Bondy and Linda Mulchahy, Mediation and Judicial Review: an empirical research study (The 
Nuffield Foundation/The Public Law Project 2009). 
155 Cowl v Plymouth City Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1935; [2002] 1 WLR 803. 
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to be explored at the first directions hearing”.156 In principle, this approach of requiring mediation 
to be explored at an early stage of an application for judicial review appears to us to be 
appropriate.  
  
                                                
156 Access to Justice, Final Consultation Paper Issued by the Royal Court Rules Review Group (5 October 
2015) p 32. 
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ANNEX A 
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Annex lists the recommendations made by the Topic Report. The method of implementation of 
each recommendation and the potential costs, benefits and strategic risks are identified in outline. 
Further explanation and analysis of each of the recommendations can be found in relevant chapters 
of the Topic Report. 
Abbreviations used: 
AJJL Many of the recommendations contained in this report would need to be implemented 
through a new Law; we use the working title “Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law 
CM The Chief Minister of Jersey, who is head of the Government of Jersey and the minister 
responsible for justice policy and resources 
SPBs Scheduled Public Bodies. We propose that the public authorities to which the AJJL 
applies should be listed in a Schedule. 
  
Chapter 1: About the project 
This chapter does not contain any recommendations 
 
Chapter 2: Overarching Issues in Administrative Justice in Jersey 
 Recommendation Method of 
implementation 
Costs, benefits, risks 
Recommendation 
2.1 
Create a legal duty on the 
CM to issue guidance to 
public bodies about fair 
and effective handling of 
complaints  
Article in AJJL 
creates duty 
CM issues non-
statutory guidance 
(and keeps under 
review); 
consideration to be 
given to the 
mechanisms by 
which the States 
Assembly can best 
scrutinise this 
guidance. 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting duty in article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of the projet de 
loi (cost to States Assembly)   
- One-off cost of developing a first draft of the non-
statutory guidance, including external advisers, and 
carrying out consultation (cost to Government of 
Jersey); the Jersey Law Commission could contribute 
to this work 
- One-off cost of scrutinising the draft guidance by 
States Assembly e.g. through a Scrutiny Panel (cost 
to States Assembly) 
- Ongoing cost of operationalising the guidance, 
including reviews of complaint handling process by 
SPBs, training for staff, and publishing information 
about internal complaints through websites and 
leaflets (cost to Government of Jersey and other 
SPBs) 
Benefits 
- Individual users of public services in Jersey will 
benefit from improved complaints handling 
- The process of developing and consulting on the 
contents of the guidance will encourage sharing of 
good practice across SPBs 
- Guidance will help SPBs to improve the quality of 
complaint handling   
- Guidance will encourage greater transparency in 
handling of complaints by SPBs 
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- Guidance will encourage a more consistent approach 
to handling of complaints across public services 
- Requirements in the guidance to publish information 
about complaint handling will improve public 
understanding of rights to complain 
Risks 
- Risk that SPBs may fail to comply with the guidance 
or view it as a “paper exercise”, leading to patchy 
improvements across the public sector 
Recommendation 
2.2 
Create a legal duty on the 
CM to present an annual 
report to the States 
Assembly on 
administrative redress 
across the Government of 
Jersey and other public 
bodies 
Article in AJJL 
creates duty 
CM prepares and 
presents annual 
report 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
- Annual cost to SPBs of staff time and other 
resources needed to collect and report data to the 
CM (cost to SPBs) 
- Annual cost to CM of analysing data, preparing and 
publishing report (cost to Government of Jersey) 
- Annual cost of providing political scrutiny and 
accountability in relation to CM’s report (cost to 
States Assembly) 
Benefits 
- Annual report provides good quality information to 
support evidence-led policy-making and actions by 
Government 
- Annual report will enable members of the States 
Assembly to provide more systematic accountability 
over the administrative justice system 
- Ultimately, individuals, business and organisations 
using public services in Jersey will benefit from more 
effective coordination and improvements in the 
operation of the administrative justice system 
Risks 
- SPBs may fail to collect and report accurate data to 
the CM 
- The CM and officials may adopt an insufficiently 
reflective and critical approach to evaluating data, 
lesson learning and taking remedial action where 
systematic problems arise 
- States Members may not regard scrutiny of the 
annual report as a political priority and will fail to 
provide independent challenge and accountability to 
Government 
Recommendation 
2.3 
The States Assembly 
should scrutinise the CM’s 
annual report on 
administrative justice 
Scrutiny Chairmen’s 
Committee to 
consider how best to 
provide scrutiny of 
the CM’s annual 
reports (e.g. through 
a committee or 
scrutiny panel) 
Costs 
- Ongoing costs of activity in States Assembly in 
conducting scrutiny of CM’s annual report, including 
Members’ time, administrative support for a 
committee/scrutiny panel and appointment of 
external specialist advisers as needed (cost to States 
Assembly) 
Benefits 
- Annual report will enable States Members to have an 
overview of where problems are arising across the 
whole administrative redress system and make 
strategic decisions about how best to scrutinise those 
problems 
- Annual report subject to public scrutiny will provide 
an incentive for SPBs to engage in continuous 
improvement and address systematic problems 
openly 
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- Ultimately, individuals, business and organisations 
using public services in Jersey will benefit from more 
effective coordination and improvements in the 
operation of the administrative justice system 
Risks 
- States Members may not regard scrutiny of annual 
report as a political priority and will fail to provide 
independent challenge and accountability to 
Government  
- The CM’s annual report and subsequent scrutiny 
may to yield insufficient practical improvement in the 
quality of public services and administrative redress 
Recommendation 
2.4 
CM and Minister for Health 
& Social Services should 
commission a study of 
complaints handling 
relating to health and 
social services decision-
making and services, with 
a remit to make 
recommendations 
Ministerial decision Costs 
One-off cost of a study involving desk-based research, 
research interviews, and review of files, which we estimate 
will be achievable for £15,000 (cost to Government of 
Jersey).  
Benefits 
- An independent review will provide basis for 
evidence-led policy making by the Government of 
Jersey in the area that produces the largest number 
of internal complaints 
- Ultimately, individuals using health and social 
services in Jersey will benefit from improvements in 
the operation of the administrative justice system 
Risks 
The independent study may make recommendations that 
are not acceptable to Government of Jersey or the States 
Assembly 
 
Recommendation 
2.5 
Create a legal “right to 
good administration” 
based on models 
developed in some other 
jurisdictions 
Article in AJJL Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
Benefits 
- Existence of the right benefiting individuals will 
become a point of reference for the Government of 
Jersey, the States Assembly and the judiciary when 
developing and applying rules relating to 
administrative justice and redress 
- Reputational benefit to the Island of signalling to the 
world Jersey’s commitment to the rule of law in public 
administration 
- Ultimately, individuals, business and organisations 
using public services in Jersey will benefit from a 
commitment by the Government of Jersey and States 
Assembly to respect and uphold a right to just 
administration 
Risks 
- The new right may have little practical impact on 
improving quality of administrative justice and 
redress 
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Chapter 3: Modernising Jersey’s Tribunals System 
 Recommendation Method of 
implementation 
Costs, benefits, risks 
Recommendation 
3.1 
Create a new tribunal (the 
Jersey Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal) with a 
broad jurisdiction to hear 
appeals against 
administrative decisions 
Articles in AJJL Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
- Ongoing costs of running JAAT (cost to the Judicial 
Greffe, with resources provided by the CM); this will 
be off-set by savings from no longer running the 
tribunals that will be abolished 
Benefits 
- The creation of a single tribunal will eliminate 
anomalies, reduce the number of separate 
legislative provisions relating to tribunals, and 
simplify and modernise the law relating to tribunals 
in Jersey 
- Efficiency gains and cost savings from running one 
tribunal rather than 8 separate tribunals 
- When in future new administrative decision-making 
functions are created in Law by the States 
Assembly, it will be straightforward to have a right of 
appeal to JAAT (rather than having to create a new 
tribunal or specify a right of appeal to the Royal 
Court, which may be disproportionate) 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeal system  
Risks 
- Perception that expertise and experience of existing 
tribunals may diminish (but see Recommendation 
3.20.a) 
Recommendation 
3.2 
Transfer jurisdiction of the 
following tribunals to JAAT 
and abolish them:  
1. Commissioners of 
Appeal for Taxes 
2. Social Security 
Tribunal 
3. Social Security and 
Medical Tribunal 
4. Income Support 
Medical Appeal 
Tribunal 
5. Mental Health Review 
Tribunal 
6. Health and Safely 
Appeal Tribunal 
7. Data Protection 
Tribunal 
8. Rate Support Board 
Articles in AJJL 
 
Amendments and 
repeals to existing 
Laws 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
- Ongoing costs of running the JAAT (cost to Judicial 
Greffe); this will be off-set by savings from no longer 
running the tribunals that will be abolished 
- Additional costs may arise during a transitional 
period if the some of the existing tribunals and JAAT 
operate simultaneously (cost to Judicial Greffe and 
some SPBs) 
Benefits 
- The creation of a single tribunal will eliminate 
anomalies, reduce the number of separate 
legislative provisions relating to tribunals, and 
simplify and modernise the law relating to tribunals 
in Jersey 
- Efficiency gains and cost savings from running one 
tribunal rather than 8 separate tribunals 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeal system 
Risks 
Perception that expertise and experience of existing 
tribunals may be lost (but see Recommendation 3.20.a) 
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Recommendation 
contained in 
Chapter 4 
Amend legislation to 
transfer rights of appeal 
from Ministers to JAAT 
Amendments and 
repeals to existing 
Laws and Orders 
Cross-refer to Recommendations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 
4.5.  
Recommendation 
contained in 
Chapter 7  
Amend approximately 54 
Laws to transfer right of 
appeal from Royal Court to 
JAAT. 
AJJL will make 
amendments and 
repeals to existing 
Laws  
Cross-refer to Recommendation 7.1 
Recommendation 
3.3 
Create new judicial post of 
“Chairman of the Jersey 
Administrative Appeal 
Tribunal” 
Article in AJJL Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
- On-going part-time salary and on-costs for judicial 
post; this will be off-set by savings in daily sitting 
fees paid to a legally qualified tribunal member in 
the previous system 
Benefits 
- Post will provide judicial leadership capacity in new 
tribunal system 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Risks 
- It may be difficult to recruit and retain suitable 
candidates for the role 
Recommendation 
3.4 
Create new judicial office of 
“Deputy Chairman of the 
Jersey Administrative 
Appeal Tribunal”. 
Article in AJJL Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
- Ongoing daily fees for this judicial post; fees are 
paid to a legally qualified tribunal members in the 
current system but additional days may be worked 
by the Deputy Chairman in carrying out leadership 
functions 
Benefits 
- Post will provide judicial leadership capacity in new 
tribunal system 
- Designated Deputy Chairman role will enable 
efficient decision-making by JAAT when the 
Chairman is unavailable or conflicted from deciding 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Risks 
- It may be difficult to recruit and retain a suitable 
person for the role 
Recommendation 
3.5 
Include all members of 
JAAT within the definition of 
members of the “judiciary of 
Jersey”, including 
1. Chairman of JAAT 
2. Deputy Chairman of 
JAAT 
3. Other legal members 
4. Expert members 
5. Lay members 
Depending on the 
sequencing of the 
legislation, this 
would either be in 
the AJJL or 
included the projet 
de loi implementing 
CM’s proposals on 
“Judicial 
Independence and 
the Establishment 
of a Judicial and 
Legal Services 
Commission” 
Costs 
- No significant additional costs 
Benefits 
- Will ensure all members of JAAT benefit from the 
proposed “guarantee of judicial independence” and 
are subject to the responsibilities of members of the 
Jersey judiciary 
- Will enhance the status of JAAT as an independent 
and impartial judicial body, to the benefit of users of 
tribunal appeals 
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(published in July 
2017) 
Recommendation 
3.6 
Members of JAAT should 
be appointed by the 
proposed Judicial and Legal 
Services Commission 
(JLSC) 
Depending on the 
sequencing of the 
legislation, this 
would either be in 
the AJJL or 
included in the 
projet de loi 
implementing CM’s 
proposals on 
“Judicial 
Independence and 
the Establishment 
of a Judicial and 
Legal Services 
Commission” 
Costs 
- Tribunal appointments, including lay members, are 
likely to be a significant part of the JLSC’s annual 
workload (cost to the JLSC); the cost of the JLSC 
making the appointments will be offset by the 
savings from the previous appointment procedures 
(savings to the Government of Jersey and States 
Assembly). 
Benefits 
- Appointments by the JLSC will enhance the 
independence of the JAAT compared to existing 
appointments procedures, to the benefit of users of 
tribunal appeals 
Risks 
- It may be difficult to recruit and retain members of 
JAAT 
Recommendation 
3.7 
The proposed JLSC should 
have legal duty to “have 
regard to the need to 
encourage diversity in the 
range of persons available 
for selection for 
appointments” to JAAT. 
Depending on the 
sequencing of the 
legislation, this 
would either be in 
the AJJL or 
included in the 
projet de loi 
implementing CM’s 
proposals on 
“Judicial 
Independence and 
the Establishment 
of a Judicial and 
Legal Services 
Commission” 
Costs 
- JLSC would need sufficient resources to take 
practical steps to encourage interest in serving 
(especially as lay members) from individuals from 
diverse backgrounds (cost to JLSC) 
Benefits 
- Diverse panels of JAAT will increase and maintain 
public confidence in the independence and 
impartiality of hearings 
- Panels of JAAT composed of members with diverse 
life experiences will make better decisions than 
homogenous panels, to the benefit of users of 
tribunal appeals 
- Placing a diversity duty on the JLSC will contribute 
to the realisation of an “effective island diversity 
strategy … essential in addressing the challenges of 
an increasingly diverse community” recommended 
by the Report of the Independent Jersey Care 
Inquiry 2017. 
Risks 
- The JLSC may lack commitment to achieving 
diverse appointments in JAAT appointments 
- It may be difficult to attract people from diverse 
backgrounds to apply to serve as members of JAAT 
Recommendation 
3.8 
The professional eligibility 
criterion for appointment as 
Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman of JAAT should 
be 7 years relevant legal 
experience 
Article in AJJL Costs 
One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi (cost 
to States Assembly)   
Benefits 
- This will simplify and remove anomalies seen in the 
criteria for appointments to the existing tribunals 
- Will ensure that the Chairman and Deputy Chairman 
have sufficient legal experience to carry out their 
functions effectively 
- Criteria for senior legal membership of JAAT will be 
brought into in line with those of the Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman of the Jersey Employment and 
Discrimination Tribunal 
Recommendation 
3.9 
The professional eligibility 
criterion for appointment as 
Article in AJJL Costs 
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a “legal member” of JAAT 
should be 5 years relevant 
legal experience 
One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (Government of 
Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi (States Assembly)   
Benefits 
- This will simplify and remove anomalies seen in the 
criteria for appointments to the existing tribunals 
- Will ensure that legally qualified members of JAAT 
have sufficient experience to carry out their 
functions effectively 
Risks 
- It may be difficult to recruit and retain suitable 
persons for the role 
Recommendation 
3.10 
Appointment as a judge to 
JAAT should be on a 
permanent basis. Open-
ended terms of office should 
be able to be brought to an 
end by resignation, reaching 
a mandatory retirement age 
of 72 years, or removal from 
office on the same basis as 
other judges 
Article in AJJL Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (Government 
of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi (States 
Assembly)   
- A move from fixed terms to open ended 
appointments may affect the frequency with which 
appointments are made by the JLSC; if it reduces, 
this will yield a cost saving 
Benefits 
- Open-ended appointments will enhance the 
independence and impartiality of JAAT 
Risks 
- A move from fixed terms to open ended 
appointments may have an adverse impact on 
achieving a more diverse tribunal judiciary if the rate 
of renewal of membership slows 
Recommendation 
3.11 
The Chairman of JAAT 
should have a legal duty to 
prepare an annual report on 
the operation of the Tribunal 
and submit it to the CM 
The CM should have a legal 
duty to present a copy of 
report to the States 
Assembly   
Article in AJJL 
 
Annual Ministerial 
decision to present 
a copy of report 
before the States 
Assembly 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
- Ongoing cost of time of Chairman and staff in 
Judicial Greffe in preparing the annual report (cost 
to the Judicial Greffe) 
Benefits 
- Annual report will provide transparency about the 
work of JAAT 
Risks 
- States Members may not regard scrutiny of JAAT 
Chairman’s annual report as a political priority, 
diminishing its usefulness as a means of 
accountability 
- The JAAT Chairman’s report may attract little 
attention from the news media, civil society 
organisations or the general public, diminishing its 
usefulness as a means of accountability  
Recommendation 
3.12 
The Chairman of JAAT and 
the Judicial Greffe should 
have a legal duty to make 
arrangements for the 
training of all JAAT 
members 
Article in AJJL Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (Government 
of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi (States 
Assembly)   
- Ongoing cost of fees for external trainers; as well as 
training in general aspects of tribunal work, 
members focusing on particular areas (e.g. mental 
health) will require specialist training (cost to the 
Judicial Greffe) 
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- Ongoing cost of daily sitting fee to be paid to fee-
paid tribunal members attending training events 
(cost to the Judicial Greffe) 
Benefits 
- Will address unmet need expressed by current 
tribunal members for training opportunities 
- Will improve the efficiency, fairness and quality of 
judgments made by JAAT by having better trained 
members 
Recommendation 
3.13 
Create a legal duty on the 
Superior Number of the 
Royal Court, with the advice 
and assistance of a Rules 
Committee, to make JAAT 
Rules to regulate the 
conduct of appeals 
Article in AJJL 
conferring rule-
making power on 
Royal Court 
Royal Court will 
adopt rules (and 
revise from time to 
time as needs be) 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
- One-off cost of drafting the JAAT Rules and 
consulting on them (cost to Judicial Greffe); we 
envisage that a “JAAT Rules Committee” would be 
established, including an external adviser with 
experience of developing tribunal rules in another 
jurisdiction 
- Ongoing cost of reviewing and revising JAAT Rules 
as needs be (cost to Judicial Greffe/Royal Court); 
this will be off-set by the cost savings of no longer 
having to revise several sets of procedural rules 
currently applicable to different tribunals 
Benefits 
- Some current tribunals do not have any or 
sufficiently detailed rules of procedure; the JAAT 
Rules will ensure there is procedural guidance for all 
administrative appeals 
- Simplification of rules applicable to tribunal hearings 
will assist appellants (especially those without legal 
advice and representation) to use the appeal 
process 
- A single set of rules will simplify the law and remove 
unjustified anomalies in current rules for different 
tribunals (though procedural differences in different 
types of appeal can be justified within a common 
framework) 
- Moving responsibility for making rules from the 
departments against which appeals are made 
(Government of Jersey) to a judiciary-led body (a 
Rules Committee/Royal Court) will lead to better 
adherence to the constitutional principles of 
separation of powers and judicial independence. 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Risks 
- The JAAT Rules may be insufficiently focused on 
the needs of tribunal users, especially those who do 
not have access to legal advice and representation 
- Individual appellants without legal advice and 
representation may find the JAAT Rules complex 
and confusing 
Recommendation 
3.14 on content 
and style of the 
JAAT Rules 
The JAAT Rules should be 
designed and written with 
appellants’ needs in mind 
and expressed in user-
friendly style 
Detail to be 
developed by Rules 
Committee having 
regard to Jersey 
Law Commission 
proposals 
Costs 
- One-off cost of providing resources to the Rules 
Committee to develop the rule (cost to the Judicial 
Greffe) 
Benefits 
- Will help accessibility of tribunal system 
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- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
 
Recommendation 
3.14 on content 
and style of the 
JAAT Rules 
(continued) 
The JAAT Rules should 
include provision for 
determining the composition 
of panels to hear different 
types of appeals;  
this should include provision 
that the Chairman of JAAT, 
the Deputy Chairman or 
another legally qualified 
member should preside 
over any panel 
Detail to be 
developed by Rules 
Committee having 
regard to Jersey 
Law Commission 
proposals 
Costs 
- One-off cost of providing resources to the Rules 
Committee to develop the rule (cost to the Judicial 
Greffe) 
- Ongoing cost – as an aspect of Recommendation 
3.1, the overall membership of JAAT will need to be 
sufficient in number to provide the range of expertise 
from which panels may be drawn. It is possible, 
however, that this number will be less than the 
overall number of members serving the existing 
tribunals. 
Benefits 
- This provision in the JAAT Rules will enable panel 
members to be assigned to cases in light of their 
expertise and training to ensure appropriate 
composition of panels 
- An express requirement that the presiding member 
of any panel is legally qualified will ensure better 
adherence to the constitutional principle of the rule 
of law 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Risks 
- If the Rules are not sufficiently transparent, some 
appellants may perceive the panel hearing their 
appeals as “fixed” 
Recommendation 
3.14 on content 
and style of the 
JAAT Rules 
(continued) 
The JAAT Rules should 
include an “overriding 
objective” of enabling JAAT 
to deal with cases fairly and 
justly 
Detail to be 
developed by Rules 
Committee having 
regard to Jersey 
Law Commission 
proposals 
Costs 
-  One-off cost of providing resources to the Rules 
Committee to develop the rule (cost to the Judicial 
Greffe) 
Benefits 
- The use of an “overriding objective” in procedural 
rules is well-established; in relation to the operation 
of the JAAT it will assist as a point of reference in 
the development of the JAAT Rules and in their 
application by panels in particular cases 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Recommendation 
3.14 on content 
and style of the 
JAAT Rules 
(continued) 
The JAAT Rules should 
include a power for appeals 
to be transferred between 
JAAT and the Royal Court 
and vice versa 
Detail to be 
developed by Rules 
Committee having 
regard to Jersey 
Law Commission 
proposals 
Costs 
- One-off cost of providing resources to the Rules 
Committee to develop the rule (cost to the Judicial 
Greffe) 
Benefits 
- This will facilitate flexibility in hearing appeals, to 
ensure that each appeal can be heard by the most 
appropriate judicial body 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Recommendation 
3.14 on content 
and style of the 
The JAAT Rules should 
include power for the 
Chairman of JAAT to 
regulate the publication of 
Detail to be 
developed by Rules 
Committee having 
regard to Jersey 
Costs 
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JAAT Rules 
(continued) 
judgments and other 
documents relating to 
appeals 
Law Commission 
proposals 
- One-off cost of providing resources to the Rules 
Committee to develop the rule (cost to the Judicial 
Greffe) 
- The ongoing cost will depend on the framework 
adopted by the Rules Committee. If this involves 
redacting private information from JAAC judgments 
or preparing summaries of cases, this will require 
resources in the Judicial Greffe 
Benefits 
- More systematic publication of tribunal judgments, 
or summaries of judgments, will increase 
transparency and open justice 
- Better dissemination of judgments will improve the 
knowledge of all tribunal members of decisions 
taken by panels on which they do not sit 
- Appellants’ advisers and representatives will have 
access to previous tribunal judgments as an aid to 
preparing their cases 
- A publication scheme will assist in ensuring that 
JAAT satisfies the requirements of Article 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights 
(incorporated into island law by the Human Rights 
(Jersey) Law 2000) on fair trials 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Recommendation 
3.14 on content 
and style of the 
JAAT Rules 
(continued) 
The JAAT Rules should 
state that a party may 
appoint a legally qualified or 
lay representative 
Detail to be 
developed by Rules 
Committee having 
regard to Jersey 
Law Commission 
proposals 
Costs 
- One-off cost of providing resources to the JATT 
Rules Committee to develop the rule (cost to the 
Judicial Greffe) 
Benefits 
- Will provide clarity on the issue 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Recommendation 
3.15 
The Chairman/Deputy 
Chairman of JAAT should 
have power to order that an 
appellant receives legal 
advice and representation 
paid for by public funds 
where this is necessary to 
ensure a fair hearing 
Article in AJJL 
CM to make 
resources available 
via the Judicial 
Greffe 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutinising it during the 
legislative process (cost to States Assembly) 
- Ongoing cost in a small number of cases each year 
of providing legal advice and representation to an 
appellant by a member of the Jersey Bar paid for 
from public funds (cost to the Judicial Greffe) 
Benefits 
- JAAT hearings will comply with requirements of 
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (incorporated into island law by the Human 
Rights (Jersey) Law 2000) on fair trials 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective tribunal 
appeals system 
Recommendation 
3.16 
There should be a right of 
appeal on a question of law 
from JAAT to the Royal 
Court 
Article in AJJL Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutinising it during the 
legislative process (cost to States Assembly) 
- No significant additional cost is identified as such a 
right of appeal already exists from most of the 
existing tribunals 
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Benefits 
- Will ensure senior-level judicial supervision of the 
legality of decisions made by JAAT 
 
Chapter 4: Appeals and reviews determined by Connétables and Ministers 
 Recommendation Method of 
implementation 
Costs, benefits, risks 
Recommendation 
4.1 
JAAT should hear appeals 
from property owners bout 
Connétables’ 
administrative decisions 
relating to wedding and 
civil partnership venues 
instead of the Minister for 
Home Affairs 
Amendment and Civil 
Status (Approved 
Premises)(Jersey) 
Order 2002 and Civil 
Partnership 
(Approved 
Premises)(Jersey) 
Order 2012 
Costs 
- One-off costs of drafting amendment to Order (cost 
to Government of Jersey) 
- Ongoing occasional costs to JAAT of hearing 
appeals (cost to Judicial Greffe) but off-set by 
saving of costs to Connétables 
Benefits 
- Appellants will have more specialist, expert and 
structured adjudication by JAAT than can typically 
be provided by Connétables 
- Simplification of administrative appeals system will 
help people better understand their rights of appeal 
- Better adherence to the constitutional principles of 
the rule of law and separation of powers by 
ensuring that disputes are adjudicated on by an 
independent and impartial judicial body 
Risks 
None have been identified 
Recommendation 
4.2 
JAAT should hear appeals 
relating to decisions of 
Agent of the Impôt instead 
of the Minister for Treasury 
and Resources 
Amend Article 68 of 
the Customs and 
Excise (Jersey) Law 
1999 
This can be done in 
the AJJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutinising it during the 
legislative process (cost to States Assembly) 
- Ongoing occasional costs to JAAT of hearing 
appeals (cost to Judicial Greffe) but off-set by 
saving of costs to Minister’s department (cost 
savings to Government of Jersey) 
Benefits 
- Appellants will have more specialist, expert and 
structured adjudication by JAAT than can typically 
be provided by the Minister and officials 
- Simplification of administrative appeals system will 
help people better understand their rights of appeal 
- Better adherence to the constitutional principles of 
the rule of law and separation of powers  by 
ensuring that disputes are adjudicated on by an 
independent and impartial judicial body 
Recommendation 
4.3 
JAAT should hear appeals 
relating to assessment of 
children’s special 
education needs instead of 
the Minister for Education 
Amend Article 31 of 
the Education 
(Jersey) Law 1999 
This can be done in 
the AJJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutinising it during the 
legislative process (cost to States Assembly) 
- Ongoing occasional costs to JAAT of hearing 
appeals (cost to Judicial Greffe) but off-set by 
saving of costs to Minister’s department (cost 
saving to Government of Jersey) 
- The current tribunal system does not deal with 
education matters whereas it is proposed that JAAT 
will; specialist training will need to be provided to 
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JAAT members available to sit on panels hearing 
SEN appeals (cost to Judicial Greffe) 
Benefits 
- Appellants will have more specialist, expert and 
structured adjudication by JAAT than can typically 
be provided by the Minister and officials 
- Simplification of administrative appeals system will 
help people better understand their rights of appeal 
- Better adherence to the constitutional principles of 
the rule of law and separation of powers by 
ensuring that disputes are adjudicated on by an 
independent and impartial judicial body 
Recommendation 
4.4 
JAAT should hear appeals 
about decisions of the 
Inspector under the Motor 
Vehicle Registration 
(Jersey) Law 1993 
Amend Article 8 of 
the Motor Vehicle 
Registration (Jersey) 
Law 1993 
This can be done in 
the AJJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutinising it during the 
legislative process (cost to States Assembly) 
- Ongoing occasional costs to JAAT of hearing 
appeals (cost to Judicial Greffe) but off-set by 
saving of costs to Minister’s department (savings to 
Government of Jersey) 
Benefits 
- Appellants will have more specialist, expert and 
structured adjudication by JAAT than can typically 
be provided by the Minister and officials 
- Simplification of administrative appeals system will 
help people better understand their rights of appeal 
- Better adherence to the constitutional principles of 
the rule of law and separation of powers by 
ensuring that disputes are adjudicated on by an 
independent and impartial judicial body 
Recommendation 
4.5 
JAAT should hear appeals 
about disciplinary matters 
at HM Prison La Moye 
instead of the Minister for 
Home Affairs  
Amend Prison 
(Jersey) Rules 2007  
Costs 
- One-off cost of redrafting rule in Prison (Jersey) 
Rules 2007 
- Ongoing costs to JAAT of hearing appeals (cost to 
Judicial Greffe) but off-set by savings of costs to 
Minister’s department (Government of Jersey) 
Benefits 
- Better adherence to the constitutional principles of 
the rule of law and separation of powers by 
ensuring that disputes are adjudicated on by an 
independent and impartial judicial body 
- Appellants will have more specialist, expert and 
structured adjudication by JAAT than can typically 
be provided by the Minister and officials 
- Simplification of administrative appeals system will 
help people better understand their rights of appeal 
 
Chapter 5: Ending the role of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
 Recommendation Method Costs, benefits, risks 
Recommendation 
5.1 
The States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel should 
be replaced by a Jersey 
Public Services 
Ombudsman   
Repeal of the 
Administrative 
Decisions 
(Review)(Jersey) 
Law 1982 by article 
in AJJL or in 
separate legislation 
creating the Jersey 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutinising it during the 
legislative process (cost to States Assembly) 
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Public Services 
Ombudsman 
- Recommendation 6.1 envisages replacing the States 
of Jersey Complaints Panel with a Jersey Public 
Services Ombudsman.  
Benefits 
- Replacing the States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
would enable the creation of a Jersey Public 
Services Ombudsman. 
 Note: Chapter 5 contains alternative recommendations for improving the Complaints Panel if our principal 
recommendation is rejected by the CM; these are also listed in Annex B. 
 
Chapter 6: Creating a Public Services Ombudsman for Jersey 
 Recommendation Method of 
implementation 
Costs, benefits, risks 
Recommendation 
6.1 
The Government of Jersey 
should make an “in 
principle” decision to 
support next steps in the 
creation of a Jersey Public 
Services Ombudsman 
(JPSO) 
Ministerial decision 
Creation of the 
JPSO would require 
legislation, either as 
part of the AJJL or 
in separate 
legislation 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting legislation to create the JPSO 
(cost to Government of Jersey) and scrutinising it 
during the legislative process (cost to States 
Assembly) 
- Ongoing costs of operating the office of the JPSO. 
This will be off-set to some extent by savings from the 
abolition of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. 
Clearly, however, the costs of running the JPSO’s 
office will be greater than the costs of running the 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
Benefits 
- The JPSO will provide a more accessible and 
effective redress service than is provided by the 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
- The JPSO will contribute to systemic improvements in 
the quality of administrative decision-making, redress 
of grievances, and quality of public administration 
- Creation of the PSOJ will help complete the package 
of recommendations made by the Clothier report in 
2000 
Risks 
- The creation of the JPSO may not lead to significantly 
more people using its services compared to the 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
- The JPSO may encounter resistance within the 
Government of Jersey and other SPBs to 
implementing recommendations in particular cases 
and on broader systematic issues 
Recommendation 
6.2 
The Government of Jersey 
should request the Jersey 
Law Commission to 
develop institutional 
design options for the 
JPSO 
Ministerial decision Costs 
This work could be carried out within the existing 
resources allocated to the Jersey Law Commission; we 
estimate the cost to be approximately £10,000 (cost to the 
Jersey Law Commission) 
Benefits 
Developing more detailed proposals will enable Ministers, 
officials and States Members to evaluate different options 
for the PSOJ, drawing on published research, analysis of 
the local context, and lesson learning from other 
ombudsman systems 
Risks 
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The detailed proposals for a JPSO may not receive 
support from the Government of Jersey or the States 
Assembly 
Chapter 7: The role of the Royal Court in Jersey’s administrative redress system 
 Recommendation Method of 
implementation 
Costs, benefits, risks 
Recommendation 
7.1 
Amend 54 Laws that 
currently provide a right of 
appeal from an 
administrative decision to 
the Royal Court to provide 
instead for the appeal to be 
heard by the JAAT 
Amendment of 
Laws. 
This can be done in 
the proposed AJJL 
   
(unnumbered 
recommendation 
because no 
change in law 
proposed) 
Retain approximately 19 
rights of appeal from 
administrative decision-
making to the Royal Court 
No action needed No change is proposed 
Recommendation 
7.2 
Amend the Royal Court 
Rules to enable the Royal 
Court to transfer the 
hearing of a case from the 
Royal Court to JAAT, and 
vice versa 
(See also 
Recommendation 3.16, 
which proposes a 
counterpart of this provision 
in the JAAT Rules) 
Amendment of the 
Royal Court Rules 
by the Superior 
Number of the Royal 
Court under powers 
from Article 11 of the 
Royal Court (Jersey) 
Law 1948  
Costs 
- One-off costs of drafting amendment to Royal Court 
Rules (cost to Judicial Greffe); a similar provision 
will be contained in the new JAAT Rules to enable 
transfer from JAAT to the Royal Court 
Benefits 
- This will facilitate flexibility in hearing particular 
cases, to ensure that each appeal can be heard by 
the most appropriate judicial body 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective 
tribunal appeals system 
Recommendation 
7.3 
There should be a standard 
time limit for making 
administrative appeals 
(unless there is a strong 
public interest in specifying 
a different limit in a law). 
The standard time limit 
should be 28 days from the 
appellant receiving notice 
of the decision appealed 
against. 
Amendment of 
Laws. 
This can be done in 
the proposed AJJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting article in AJJL (cost to 
Government of Jersey) and scrutiny of projet de loi 
(cost to States Assembly)   
Benefits 
- Simplification of administrative appeals will help 
people better understand the system and their rights 
of appeal 
- Reduce unfairness to individuals of unjustified 
differences in time limits for appealing against 
different administrative decisions 
Recommendation 
7.4 
A Royal Court Rules 
Review Group should 
consider reviewing Part 16 
of the Royal Court Rules 
(Applications for Judicial 
Review in Civil 
Proceedings) 
Decision of the Bailiff Costs 
- One-off costs of work by the Royal Court Rules 
Review Group in reviewing operation of Part 16 in 
light of experience in Jersey and developments in 
other jurisdictions on which Part 16 was originally 
modelled (cost to the Judicial Greffe) 
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Benefits 
- Opportunity to identify improvements in the Part 16 
procedure 
 
Chapter 8: Using Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)  
 Recommendation Method of 
implementation 
Costs, benefits, risks 
Recommendation 
8.1 
Further research should be 
carried out to develop 
proposals for mediation and 
other forms of ADR related 
to disagreements about 
administrative decision-
making in the Island 
Detail to be 
developed by a 
Rules Committee 
having regard to 
Jersey Law 
Commission 
proposals 
Costs 
- One-off cost of providing resources to a Rules 
Committee to develop the rule (cost to the Judicial 
Greffe) 
Benefits 
- The rule will provide flexibility to JAAT to dispose of 
cases other than by a formal hearing, where this is 
appropriate and the parties agree 
- Ultimately, users of the appeal process will benefit 
from a better coordinated and more effective 
administrative redress appeals system 
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ANNEX B 
LIST OF ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO 
THE STATES OF JERSEY COMPLAINTS PANEL 
 
Annex B: LIST OF Alternative Recommendations on the future of the States of Jersey Complaints 
Panel (Chapter 5) 
In Chapters 5 and 6, we set out our principal recommendations for improving the external complaint 
handling provision in Jersey. Our primary recommendation is that the States of Jersey Complaints 
Panel (Chapter 5) should be replaced by a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman (Chapter 6). Should 
our primary recommendation not be accepted by the Government of Jersey or the States Assembly, 
we have developed a set of alternative proposals designed to improve the functioning of the States 
of Jersey Complaints Panel: these are explained and analysed in Chapter 5. 
ADJL Administrative Decisions (Jersey) Law 1982 
AJJL The proposed Administrative Justice (Jersey) Law, that would implement many of the 
proposals contained in this report 
CM Chief Minister 
Panel States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
LPBs Listed Public Bodies. We propose that the public authorities to which the AJJL applies 
are listed in a Schedule. 
 
 Recommendation Method of 
implementation 
Costs, benefits, risks 
Alternative 
recommendation 
5.2 
The States Greffe 
should have a legal duty 
to provide a programme 
of training to members of 
the Panel 
Amendment to 
ADJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting amendment to ADJL 
(cost to Government of Jersey) and 
scrutinising it during the legislative process 
(cost to States Assembly) 
- Ongoing resources sufficient to provide 
induction to new members and continuing 
professional development to all Panel 
members to address currently unmet 
training needs (cost to States Assembly) 
Benefits 
- Panel members will be better equipped to 
fulfil their role 
- Ultimately, users of the complaints process 
(complainants and public bodies) will benefit 
from improved quality of complaint 
resolution 
Alternative 
recommendation 
5.3 
The States Greffe 
should invest resources 
in developing a website 
and other material to 
explain and publicise 
Decision of the 
States Assembly 
Costs 
- Ongoing resources sufficient to provide 
better information to the public about how 
the Panel can help with complaints about 
provision of public services and 
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how the Panel can help 
aggrieved people 
administrative decision-making (cost to 
States Assembly) 
Benefits 
- Members of the public will gain greater 
awareness of the existence and role of the 
Panel 
- More people with complaints will use the 
Panel 
Risks 
- Better public information may not lead to 
significantly better public awareness of the 
Panel 
- Better public information may not generate 
significantly greater demand for use of the 
Panel as a form of redress from people with 
complaints 
Alternative 
recommendation 
5.4 
The remit of the Panel 
should be widened 
beyond Ministers and 
States of Jersey 
Departments to cover all 
SPBs 
Amendment to 
ADJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting amendment to ADJL 
(cost to Government of Jersey) and 
scrutinising it during the legislative process 
(cost to States Assembly) 
- The States Greffe and Chairman of the 
Panel will need to develop and deliver 
induction and training to key personnel in 
SPBs not currently within the Panel’s remit 
about the role of the Panel and the 
implications of being brought within it remit 
(cost to States Assembly) 
Benefits 
- Will create a better match between (a) the 
Panel’s remit and (b) how public services 
are delivered and the bodies making 
administrative decisions   
Alternative 
recommendation 
5.5 
The grounds on which 
people can complain to 
the Panel should be 
reformulated  
Amendment to 
ADJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting amendment to ADJL 
(cost to Government of Jersey) and 
scrutinising it during the legislative process 
(cost to States Assembly) 
Benefits 
- The Panel’s work will be better aligned to 
the techniques, skills, and membership of a 
Panel consisting mainly of non-legally 
qualified members  
- Ultimately, users of the complaints process 
(complainants and public bodies) will benefit 
from improved quality of complaint 
resolution 
Alternative 
recommendation 
5.6 
The Panel should not 
accept complaints where 
the aggrieved person 
has or had    
1. a right of appeal to 
JAAT or 
Amendment to 
ADJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting amendment to ADJL 
(cost to Government of Jersey) and 
scrutinising it during the legislative process 
(cost to States Assembly) 
Benefits 
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2. a right of appeal to 
the Royal Court or 
3. it would be 
reasonable for the 
person to challenge 
the legality of the 
administrative 
decision by making 
an application for 
judicial review to the 
Royal Court 
- The Panel’s work will be better aligned to 
the techniques, skills, and membership of a 
Panel consisting mainly of non-legally 
qualified members  
- Ultimately, users of the complaints process 
(complainants and public bodies) will benefit 
from improved quality of complaint 
resolution 
Alternative 
recommendation 
5.7 
All members of the 
Panel (not only the 
Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman) should have 
power to attempt 
informal resolution of 
complaints 
Amendment to 
ADJL 
Costs 
- One-off cost of drafting amendment to ADJL 
(cost to Government of Jersey) and 
scrutinising it during the legislative process 
(cost to States Assembly) 
- Ongoing cost of training on informal 
resolution for all Panel members (cost to 
States Assembly) 
Benefits 
- The Panel’s capacity to offer informal 
resolution of complaints will be increased 
- The reform will improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Panel (e.g. preventing 
the Chairman or Deputy Chairman from 
presiding at a hearing after he has 
attempted informal resolution, which has 
failed, because this would create a conflict) 
Risks 
- Too few people may continue to use the 
Panel to justify a full training programme for 
all Panel members on informal resolution 
Alternative 
recommendation 
5.8 
The Chief Minister 
should prepare a report 
reviewing responses to 
Panel recommendations 
since October 2011 and 
making proposals for the 
Government of Jersey’s 
future working 
relationship with the 
Panel 
Ministerial decision Costs 
- One-off cost of Ministers’, officials’ and Law 
Officers’ time in conducting the review (cost 
to the Government of Jersey) 
Benefits 
- Review and report will provide greater 
transparency about Government of Jersey 
thinking about its past and future 
relationship with the Panel 
- Review and report will contribute to 
evidence-base for policy-making about the 
future of the Panel. 
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ANNEX C 
LIST OF PROPOSALS MADE IN CONSULTATION REPORT NOT 
IN FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Section of 
Consultation 
Report 
Interim proposal Reasons for not pursuing the proposal 
Overarching issues  
Consultation 
Report 
section 1.10 
The Chief Minister (CM) should establish a 
standing committee of experts (“the Jersey 
Administrative Justice Forum”) to advise on the 
development of the administrative redress 
system 
- Concerns expressed during consultation 
about the cost of running the Forum 
- Our vision for the Jersey Public Services 
Ombudsman (JPSO) has developed to 
include a more extensive role across the 
administrative justice system, which will 
provide opportunities for the Government of 
Jersey and other SPBs to benefit from expert 
and external strategic advice 
- An expert committee may risk marginalising 
States Members and the States Assembly in 
monitoring and developing the administrative 
justice system; a better model would be one 
in which the States Assembly (e.g. through a 
committee or scrutiny panel) calls in specialist 
advisers to support their work as required 
Tribunals 
Consultation 
Report 
section 2.2.3 
The term “tribunal” in Jersey legislation should 
be reserved for judicial bodies adjudicating on 
appeals and should not be used for bodies 
exercising advisory or executive functions 
- There is no pressing legal need to amend the 
titles of the three bodies that are misnamed 
(the Health Services Disciplinary Tribunal, the 
Misuse of Drugs Tribunal, and the Marine 
Accident Tribunal) 
- In future, we do not foresee the need to 
create new judicial bodies adjudicating on 
administrative appeals as jurisdiction will be 
conferred on the Jersey Administrative 
Appeal Tribunal (JAAT) 
Consultation 
Report 
section 2.6  
2.9 
2.11 
The Consultation Report made detailed 
recommendations on arrangements to reform 
how JAAT members should be appointed and, if 
needs be, disciplined and removed from office 
- Since publication of the Consultation Report, 
the Chief Minister has published proposals to 
create a Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission (JLSC) with a function of 
appointing members of the judiciary in Jersey 
- The law would be simpler and clearer if 
members of JAAT are appointed by the JLSC 
rather than through the bespoke 
arrangements proposed in our Consultation 
Report 
Consultation 
Report 
section 2.12 
The Consultation Report made 
recommendations relating to remuneration of 
members of JAAT 
- Although some consultation responses raised 
concerns about remuneration arrangements, 
we take the view that this work can be taken 
forward by the Judicial Greffe as an 
administrative action without the need for a 
specific recommendation from the Jersey 
Law Commission 
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Consultation 
Report 
section 2.15 
The administration of JAAT should be based at 
Trinity House (in Bath Street, St Helier), where 
hearings should also be held except for mental 
health appeals which should continue to be 
heard at St Saviour’s Hospital or similar facility. 
New signage should be installed to make it plan 
that Trinity House is the home of JAAT as well 
as the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal 
- This is a matter of practical administration 
and resourcing rather than a law reform 
question 
- We note with approval that since publication 
of our Consultation Report in April 2016 
better signage has been installed at street 
level, making it clearer that Trinity House is 
the home of the Tribunal Service and a 
number of the current administrative appeal 
tribunals. 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
Note: the primary recommendation in the Consultation Report was that the Panel should be replaced by a 
Jersey Public Services Ombudsman. The following interim recommendations were made on the alternative 
basis that the Government of Jersey or the States Assembly did not support the proposal for an ombudsman. 
See Annex B for alternative recommendations that are carried forward to this Topic Report 
Consultation 
Report 
section 4.4 
The States Assembly, in appointing members of 
the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (the 
Panel) should have a legal obligation “to have 
regard to the desirability of Panel members, 
between them, being broadly reflective of 
Jersey society” 
- On reflection, we regard this to be an aspect 
of a much broader issue of diversity in public 
appointments and membership of public 
bodies  
- It will be for the Chief Minister to take steps to 
put in place an “effective island diversity 
strategy … essential in addressing the 
challenges of an increasingly diverse 
community” recommended by the Report of 
the Independent Jersey Care Inquiry 2017. 
Consultation 
Report 
section 4.8 
The Greffier to the States should cease to be 
the point of entry for complaints; the role should 
be assumed by the Judicial Greffe 
- In its response to consultation, the Panel 
stated that there would be no benefit in 
moving the initial point of contact for potential 
complainants, and administrative support for 
the work of the Panel, from the States Greffe 
to the Judicial Greffe.  
- On reflection, we accept that as part of an 
evolutionary approach to developing the work 
of the Panel, there are practical benefits to 
retaining the role of the States Greffe; we are 
mindful that the resources of the Judicial 
Greffe may be stretched if implementing our 
proposals on creation of JAAT 
Consultation 
Report 
section 4.10 
The Panel should cease to hold public hearings 
and focus on using investigatory techniques to 
find facts and develop its recommendations 
- In its response to consultation, the Panel 
accepted that there may be cases were an 
investigatory approach is more appropriate 
than a formal public hearing and pointed out 
that Article 7 of the ADJL provides a broad 
power to “enquire into any complaint”, which 
could include investigation.  
- We are satisfied that under the current Law 
there is sufficient power for the Panel to make 
greater use of investigatory techniques 
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ANNEX D 
RESEARCH STATEMENT 
 
This Annex contains information about: the research questions that underpinned this project; the 
research methods; and the contribution of the study to understanding administrative justice 
systems. 
Principal Investigator and author 
The PI of the research project and author of this report for the Jersey Law Commission is Andrew 
Le Sueur. He is Professor of Constitutional Justice at the University of Essex, UK. 
Research aims  
The project had two principal aims.   
The first aim was descriptive, and sought to answer the research question “In Jersey, what 
procedures and institutions are available to people who need to challenge the correctness of 
administrative decisions?” In answering this question, the project makes an important contribution 
to the growing body of literature that provides a “map” of the administrative justice “landscape” 
across the British Islands. The map previously extended to England,157 Wales,158 Scotland159 and 
Northern Ireland.160 This mapping exercise is a necessary prelude to thinking systematically and 
strategically about how administrative redress systems can be improved.   
The second aim was to evaluate the procedures and institutions in order to generate policy 
recommendations for improving the quality of administrative redress in the Island. This 
aspect of the research study applied and tested the Principal Investigator’s previous research and 
published outputs in this area, including: A Le Sueur, “Foundations of Justice”, chap 9 in J Jowell, D 
Oliver, and C O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (Oxford, OUP, 2015); H Woolf, J Jowell, 
A Le Sueur, et al, De Smith’s Judicial Review (7th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013); A Le 
Sueur, “Parliamentary Accountability and the Judicial System”, chap 9 in N Bamforth and P Leyland 
(eds), Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution (Oxford, OUP, 2013); and V Bondy and A Le 
Sueur, Designing redress: a study about grievances against public bodies (London, The Public Law 
Project, 2012). 
Research methods 
A mixed methods research design was used.  
1. Analysis of Jersey legislation was carried to identify where rights of appeal in administrative 
decision-making had been created. This was done through the Jersey Legal Information 
Board database of Laws (www.jerseylaw.je). We are grateful to Lori-Ann Foley for research 
                                                
157 See for example Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, The Developing Administrative Justice 
Landscape (2009). 
158 See for example S Nason, Understanding Administrative Justice in Wales (2015). 
159 See for example Scottish Tribunals and Administrative Justice Advisory Committee (STAJAC), Mapping 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals in Scotland (2015). 
160 See for example M Anderson, A McIlroy and M McAleer, Mapping the Administrative Justice Landscape in 
Northern Ireland (2014). 
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assistance in relation to this part of the project. The analysis is based on a snapshot of Laws 
in force in the first half of 2015; some amendments have been made since then which are 
not reflected in the analysis. 
2. A series of semi-structured research interviews were carried out, starting in 2015. 
Interviewees were identified using a snowball approach: we started with a small core of 
people we wanted to interview and asked each of them to suggest further possible 
interviewees. We conducted 24 individual interviews and three group interviews. The people 
interviewed included: a social security claimant using the social security tribunals; current 
and former Members of the States Assembly with experience of assisting constituents with 
administrative grievances; people working in advice agencies with first-hand experience of 
assisting aggrieved people; past and present tribunal members; past and present members 
of the States of Jersey Complaints Board; officials responsible for running tribunals, the 
Royal Court and the States of Jersey Complaints Board; and officers in States Departments. 
The interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity, in accordance with the ethical 
framework agreed with the University of Essex.   
3. A hearing of an appeal by a social security tribunal in October 2015 was observed. 
4. Desk-based research was conducted to collect information about the operation of all strands 
of the Island’s administrative justice system. In relation to most aspects of the system, there 
was no previously published academic literature available. Our research mainly used online 
material (especially the Government of Jersey and States of Jersey websites); where 
information was not in the public domain we corresponded with relevant organisations.  
5. We had regard to the political science literature on “lesson learning from abroad”. Richard 
Rose describes this approach as follows: “Lesson-drawing is future-oriented, drawing on 
current experience in other countries to improve national policy. It offers an evidence-based 
alternative to developing new programme. It is evidence-based, since a lesson is based on 
programmes that have been operating for a long time elsewhere” (Richard Rose, Ten Steps 
in Learning Lessons from Abroad, ESRC 2001; see also, for example, Edward C Page, 
Future Governance and the Literature on Policy Transfer and Lesson Drawing (ESRC, 
2000). Several of the recommendations made in our report are based on experiences in 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. These were chosen as points of reference 
because of the similarities in the structures of Jersey’s administrative system with those in 
the United Kingdom. In developing our proposals, we have been especially sensitive to 
feelings about change in Jersey that is sceptical or hostile to importing carbon-copies of UK 
arrangements to the Island.   
6. We looked at published research about the administrative justice system in the UK. As there 
was little or no previous empirical research into the operation of administrative justice in 
Jersey, we sought where appropriate practical lessons from research findings and policy-
development work in the UK, mindful of the need for consider the differences in the Jersey 
situation. We record our thanks to the UK Administrative Justice Institute (www.ukaji.org) for 
providing resources and professional links. 
7. As part of the Jersey Law Commission’s process for preparing this report, we published a 
consultation report in April 2016 (Jersey Law Commission, Improving Administrative Redress 
in Jersey: Consultation Report, Consultation Paper No.1/2016/CP). A consultation event was 
held at the Institute of Law, St Helier on 21 June 2016, which was attended by 12 people 
including two States Members, representatives of the Law Society of Jersey, staff from the 
Viscount’s Department, the States Greffe, the Government of Jersey, the Jersey 
Appointments Commission, and two members of the public. During the 3-month consultation 
phase of the project, we received 14 written responses and engaged with 22 individuals and 
organisations. The Chairman and Topic Commissioner attended a meeting of the States of 
Jersey Privileges and Procedures Committee on 16 August 2016 to be questioned about our 
interim proposals on the States of Jersey Complaints Panel). 
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What does a good administrative redress system look like? 
In order to develop reform proposals, we needed to have a strong sense of “what good looks like”. 
Our starting point was work carried by Varda Bondy and Andrew Le Sueur (funded by The Nuffield 
Foundation), which investigated questions relating to institutional design of administrative justice 
systems (see V Bondy and A Le Sueur, Designing Redress: a study about grievances against public 
bodies, The Public Law Project, 2012).161 This study identified nine principles of redress design, 
which have been tested and applied in developing recommendations for Jersey. 
Three principles relate to the constitutional context: they are premised on the idea that redressing 
grievances is a constitutional activity – it conditions the relationship between citizens and the state. 
1. There should be a presumption in favour of all administrative decision-making schemes making 
an express provision in legislation for effective pathways and remedies for addressing 
grievances. Establishing the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT),162 will help in future 
design of rights of appeal. Because Jersey lacks an administrative appeals tribunal with a broad 
jurisdiction, policy-makers and law draftsmen typically have three options: (a) to create a new 
bespoke tribunal, (b) to create a right of appeal to the Royal Court, or (c) make no express 
provision for a right of appeal. There are disadvantages associated with all three. The existence 
of JAAT will enable Laws passed by the States Assembly to use this as the default appeal route 
in the future. 
2. The design of grievance redress mechanisms should (i) include processes for considering 
compatibility with principles and rights protected by the constitution and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and (ii) be compatible with them. During the mapping phase of the 
project, several features were identified as calling for closer analysis of their compatibility with 
constitutional principles and/or the ECHR. In Chapter 3, we recommend a package of reforms to 
the tribunal system, including better arrangements for appointing members and their terms of 
office, arrangements for public hearings and publications of judgments, and the availability of 
publicly funded legal advice and representation to appellants where this is necessary to ensure 
a fair trial takes place. In Chapter 4, we make recommendations about: no longer creating rights 
of appeal to Ministers – we propose that five appeal rights, including the newly created right of 
appeal for prisoners to the Minister for Home Affairs – should instead be heard by an 
independent and impartial tribunal (JAAT).     
3. Grievance-handlers should be held to account for their work. A design of a grievance handling 
system should facilitate accountability by considering the methods of accountability and the 
“audience”. The appropriate mix of accountability mechanisms varies according to the context in 
which the grievance system operates. Our recommendations propose that the Chief Minister 
make an annual report on administrative justice to the States Assembly (see Chapter 2) and that 
the Chairman of JAAT makes an annual report (see Chapter 3). We intend that these reports will 
encourage the States Assembly to adopt a more strategic approach to accountability over the 
administrative justice system. As we note, the States Assembly has in the past preferred to 
focus on individual cause célèbres and there is a risk that insufficient political attention is paid to 
systemic issues. 
Two principles are about the process of design. 
4. Where a new grievance redress system is being created, or an existing one reformed, policy-
making should be informed by evidence and research. The Jersey Law Commission’s whole 
project was designed to bring an evidence-based and research-focus approach to reform. As we 
discuss in Chapter 5, our work at consultation stage was criticised as not based on evidence or 
rigorously researched by members of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (a body we 
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recommend should be abolished) and by States Members on the Privileges and Procedures 
Committee (which has political responsibility for the Complaints Panel). We do not accept the 
criticisms made of our research; but the exchanges did serve to highlight the politically 
contentious character of the proposals and the need to develop better shared understandings of 
what is meant by “evidence” and “research” in policy-making contexts such as this. We have 
been clear about the limits of the research conducted for this project and where, accordingly 
further research is needed, for example: on internal complaint handling related to health and 
social services (Chapter 2); on design options for a Jersey Public Services Ombudsman 
(Chapter 6); and on developing ADR for administrative redress (Chapter 8).  
5. There should be opportunities for grass-roots innovation. The package of recommendations is to 
a large extent “top down” proposals for change. We have, however, identified where possible 
opportunities for innovation by those who will be responsible for running different aspects of the 
system. We envisage that the work by the Chief Minister in developing and implementing 
guidance on complaints handling to all public bodies in the Island will enable the sharing of good 
local practice (Chapter 2). In making recommendations about the procedural rules of JAAT, we 
have not sought to be overly prescriptive, recognising that these should be developed by the 
Chairman of JAAT and the JAAT Rules Committee (Chapter 3).   
Four further principles focus on the substance of the design. 
6. The design of a grievance handling system should ensure that the costs of creating, running and 
using a grievance redress system provide value for money and are proportionate. In developing 
our proposals, we were mindful of the need to provide the Government of Jersey and the States 
Assembly with assistance in understanding the costs and benefits of each recommendation. As 
one of the smallest law reform agencies in the world (in terms of our budget and manpower), we 
are not in a position to be able to provide detailed costings; we have, however, attempted where 
possible to identify the “heads” of costs, costs savings and benefits.    
7. There should be good “fit” between the types of grievance and the redress mechanism. A well-
designed administrative redress system should ensure that grievances are channelled to the 
appropriate redress body. In reviewing and redesigning a redress system, regard should be had 
to achieving a good ‘fit’ between the type of complaints that arise and redress mechanism. For 
example: disagreements about everyday facts, or how the decision-maker exercised discretion, 
may be best resolved by a body including lay people with broad experience of life; disputes 
involving disagreements over professional judgements or technical matters may be best 
resolved by a body that includes experts in the relevant subject-matter; disputes about important 
points of law are best addressed by a judicial body such as the Royal Court. 
8. It should be anticipated that if a redress mechanism is created it will be used (i) by people who 
have complaints that are obviously without substance and (ii) by people who may have a 
legitimate grievance but who are seeking to raise it using the wrong mechanism. Fair, rational 
and effective “filters” should be put in place. In our alternative recommendations for the States of 
Jersey Complaints Panel (if it is retained contrary to our principal recommendation), we propose 
that the Panel should not be open to people who could reasonably be expected to use a tribunal 
appeal, appeal to the Royal Court, or application for judicial review to the Royal Court (Chapter 
5). 
9. As well as resolving individual grievances, redress mechanisms should contribute to 
improvements in public service by providing opportunities for public bodies to learn lessons. We 
envisage that the annual report by the Chief Minister (see Chapter 2) will be one way of 
disseminating lesson learning across all public bodies. 
The Jersey context 
In reviewing and making reform proposals for the administrative redress system in Jersey, we have 
been mindful of the island’s characteristics.  
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One obvious characteristic is the island’s relatively small size. With a population of around 100,000 
there are far fewer administrative decisions than in larger systems and consequently fewer 
grievances. Everything operates on a much smaller scale than in the United Kingdom (the country 
that has been most influential in shaping Jersey’s approach to public administration and 
administrative redress). Many reforms introduced in the UK are in response to systems coming 
under pressure from large volumes of grievances. This should not, however, lead too quickly to the 
conclusion that successful reforms in larger systems are inappropriate for Jersey (though they may 
need adaptations). 
During research interviews for this project, several people highlighted the perception that in a small 
island ‘everybody knows everybody’. This led some interviewees to suggest, for example, that it 
was right that judgments of social security tribunals were unpublished: if potential appellants knew 
that details of their case would be available online, they would be deterred from making an appeal. 
Other interviewees suggested that too much personal information had to be made public during the 
process of taking a case to the Complaints Panel. Another factor that some interviewees referred to 
was the perception that a small pool of people serve as members of tribunals and the Complaints 
Panel. 
In a small community, civil society is relatively underdeveloped. Compared to the United Kingdom, 
there are few active campaign groups or expert organisations interested in access to justice and 
administrative redress. The island appears to have few lawyers in the private sector with expertise 
or interest in administrative law or human rights.  
A further aspect of the Jersey context is the island’s population mix. Seven percent of the population 
were born in Portugal/Madeira and 3 per cent in Poland. In reviewing the operation of the 
administrative redress system, consideration needs to be given to the level of English language 
skills that are needed to deal with letter writing and form filling that is normally required to seek 
administrative redress. Adopting a user perspective, one response could be to make it easy to have 
initial contact with a redress institutions (tribunals, the States of Jersey Complaints Panel, the 
proposed public services ombudsman, the Royal Court) by telephone or in person rather than in 
writing.  
List of consultees 
We have decided to depart from the normal practice of listing the names of people and organisations 
who responded in writing to our consultation in 2016. Several people asked not to be listed; this, taken 
with the ethical framework of the research interviews that required anonymity, makes it inappropriate 
for us to publish an incomplete list.  We extend our thanks to everybody who participated in the project. 
